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Abstract 
The purpose of this research has been to make a contribution to 
knowledge about those processes and phenomena which influence the 
use of computer-based decision systems by senior managers for 
their own decision activities. In the course of the thesis, 
research questions are addressed which relate to the nature of 
the role of the directly-accessed computer in the working life of 
the top manager, and especially to the factors which influence 
computer adoption and use. 
A review of relevant literature enabled gaps in existing 
knowledge about senior managerial computer use to be identified, 
and indicated the potential value of exploratory research. A 
programme of interviews was devised and executed which enabled 
the exploration of the research problem across a sample of senior 
managers from private and public organizations. It is felt that 
the methodology of performing intra- and inter-organizational 
comparisons among computer-exposed managers was fundamental to 
achieving new insights into managerial behaviours. 
Following qualitative and qualitative analysis of the research 
data, a dynamic behavioural model of the computer adoption 
process in large organizations is proposed together with a 
description of salient behavioural features at key points in the 
process. This theoretical model contributes to an understanding 
of the nature and circumstances of the senior managerial 
behaviours associated with direct computer use. 
i 
Acknowledgments 
I am greatly indebted to Terry 
Business School, for his insights, 
all, his never-failing support and 
supervision of the research. 
Webb, at Durham University 
critical evaluation and above 
encouragement throughout his 
My thanks also go to Professor Charles Baker for his 
encouragement and invaluable introductions to otherwise 
recalcitrant respondents in several organizations; Dr Graham 
Winch helped me with the project during the crucial early stages. 
Many people at Durham University read papers, helped, listened or 
commented during the project; special thanks go to my fellow 
doctoral students and departmental colleagues who provided a 
sympathetic and interested environment. 
A number of managers at ICL listened to presentations 
research results at various stages in the project and 
valuable feedback and comments. 
of the 
provided 
Senior managers (who must remain anonymous) in a number of 
organizations gave their valuable time and provided the material 
for this thesis; their help and patience nearly always went far 
beyond the call of duty. Amongst several organizational 
facilitators, Julian Phillips ranked as the most adroit and 
successful of all. 
My wife Ann read several versions of the thesis as it unfolded, 
and patiently listened to a great deal more during this exercise 
in terminal monomania; without her support, backing and 
forbearance it would simply not have happened. 
C.J.Martin 
Durham University 1986 
ii 
A Behavioural Analysis of the Adoption and use of Interactive 
Computer Systems by Senior Managers 
Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Acknowledgments 
List of figures and tables 
Chapter 1 Introduction and overview 
Chapter 2 The theory and technology of computer-
based decision support 
Chapter 3 Characteristics of managerial behaviour 
and decision-making 
Chapter 4 A review of previous work on decision-
system implementation and adoption 
behaviours 
Chapter 5 Introduction to the fieldwork -
methodological issues 
Chapter 6 Senior managers in the private sector: 
case analysis of two large companies 
Chapter 7 Senior managers in the public sector: 
case analysis of three organizations 
Chapter 8 The effect of organizational size: 
analysis of sixteen small firms 
Chapter 9 Quantitative analysis of selected 
hypotheses 
Chapter 10 Results and conclusions 
References 
Bibliography 
Page 
i 
ii 
v 
1 
14 
40 
72 
125 
158 
229 
283 
302 
334 
362 
374 
Continued ... 
iii 
Table of Contents continued,,, 
Appendices 387 
Al. Details of the computer-based literature search 388 
A2. Towards an operational definition of senior 389 
management 
A3. List of organizations surveyed showing type 390 
A4. Interview details and formats 392 
AS. List of variables and definitions 411 
A6. Interview summary accounts (examples) 413 
A7. Characteristics of the small firm respondents 422 
A8. statistical background for small firm analysis 423 
A9. Some practical implications of the results 
A10. Opportunities for further research 
iv 
424 
427 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figures 
2.1 A matrix of computer use relationships 27 
4.1 A theoretical model of managerial computer 113 
adoption variables 
4.2 A dynamic model of the computer adoption 117 
process 
10.1 Final model of the managerial computer 337 
adoption process in large organizations 
A.l Matrix showing firm size against behavioural 423 
Tables 
3.1 
3.2 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.7 
6.1 
6. 2 
category (small firm analysis) 
Characteristics of senior managerial 
behaviour: some similarities and 
differences 
A summary of the principle characteristics of 
senior managerial activity 
Organizations and respondent groups 
Organizations.and intermediary respondents 
Organizational access methods reviewed 
Analysis of interviewed and target 
respondents 
Theoretical respondent categories 
Numbers of respondents in theoretical 
categories 
Summary of interview topics 
Senior managers and computer use categories -
case 1 
Computer information provided for senior 
managers in case l 
v 
66 
67 
132 
133 
137 
139 
141 
144 
146 
161 
168 
6' 3 
6.4 
6.5 
6.6 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
9 .1 
9.2 
9.3 
9.4 
9.5 
9 0 6 
9.7 
9.8 
List of Figures and Tables (continued) ... 
The relationship between systems and 
managerial roles 
Senior managers and computer use categories -
case 2 
Continuing users in case 2 
System preferences in case 2 
Senior managers and computer use categories -
case 3 
Senior managers and computer use categories -
case 4 
Senior managers and computer use categories -
case 5 
Firm Size Distribution in the Small Business 
Sample 
Age of Firm and Number of System Changes 
Categories of application system and 
percentage of firms in the sample who 
used each type 
The relationship of the chief executive to 
the computing resource: a typology of 
behaviour patterns 
Organizational background for the 
miscellaneous group 
Frequencies of all respondents by group and 
usage category 
Respondent frequencies by adoption cycle 
categories 
Career background and adoption decisions 
Career background observed and expected 
values 
Tertiary education and adoption decisions 
Respondent age and adoption decisions 
Formal training and adoption decisions 
vi 
185 
192 
211 
224 
232 
258 
271 
286 
287 
288 
290 
305 
305 
307 
313 
313 
316 
317 
319 
List of Figures and Tables (continued).,, 
9.9 Prior experience and adoption decisions 
9.10 Home computers and adoption decisions 
9.11 Involvement in design or choice of 
facilities 
321 
323 
325 
9.12 Technical involvement and continuing use 326 
9.13 Summary of hypotheses and statistical tests 330 
10.1 Main features of the decision paths in the 341 
adoption cycle 
10.2 Variables in the model of the adoption 350 
A.l 
A. 2 
A. 3 
process 
Computer training in small businesses 
Prior direct (hands-on) computer 
involvement (small businesses) 
Prior managerial experience of 
implementation (small businesses) 
vii 
422 
422 
422 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Abstract 
The topic of senior managerial computing is introduced, and some 
of the opening research questions are described. There follows a 
review of articles which discuss the present position, and some 
contrasting views are described in order to set the scene for the 
ensuing discussion. The chapter concludes by describing the need 
for research and highlighting the principal direction of the 
research effort. Finally, an outline of the contents and 
structure of the thesis is provided. 
1 
Introduction to the topic 
Managerial computing is a fascinating topic; on the one hand it 
involves the use of the most interesting products of current 
technology, and on the other it is concerned with subtle and 
difficult effects involving the manager and his organization. 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the later aspects, and 
endeavours to explore the behavioural aspects of computer use in 
order to enhance understanding of the issues and factors 
involved. 
The research is focussed specifically on top managers. There were 
several reasons for this: to a large extent our industrial top 
managers remain an under-researched group in general, and it 
seems appropriate to examine people to whom, by virtue of their 
organizational position, computing has, in principal, most to 
offer. Another reason for this choice was that it was anticipated 
initially that the top managers would have complete discretion in 
relation to their computer use; this would enable the research 
effort to concentrate on "important" issues relating to managers' 
free choices of suitable systems. The field research quickly 
showed that these latter ideas (and some others held at the 
beginning) were quite wrong! Nevertheless, in the course of 
exploring this particular topic a number of very interesting 
issues have been examined and the decision to research top 
management (and the difficulties which this caused) was felt to 
be more than justified by the results. 
The research effort began with a number of questions; these were 
refined (and in some instances discarded!) as the research 
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proceeded, but it is worthwhile stating the principle ideas at 
once: Do top managers use computers, and if so, what do they use 
them for? How do present day decision support systems impact top 
level decision processes? Why should some managers apparently use 
computers a great deal and yet others not at all? What are the 
characteristics of the systems (or the people, or the situation) 
which encourages use or non-use? It is hoped that this thesis 
goes some way towards providing answers to these questions. 
There have been a number of articles in the computer and 
management press, as well as in academic journals, relating to 
senior managerial computer use. It is to these reports to which 
attention is now turned in order to examine the "state of the 
art" as it has been described. 
Reports of senior managerial computing 
In order to ensure an up to date picture of the way that the 
topic is perceived, a computer database search was performed, 
using carefully defined parameters, in order to supplement the 
wide literature review which will be described in forthcoming 
chapters. Details of this database search, which was undertaken 
at the end of 1985, are discussed in Appendix 1. By including 
sources from within the computing industry and from news articles 
and other more immediate reporting media as well as academic 
journals, it is felt that a reasonably up-to-date view has been 
taken. 
One of the main problems with researching application effects in 
the computer field is the excessively rapid rate of change. 
Effectively, one seems to be following a fast moving target and 
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general statements about current practices must be hedged about 
with caveats. This is certainly true of the field of managerial 
decision support, which has been particularly volatile during 
this research project (1983~1986) and in fact the period 1980-
1985 yielded three times as many references in the literature 
search as the period 1974-1979; in addition, there was a 
significant peak in the number of related article references in 
1983 and, to a lesser extent in 1984 (see appendix 1 for 
details). This flurry of interest has all the properties of the 
typical computer industry "boom and bust" cycle (King 1981); this 
is characterised by a cycle of increased awareness followed by 
rapid application, with a subsequent falling off of interest when 
results fail to match expectations. Interestingly, there seems to 
have been a falling off of interest in 1986 - perhaps as newer 
and more "exciting" topics have attracted attention. 
A historic perspective 
The idea of senior managers utilising computers themselves in 
order to enhance their decision-making has attracted considerable 
interest over the years. However, the direction of the comment 
seems to fall into two categories: on the one hand enthusiastic 
reports of use and prognostications of increased use and benefits 
have appeared; but on the other hand more pessimistic comments 
have also been seen. It is illuminating to examine some examples 
from both these camps. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s there was increasing enthusiasm for 
the capabilities of direct computer use by managers - "on-line, 
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real-time systems" (Boulden and Buffa 1970), which were intended 
to support interactive decision making. The seminal case-study 
described by Scott-Morton (1971) seemed to show the value of 
direct computer use in managerial decision making. Scott Morton 
was among the first to demonstrate that the use of interactive 
computer terminals could, in certain situations, influence and 
support the managerial decision process. The decision support 
capability which he discussed is based on the concept of "limited 
rationality", proposed by Simon (1957), and Cyert and March 
(1963); and Scott Morton contends that the human problem solving 
capability is directly enhanced by on-line computer capabilities. 
However, the use of these systems at top management levels has 
been in doubt. According to a study by Brady (1967) computing had 
had little impact at senior managerial levels at that time; 
nevertheless, the author went on to forecast that: 
" by 1975 the computer will have had a substantial impact 
on top executives' decision making ... " (Brady 1967) 
Other authors had doubts as to the role of computing in top 
decision making. According to Hall (1973) the use of computer-
based strategic planning models had failed to have significant 
impact on strategic decision making. 
" there is a serious question as to whether the current 
direction of strategic modelling will ever lead to the 
implementation and utilization of these tools." 
Hall believed that this situation had arisen because of a 
misunderstanding of the top-level decision process leading to the 
creation of inappropriate models based on normative views of the 
strategic decision process. 
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"In fact, it would seem that the much discussed concept of 
top managers using real-time models for strategy formulation will 
never come to pass ... " (Hall 1973) 
These pessimistic views are generally supported by surveys of 
strategy~oriented model-based DSS (Grinyer and Wooller 1975) 
which show that systems are generally built and used by staff 
specialists or consultants (external or internal), rather than by 
senior managers with significant decision responsibilities, and 
that these systems infrequently impact strategic or policy 
related decision outcomes (Fromm et al 1974). In a recent survey 
of financial DSS packages, Grinyer (1983) states: 
" management and directors... seem to be as remote from 
direct use of models as ever ... " 
The reasons for the lack of impact of model-based DSS are 
discussed in more detail by Martin and Winch (1984), but in 
general it was considered that the model-based systems are 
inappropriate in relation to the senior manager's organizational 
role in the strategic decision process. 
Despite these apparent failures at top level, enthusiasm for DSS 
remained unabated, as expressed by Keen (1976): 
" the aim remains and rests on faith - surely the 
computer can be made useful for top managers." 
It has been during the 1980s that significant reports of direct 
senior managerial use have emerged. Isolated examples of firms 
who have introduced computers to the top managers have been 
reported; examples include L.Davis (1983) reporting on general 
managers' computer use in British Petroleum and D.Davis (1984) 
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relating his own experience as president of Tate and Lyle plc. 
According to L.Davies (1983) this development represented a 
significant change in senior management activity: 
" the most fundamental shake-up of management methods ... ~ 
the computerisation of the executive suite. 11 
But this seems to be only the tip of a newly emerged iceberg. 
Other enthusiastic comments have been reported recently in the 
management press and elsewhere: 
11 The top management office is where basic decisions are made 
that determine the viability of the organization ... the function 
of the [computer] workstation is to make the information almost 
instantly accessible... An IDC survey... indicated an 
unexpectedly high incidence of companies anticipating widespread 
use of workstations among senior executives. 11 (Data Management 
Supplement to Management Today - Sept 1984) 
11 A recent survey reveals that senior executives in the UK, 
with access to personal computers and terminals are most likely 
to use them for financial analysis purposes ... " (Financial Times 
30th Sept 1985). 
According to Rockart and Treacy (1982), writing under the title : 
"The CEO Goes On-Line", many top managers have now begun to use 
computers themselves in order to carry out analyses for their own 
decisions. These authors cite several examples of computer use 
by chief executives and state that: 
"Although these examples do not yet represent common 
practice for senior corporate officers, they do suggest a trend 
towards greatly increased computer use in top-executive suites." 
The use to which the systems are put by the top managers in this 
study are described as follows: 
" the top executives who personally use computers do so 
as part of the planning and control processes in their 
organizations .... [they] have decided that they need a better 
understanding of the workings of their corporations. To achieve 
this, they have sought out the individually tailored access to 
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the broader, more detailed sweep of data that only computers can 
provide," (Rockart and Treacy 1982) 
Three reasons for the trend towards increasing top-level use are 
offered: 
an acceptable price; executives are better informed of the 
availability and capabilities of these new technologies; and 
predictably, today's volatile competitive conditions heighten the 
desire among top executives for ever more timely information and 
analysis." (Rockart and Treacy 1982) 
In fact, the field research described later in this thesis shows 
a very different picture of the requirements of senior managers. 
Nevertheless, the content of these later reports seems to 
indicate a strong movement towards top-level computing; the 
validity of these ideas will be explored later. 
Discussion 
There appears to be insufficient evidence in these reports to 
support clear views about the processes which would distinguish 
between those executives who do use computers and the vast 
majority who apparently do not. What are the characteristics of 
the situation or the people that lead to the uses described here, 
which would seem, on the face of it, to be reasonable for many 
executives? 
In the light of the conflicting accounts of senior managerial 
computing, it remains an open question as to exactly what the 
extent and nature of direct use really is; further, there appears 
to be a clear academic requirement to explore the processes 
which appear to lead to adoption of the technology by the few and 
the rejection of that very same technology by the many. It is 
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these questions that have particularly fired the present research 
effort, and it is to these that the results and conclusions of 
the thesis will be addressed. 
Conclusion 
The preceding topic review has outlined the scope and need for 
research and has indicated the nature of the questions of 
interest. To sum up, then, the aim of the research is to explore 
the processes and phenomena which influence the use of computer-
based decision aids by senior managers in their own decision 
making behaviour, and particularly where such behaviour is 
related to organizational strategy or long-term policy. 
An outline of the thesis 
The thesis continues in chapter 2 with an examination of the 
ideas and technology behind the decision support movement, in 
order to see to what end these technological developments are 
intended. Particular attention is paid to the intentions and 
ideals of the movement, as well as to the content of 
technological systems, and to the theories which underpin the 
technology. In order to clarify the meaning of the ill-defined 
and over-worked word ''user", a new typology of computer use 
relationships is proposed. 
In order to understand something of the nature of managerial 
decision behaviour, a review of some of the extensive literature 
on this area has been undertaken in chapter 3. The work here has 
not been centred on the normative decision paradigms usually 
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associated with decision support, but rather on the descriptive 
elements of organizational behaviour based on diary and 
observational studies. Particular attention is paid to role 
theory, which forms an important background for evaluating the 
field research results. 
Although the literature relating to specific studies of senior 
managerial computer use is sparse, there is a large body of work 
concerned with the general problem of decision system 
implementation and it seemed natural to review this work in order 
to establish a theoretical basis for the study. This is 
undertaken in chapter 4. In order to make some sense of the broad 
and varied coverage which the literature provides, a synthesis 
of the literature is attempted which derives seven groups of 
factors which may be considered to influence computer use. This 
synthesis has been taken as the essential theoretical guide and 
context for the research, and comprises a static model of the 
factors presumed to affect decision system implementation 
generally. 
Chapter 5 introduces the field research work. In choosing among 
several alternative research strategies, a programme of direct 
interviews with senior managers (supplemented with other 
materials) was felt to represent the most appropriate alternative 
in view of the generally exploratory nature of the research 
effort. This chapter discusses access problems and solutions, and 
describes how the sampling and data gathering methodologies 
support the emerging theoretical standpoint. 
Chapters 6 - 9 are concerned with describing and evaluating the 
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results from the field work. Chapters 6 and 7 review and analyse 
the findings from research in five large organizations; emerging 
theoretical categories are discussed in detail with reference to 
data from individual respondents. Chapter 8 examines the special 
circumstances of the owner/manager or chief executive 
small business, and a new typology of behaviours is proposed. 
Chapter 9 is concerned with the statistical analysis of data in 
order to test pre-defined hypotheses. 
Chapter 10 reviews the key results from the field research and 
discusses the development of a new theoretical model which 
describes the behavioural processes of senior managerial computer 
adoption. An appraisal of the model is undertaken in terms of its 
usefulness for researchers and practitioners. Finally, the thesis 
as a whole is briefly reviewed. Some of the implications of the 
findings for managers and practitioners are discussed separately 
in appendix 9, and some opportunities for further research are 
described in appendix 10. 
11 
References 
Boulden JB, Buffa ES, Corporate Models: On-Line, Real-Time 
Systems, Harvard Business Review, July-Aug, 1970 
Brady RH, Computers in Top-Level Decision Making, Harvard 
Business Revie~J, July/lmgust, 1967 
Cyert RM, March JC, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, USA 1963 
Davis D, SMR Forum: Computers and Top Management, Sloan 
Management Review, Spring, 1984 
Davis L, Learning to Walk With a New Computer System : Computers 
in the Executive Suite, International Management, July, 1983 
Financial Times, Different Systems Begin to Emerge, piii 30/9/85 
Fromm Get al, Federally Supported Mathematical Models: Survey 
and Analysis, Report for the National Science Foundation USA 1974 
Grinyer PH, Financial Modelling for Planning in the UK, Long 
Range Planning, Vol 16 5, 1983 
Grinyer PH, wooller J, Computer Models for Corporate Planning , 
Long Range Planning, Feb, 1975 
Hall WK, Strategic Planning, Product Innovation, and the Theory 
of the Firm, Jnl. of Business Policy, Vol 3 3, 1973 
Keen PGW, Interactive Computer Systems for Managers: A Modest 
Proposal, Sloan Management Review, Vol 18 l, 1976 
Kilmann RH, The Cost of Organization Structure: Dispelling the 
Myths of Independent Divisions and Organization-Wide Decision 
Making, Accounting, Organization and Society Vol 8 4, 1983 
King WR, Strategic Planning Decision Support Systems: Planning, 
Development and Evaluation, Working Paper WP-440 Grad. School of 
Bus, Univ. of Pittsburgh, Penns. 1981 
Management Today, Data Management Supplement, The Birth of a New 
Machine, p.iv. Sept. 1984 
Simon HA, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision Making 
Processes in Administrative Organizations, MacMillan 1957 
Martin CJ, Winch GW, Senior Managers and Computers, Management 
Decision, Vol 22 2, 1984 
Rockart JF, Treacy ME, The CEO Goes On-Line, Harvard Business 
Review, Jan/Feb, 1982 
12 
Scott Morton MS, Management Decision Systems, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard Univ" Boston USA, 1971 
13 
Chapter 2 
The Technology of Computer-Based Decision Support: A Review 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the literature on computer-based decision 
support systems (DSS), and discusses the development, 
definitions, aims and intentions which are associated with the 
technology. The theoretical underpinnings of the DSS are found to 
be based not on the behavioural characteristics of organizational 
decision making, but are closer to normative paradigms which owe 
much to the management science tradition. In order to clarify 
discussions on computer applications, a new typology of computer 
users is proposed; this typology recognises two separate 
dimensions of system and purpose connectivity. Finally, the 
intended benefits of decision support are examined in relation to 
the senior manager's strategic decision role. 
14 
Introduction 
Over the last thirty five years, the development of 
organizational computing has followed a path. which seems to have 
steadily involved both. more people, and, latterly, more senior 
people. According to Scott Morton and Rockart (1983) there are 
three distinct eras which characterise this movement. During the 
first era - roughly the 1950s and 1960s - the emphasis was on 
data processing, ie the economic processing of large volumes of 
data transactions typically in payroll and accounting 
applications. The second era - 1960s to the early 1970s saw the 
extension of these systems to manufacturing, stock control and 
on-line order-entry applications, systems which incorporate both 
the technical advance of interactive processing and also the 
systemic advance of addressing management control rather than 
just data processing. These latter systems have enabled 
efficiencies among first-line supervision and junior and middle 
management. 
The third era, starting in the early 1970s, has been concerned 
not so much with the automation of simple clerical functions but 
with the provision of information for management - management 
information systems (MIS) and, latterly, decision support systems 
(DSS). An important technological feature of the last ten years 
has been the sharp reduction in costs (combined with a 
significant increase in effective power) of desk-top 
microcomputers, resulting in the general opportunity for managers 
to use a personal computer. It is against this background of 
rapid, technology-driven, computer development and the resulting 
changes in organizational uses of computers, that the DSS 
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movement has developed. The purpose of the following paragraphs 
is to review the nature and scope of DSS and to discuss 
especially the aims and objectives to which these systems are 
directed. 
The notion of decision support 
An early, perhaps seminal case study of an archetypal DSS has 
been described by Scott Morton (1971). Here the author depicts 
the use of interactive computer display terminals which were 
specifically intended to support management decision making. 
Scott Morton's description of the purpose and scope of this DSS 
furnishes illuminating examples of the thinking behind much DSS 
development, then and now. Primarily, there is the idea that the 
manager's cognitive decision patterns involve problem search and 
solution procedures which are intuitive, judgemental and 
essentially sub-optimal. The manager is therefore to be provided 
with access to a system which furnishes both data and decision 
models, which together will improve his decision making 
capability beyond the level of the individual acting alone. This 
key point is fundamental to the development of contemporary 
decision support systems. 
" the belief that the powerful techniques of management 
science can make a great difference to the performance of 
managers, and thus companies. Yet management science techniques 
have hardly begun to touch the life of a typical manager. The 
opportunities for the application of scientific decision making 
are enormous, and the payoffs most rewarding. Interactive 
terminal systems appear to have the capability of bringing these 
techniques closer to the manager who has the judgement to 
interpret the results." (Scott Morton 1971) 
These beliefs, which in themselves seem entirely reasonable, have 
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acted as a focal point and article of faith for much of the DSS 
movement. An important issue is raised by the notion that the 
manager and computer acting together achieve better results than 
either could alone: 
"We may in fact be reaching the point where the manager in 
combination with the computer is going to be a significantly 
different and more effective manager than one without the 
computer. Of course, the computer is not the essence of 
management planning and control but, at the same time, it is far 
from clear whether or not the manager alone will be able to 
exercise effective control in the years to come." (Scott Morton 
1971) 
The point being made here is not just that computers are 
important to modern organizations (which few people would 
dispute), but that the manager will be acting in close harmony 
with a specifically decision oriented system which has been 
designed to assist or support his own personal decision 
activities, and without which he will inevitably be a less 
effective decision maker. Of course, this latter point makes a 
number of assumptions about the nature of managerial decision - a 
point which will be taken up later, and which will be explored in 
some depth in chapter 3. In general however, the DSS movement 
represents a specific and deliberate attempt to make computers 
helpful to managers in a way that had not been achieved before. 
Generally speaking, these ideas represent the classic statement 
of the DSS philosophy. Although Scott Morton was perhaps the 
first to describe a large scale implementation and case study, 
the ideas themselves have been expressed even earlier (see for 
example Simon 1960 or Carroll 1966). 
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Theoretical background 
In general, the theoretical underpinnings of DSS are not strong; 
this may be due in part at least to the comparative recency of 
the DSS movement, which is characterised by the lack of a 
coherent literature or academic tradition. This point is made by 
Keen (1980), and by Eason (1980): 
" the current literature is bewildering in the variety of 
terminology and in the apparent contradictions to be found in the 
findings." (Eason 1980) 
Another important factor contributing to the slim theoretical 
base is that the DSS concept is intended to apply specifically to 
organizational decision-making, whereas the basis of directly 
applicable knowledge relating to this topic is itself slim. The 
mismatch between descriptive theories of organizational decision 
behaviour on the one hand and prescriptive theories from 
management science and elsewhere on the other, is well known. (A 
fuller discussion of this point occurs in Martin 1982). The 
importance of this circumstance in relation to the development of 
DSS theory and practice has been well stated by Bosman: 
" in various sciences studying the topic of decision 
processes in organizations a hard core for research is missing. 
It is questionable whether DSS, even in the form of a theory, can 
deliver such a hard core ... it is not possible to define a theory 
of DSS without considering the methodological problems of 
defining organizational decision processes. DSS 'theories' should 
not be regarded as a substitute for theories of organizational 
decision processes." (Bosman 1983) 
The most commonly used theoretical background for DSS is one 
which was developed originally by Garry and Scott Morton (1971), 
and expressed as a "framework'' which relates together decisional 
and organizational control paradigms, by Simon and Anthony 
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respectively. The first of these paradigms is the programmed I 
non-programmed decision-making typology devised by Simon (1960), 
which is based on a view of the decision process as a sequence of 
activities involving intelligence, design and choice. The second 
paradigm was developed by Anthony (1965) and defines three levels 
of information use in organizations: operational control, 
management control and strategic planning. 
These two paradigms underlie much of the theoretical work in DSS, 
and are utilised either explicitly or implicitly by nearly all 
writers in the field. One of the reasons why these concepts have 
been found to be so useful is that they provide a convenient 
organizing principle for discussing DSS topics, cataloging 
systems and limiting an otherwise unruly topic area. However, as 
has been pointed out by Bosman (1983) above, they do not in 
themselves constitute an effective substitute for a detailed and 
consistent theory of organizational decision processes - a theory 
which presumably will be only slowly developed over years or 
decades into the future. 
Several alternative views of the specific nature of DSS can be 
found in the literature. These range from a very specific (if 
speculative) list of technical elements, through to a much 
broader view which encompasses any computer system intended to 
aid decision making. One problem here has been the rapid adoption 
of DSS terminology in the computer industry; as with other 
aspects of computing, technical terms rapidly become jargonised 
to the point where they no longer have a sharp meaning (or any 
meaning at all, in some cases). This has been particularly the 
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case with DSS. Initially, the terminology was used for a 
specialised field of management-science oriented large-scale 
computer systems, whereas recently (in 1985) almost any software 
package which is at all business oriented (including spreadsheets 
and wordprocessors) are described as "Decision Support Systems" 
by their creators. Sol (1983) expresses the point neatly when he 
characterises the progression of DSS in the computer industry as 
moving from from "concept to movement to bandwagon". It is 
therefore necessary to make clear distinctions about the nature 
of the systems which are being studied here, and the context in 
which they are examined in this thesis. 
One of the more focussed, technical definitions of DSS is due to 
Bonczek et al (1981): 
"The approach to computerized decision support systems 
adopted here is one of utilizing ideas and techniques from the 
areas of management science, data base management, formal logic, 
and linguistics, all within the global frameworks of 
organizational information processing and decision making." 
Most commentators would probably view such a definition as an 
ideal to be achieved at some point in the future, rather than a 
practical definition of a system which can be found in 
contemporary use. More speculative ideas about the possible 
future direction of DSS can be found in Young (1983) and Zadeh et 
al (1975) and elsewhere. 
An example of a much broader approach would be that adopted by 
Alter (1978), who defines DSS as any systems ''designed to aid 
decision making and decision implementation"; this decision 
orientation is emphasised by Alter to contrast with those systems 
designed for transaction processing. Of course this latter view 
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is a rather catholic one which incorporates many different ranges 
and types of systems. 
A reasonable definition which incorporates several of the key 
intentions of DSS is provided by Sprague (1980): 
"DSS [can be] characterised as interactive computer based 
systems, which help decision makers utilise data and models to 
solve unstructured problems." (Original author's emphasis). 
In more concrete terms, a model-based DSS is usually conceived as 
physically comprising an interactive display terminal, which is 
linked to (or has contained within it) a powerful computing 
resource which includes data storage, retrieval, modelling and 
other facilities. The details of the essential elements vary from 
author to author, but a fairly complete contemporary model-based 
system would contain all or most of the following elements: 
1. Data storage and retrieval 
2. Analytic modes 
3. Modelling facility (usually financial) 
4. Graphic facility 
5. Reporting routines 
These facilities are usually made available by a purpose-designed 
command language, and in a typical commercial package this 
language would comprise a comprehensive and complex syntactical 
system. As an illustration of the scope and complexity of such a 
language, one commercial DSS system generator studied by the 
author (Reveal from ICL) has a reference manual of some 400 pages 
(Tymshare 1983), nearly all of which must be understood before a 
system can be built. Of course, the decision maker himself is not 
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necessarily the one who builds the system, he may only be 
required to understand enough of the elements of the command 
language to be able to access pre-defined routines and sequences. 
This consideration introduces the analyst, or other expert who 
has acquired a knowledge of techniques and technical workings of 
the systems and acts as an intermediary between the 
technicalities of the system and the decision maker. The role of 
the analyst and his effect on system adoption are discussed in 
more depth in chapter 4. 
The technology of decision support 
In order to widen this review of applicable computer systems, it 
is valuable to consider Alter's evaluation of decision oriented 
systems based on a field study of 56 cases (Alter 1975, 1977b). 
He proposes a typology of the DSS systems which includes seven 
categories. These may be further subdivided into two types: data 
oriented and model oriented. The latter model-based category 
relates to systems which clearly fall into the definition 
proposed by Sprague (above), and includes systems based on 
accounting principles and on management science techniques. The 
former data-oriented category includes systems which are 
concerned essentially only with information storage, analysis and 
retrieval. The seven types of DSS are categorised as follows: 
Data oriented systems 
1. File drawer - allows immediate access to data items 
2. Data analysis - allows manipulation of data 
3. Analysis information - provides access to pre-specified 
aggregates of data 
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Model oriented systems 
4. Accounting models - enables "what if" calculations based on 
accounting definitions 
5. Representational models - calculate conseyuences based on non-
accounting models (management science models) 
6. Optimization models - explore optimal solutions (eg linear 
programming) 
7. Suggestion models - routine calculations leading to a 
suggested course of action (eg bank loan 
applicant assessment) 
(Based on Alter 1977b) 
In order to complete this review of the currently available 
decision oriented technology discussed in the literature, it is 
of course necessary to include Expert systems. These systems, 
together with the study of Artificial Intelligence techniques 
generally have been studied academically for many years but have 
recently enjoyed an upturn in general interest. In principle, 
management decision aids based on Expert systems principles could 
well be a very significant development in the future. A review of 
current developments in this field and the implications to 
management has been published as Martin (1985b), and this 
material will not be repeated here. (In practice, no examples of 
Expert systems in use were found in the field research on senior 
managers). 
The approach generally adopted in this research has been to 
examine any instance of senior managerial computer use, where 
such use involves the manager operating the computer himself; but 
the area of special interest is particularly where computer use 
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relates to the intentions and ideals expressed in the DSS 
movement. In practice, many types of system other than those 
outlined above were found in the field studies (messaging, diary, 
external database, textual search and telephony oriented systems 
were clear additions to the DSS categories outlined above) but a 
full discussion of these will be deferred to the appropriate 
section. 
Towards a better definition of computer 11 USe 11 
Curiously, discussions of DSS in the literature are often quite 
vague about who exactly will interface with the technology. In 
fact, a review of journal articles in the MIS and DSS literature 
(and for that matter in the computer literature generally) 
reveals many examples where the word 11 User 11 appears, but it is 
not at all clear whether the term refers to the operator of the 
equipment or to somebody who receives information second or third 
hand. (See for example Corbin 1985). Is a 11 User 11 somebody who 
interacts directly with the system (hands on)? Often, what is 
meant by the term 11 user 11 is somebody who interacts directly with 
the computer but in fact then relays the information produced to 
somebody else. Often the term 11 end-user 11 is applied by computer 
professionals to refer to people other than the computer 
personnel who produce information for others. There is also the 
case of a person who utilises computer information, where the 
information was acquired second or third hand, perhaps by word of 
mouth. In a sense we are all computer users in some way or 
another. 
It is well worth being quite clear about this, because this 
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thesis is particularly concerned with those problems which occur 
when a computer system is intended for interactive use by the 
decision maker himself. A second difficulty concerns the nature 
of the "use". A hands-on interactive user may in fact be 
acquiring information for somebody else; only at some further 
point is the information received by the "information consumer" 
for whom it was intended. 
In order to clarify these ideas, two usage dimensions are 
proposed: 1) degree of system connection and 2) degree of purpose 
connection. 
Degree of system connection 
This dimension reflects the proximity of a user to a particular 
system, ie whether he interacts directly or indirectly. In fact 
it is possible to conceive of several intermediate positions 
along the scale, such that it is virtually continuous. For the 
purposes of this research three discrete positions will be 
considered. 
1 Direct - the user is in a "hands-on" relationship 
system and controls directly himself the input of 
functioning and direction of the system(s) and the 
nature of the output. 
with 
data, 
extent 
the 
the 
and 
2 Indirect - the user has no direct physical control 
system or its functions or input, but receives system 
directly (printout or readout). 
over the 
outputs 
3 Remote - the user has no direct control over the system and 
does not receive direct system outputs. He receives outputs 
indirectly in written, edited or word-of-mouth form. 
25 
Degree of Purpose Connection 
This dimension reflects the nature of the user's relationship to 
the system outputs in respect of his own work role. 
A Own use - the user receives system output which is intended to 
be incorporated in some manner in the execution of the user's own 
work tasks or role. 
B Used for Others' Purposes - the user receives system output 
which he may manipulate in some way, but which is intended 
essentially for some other to incorporate in his work role. 
C Not used - the user makes no direct use of 
(although he may receive it), but acts so as to 
information onward. 
system output 
transmit the 
These dimensions have been combined together to form a matrix of 
computer use relationships (see figure 2.1) Some examples are 
included to indicate the scope of the construct. An example of a 
2A user would be a manager who uses a messaging system by asking 
his secretary to enter memos for him; if he then reviews the 
system himself he is operating as a direct lA user. The matrix is 
intended to be associated with some specific system (rather than 
some specific user). For example, a payroll system might be 
controlled by a computer operator (lC); the main outputs received 
by accountants clerks (2B) and then passed on to payees (2A); 
reports and summaries received by managers and others (2A,2B,2C); 
written and verbal information passed to senior managers (3A). 
Some individuals may fit several categories for the same system; 
eg the computer operator who later gets a payslip. 
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Figure 2.1 Matrix of Computer Use Relationships 
Degree of system connection 
(eg mode of input) 
1 Direct 
(Hands on, interactive) 
2 Indirect 
(Receive printed outputs 
unedited, or view screen) 
3 Remote 
(Receive outputs second-
hand, eg manually edited 
summary or word of mouth) 
Degree of purpose connection 
< A 
outputs 
rT,...'"'~ -1=,-......,.., 
U..;;)CU .J..V.L. 
' 
B 
outputs 
Used for 
Own' job Other's 
Purposes Purposes 
c 
Outputs 
1\T ,..,-~.. T1 C' 0 r1 
.L~V \... Uo..J"-......_ 
1---------------------------------
1 
1 engineer, 
1 author 
1 
1 
1 some 
1 managers 
1 
1 
1 most 
1 managers 
1 
1 
w-p 
operator 
management 
accountant 
financial 
analyst 
key-punch 
operator 
filing 
clerk 
Notes: categories 1-3 and A-C indicate the two usage dimensions 
indicating connection of system and connection of purpose 
respectively. Items in the cells of the matrix represent examples 
of each type. 
In terms of the present research we are interested in usage type 
which occupies the lA cell of the matrix. In other words, the 
research focus is on senior managers who use a computer directly 
to achieve computer outputs which they will incorporate directly 
into their work roles. As well as clarifying terms for the 
present research effort, it is hoped that this typology will 
serve a useful purpose in the field of computer applications 
generally. 
Focussing on the decision maker 
For some commentators, for example Keen (1976), Sprague (1980), 
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Rockart and Treacy (1982) the direct use of DSS for the users' 
own purposes represents the essence of the DSS ideal: 
"Interactive systems facilitate the use of the computer's 
analytic power and data retrieval facilities by managers as part 
of their ongoing decision-making process." (Keen 1976) 
For others, the precise nature of the information transmission 
from system to "consumer" is not important, or is not made 
explicit. Scott Morton (1971), for example, in his description of 
the seminal managerial DSS said that it was not important as to 
whether the manager or his staff used the decision support system 
(although he said that most of the managers in his experiment did 
use it themselves). In fact this particular topic has aroused 
some empirical research interest, for example the work of Culnan 
(1983) who investigated sets of users who accessed a database 
either directly or through an intermediary ("chauffeured" 
access). Culnan found, not surprisingly perhaps, that direct 
access was more appropriate where the interaction was a regular 
one, and that chauffeured access was most appropriate where the 
access was irregular or one-off; but the relationships of these 
access modes to other variables such as the education, 
professional background and so on of the subject were not so 
clear cut. 
The topic of the intended benefits of DSS in decision making is 
another area which is not always made entirely explicit. In fact 
the benefits have often been linked, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to specific cognitive deficiencies of the human 
manager. For example, Zmud (1979) provides a summary of well-
documented evidence which shows that that managers display 
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significant differences in their decision-making styles and 
abilities. In particular, they do not understand their 
information requirements and ask for more or less than is 
economically justified, they delay too long before making 
decisions and are reluctant to change decisions once 
__ _:;_ 
lllOUt::, they 
violate rules of rational decision making and are unable to take 
account of new evidence which affects a decision situation. 
Documented case studies of organizational decision failures can 
be found in Janis and Mann (1977) and elsewhere. (In fact this 
area has become an academic field of study in its own right, see 
for example the Open University undergraduate course: Human 
Performance and Systems Failures T341 1977) 
Other aspects of man's culpability in decision making include his 
failure to make full use of information provided, his tendency to 
consider only a few alternatives, and his inability to make use 
of good strategies even when they are developed. A particular 
problem identified by Zmud is the manager's reluctance to use 
probabilistic data, such that " provision of probabilistic 
aids would appear to be a necessity in most cases." (Zmud 1979). 
These views of man as a limited decision maker are not confined 
to exponents of management science. There is also a tradition in 
the management literature which owes much to the work of 
behaviouralists who have studied organizational decision 
processes. Amongst these there is the work of Simon who 
introduced the concepts of "bounded rationality" and 
"satisficing" to characterise the idea that organizations accept 
solutions which are sufficient at the time but not necessarily 
optimal (Simon 1957, 1960). Lindblom (1959) described 
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incremental decision processes in bureaucratic organizations and 
justified their effectiveness in terms of "successive limited 
comparisons". Cyert and March (1963) discussed organizational 
decision making in terms of uncertainty avoidance and the 
tendency for dominant coalitions to negotiate mutually beneficial 
outcomes. This latter view of the decision process as essentially 
the workings of a political arena has been extensively explored 
by Pettigrew (1973, 1985) and others. 
However, the arguments which relate organizational decisional 
behaviour to an inability on the part of organization or 
individual to optimize or make "full" use of computer-based 
techniques and aids are essentially the arguments of management 
scientists and computer scientists advocating the use of 
management science techniques. The alternative viewpoint, which 
shows the inadequacies of management science-based information 
systems for human decision, has been ably expressed by Ackoff 
(1967) and Mintzberg (197Sa) and others and will be discussed in 
more detail in chapters 3 and 4. Nevertheless, a discussion of 
the human manager's indisputable inadequacies in the field of 
optimal decision performance does seem to provide a powerful 
prima facie rationale for employing decision support at all 
levels, and especially perhaps at top levels where decisions are 
more far-reaching. 
Aims and objects of decision support 
In more general terms, the benefits which might be expected to be 
achieved by the introduction of DSS in an organization have been 
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variously stated. A representative sample of 
benefits which have been identified would include: 
the potential 
the support 
and improvement of individual managerial judgement (Hackathorn 
and Keen 1979), supporting unstructured decisions (Methlie 1983), 
providing an impartial information resource (Alter l977a), 
meeting the needs specifically of top management (Kroeber, watson 
and Sprague 1980), helping to solve unstructured problems at 
upper management levels (Sprague 1980), resolution of conceptual 
difficulties with management science models (Methlie 1983), 
reduced cost of data gathering and added value from improved 
decisions (Carlson 1978), specific contribution to strategic 
decision making (King 1981, and Scott Morton and Rockart 1983) 
and improved performance for senior managers (Rockart and Treacy 
1980 and 1982). 
The benefits of DSS have been discussed less frequently in more 
specific terms, but for example Keen (1981) analyses eight case 
studies and identifies twelve distinct benefits in the decision 
process which may accrue: 
1 Increase in the number of alternatives examined 
2 Increased understanding of the business 
3 Fast response to unexpected situations 
4 Ability to carry out "as required" analysis 
5 New insights and learning 
6 Improved communication 
7 Improved management control 
8 Cost savings 
9 Improved decision analysis 
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10 Better teamwork and reduced conflict 
11 Time savings 
12 More effective use of data resources 
(From Keen 1981) 
In contrast to this, Alter (1977b) in his analysis of 56 cases 
identifies a much more cautious range of benefits which includes 
improvements in convenience and efficiency for decision makers 
under certain circumstances, and a distinct impact on group 
planning processes where the systems are oriented to this end. 
The DSS literature often has a distinctly evangelical flavour to 
it, resulting in the identification of organizational potential 
beyond the realms of general practicality in the present. It may 
be that the enthusiasm shown by the DSS movement is an essential 
part of the process of creating opportunities for change and 
progress in organizational computing. Nevertheless, the tendency 
to "oversell" the potential may result in a later backlash 
whereby real opportunities are missed. This point has been made 
by some commentators, including for example King (1981), who 
describes a "boom and bust cycle" in computer innovations due at 
least in part to initial overselling in order to overcome 
resistance to new ideas; nevertheless there remains a significant 
problem for the student of managerial computing who has to 
identify realistic and significant trends amongst a barrage of 
conflicting claims and evaluations. 
Attempts to evaluate DSS applications in terms of purely economic 
benefit have not always been successful, and most commentators 
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accede (if only reluctantly) to the idea that largely qualitative 
arguments must be employed to justify their development (Keen and 
Hackathorn 1979). Examples of approaches to non-economic but 
rigorous evaluation methodology has been describ~d by Akoka 
(1981) and King and Rodriguez (1978). 
First-hand experience with decision support 
In addition to examining the DSS case studies in the literature, 
reference has been made by the author to commercial and semi-
commercial software products available which are aimed at the DSS 
market. The author has obtained access to some of these, and has 
made a detailed study of two of them: Reveal, a management 
science oriented package from ICL (UK) Ltd, and Wizard, a 
financial modelling oriented package distributed by Comshare Ltd. 
A review of likely users of commercial model-oriented DSS 
software has appeared as Martin (1984d). 
The author also gained access to an Expert systems shell package, 
SAGE (Systems Programming Ltd 1982a and 1982b), distributed by 
ICL, and has experimented with this and various expert systems 
programs. In addition, a personal computer (pc) was acquired and 
experience gained with the more popular forms of commercial pc 
business software. Wordprocessing, spreadsheet and database 
packages were all used in order to gain some first hand 
experience of learning effort and interface problems. In general 
the pc has been used to draft and type this thesis, to maintain 
research records and to develop an extensive bibliography and for 
other research-related purposes. A detailed and critical account. 
of the use of the personal computer in doctoral research 
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administration has been published as Martin (1984b). 
An important outcome of these practical undertakings has been to 
gain a first-hand impression of the scope of contemporary 
commercial DSS systems and software, and also of the practical 
implications of own-use computing for the individual. Certainly, 
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to discuss 
adequately various aspects of computer systems with senior 
managerial respondents and technical personnel without a sound 
appreciation both of the theoretical and practical ramifications 
of the technological aspects of these systems. 
Discussion 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to identify the aims of 
decision support, to examine the possibilities which are open and 
to explore the potentialities which DSS theory has to offer. Two 
themes have emerged from the discussions so far which are worthy 
of re-emphasis. Firstly that the DSS movement is oriented, at 
least in part, towards creating systems which are to provide 
benefits to senior managers (a group which hitherto has not 
benefited significantly from computer developments), and secondly 
that systems are expected to have significant impact when 
oriented towards strategic decision processes. These are not of 
course the only directions for DSS, far from it, but they do 
represent some of the stated intentions of the movement, as 
expressed by some of its prominent exponents. 
These points form an essential background to the present 
research; they comprise the "ideal" towards which the 
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aspirations, if not the technology, of 
computing systems may be said to aspire. 
practice are these ideals met, and what are 
To 
senior managerial 
what extent in 
the circumstances 
surrounding senior managerial DSS use? Although there are several 
case studies of DSS development in the literature (see Scott 
Morton 1971, and reviews of cases in Keen and Scott Morton 1978, 
Alter 1975, 1977a and Keen 1980) these studies do not, by and 
large address the issue of systems benefit to the senior manager 
as an individual or, more specifically, from the senior manager's 
own point of view. 
It is this latter viewpoint, ie that of the senior manager 
himself, which is taken as the main stance for the field research 
in this thesis. The approach adopted has been therefore not to 
limit the study of applications to any particular definition of 
DSS, but to examine any instance of senior managerial computer 
use, where such use involves the manager operating the computer 
himself. However, the area of special interest is particularly 
where computer use relates to the intentions and ideals expressed 
in the DSS movement. 
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Chapter 3 
Characteristics of Senior Managerial Behaviour 
and Decision Making 
Abstract 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore key aspects of the 
senior manager's world; the intention is to focus the thesis on 
behavioural aspects of senior managerial decisions and to 
establish a conceptual background from which to address the 
field-work. In particular, aspects of managerial work, 
information processing and decision behaviour are discussed in 
depth. Following the review of the literature on senior 
managerial behaviour and decision making, conclusions are drawn 
in the form of a summary of senior managerial characteristics. 
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Introduction 
It has long been supposed that the managers at the top of an 
organization exert a particularly powerful influence by virtue of 
their position, power base, and the personal attributes which 
have brought them to the top. A not unreasonable assumption might 
be that the senior manager is responsible for the most 
significant and difficult decision outcomes, and that he at the 
very least acts as final arbiter on the most important issues 
facing his organization. This in itself is a powerful argument 
for examining the use of computer-based decision aids at the top 
level; according to this logic, who else in an organization could 
benefit more from the best tools that management science and 
computer applications technology have to offer? 
A review of the literature 
The view that the top executive himself is a vitally important 
ingredient in the process which affects organizational outcomes 
is not without its critics. For instance Hall (1973) argues that 
organizational outcomes are determined more by the pressure of 
events; and an empirical study by Lieberson and O'Connor (1971) 
showed some evidence that extrinsic situational factors were more 
important than change of leadership in determining organizational 
outcomes. 
It would be wrong of course, to assume simply that high office is 
synonymous with control; in practice the power of any top manager 
is significantly affected by all manner of constraints acting 
from within and without his organization. However, most 
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commentators would probably agree that people at the top of the 
organization have a special and significant part to play in its 
affairs. This idea of the importance of the senior manager in 
organizational activities has been effectively stated by Hambrick 
and Mason (1984): 
"Organizational oufcomes - both strategies and effectiveness 
- are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of 
powerful actors in the organization." 
These authors reaffirm the key role of the senior manager and 
argue for reawakened research interest in the area in order to 
enhance theories which seek to predict organizational outcomes. 
The view taken in this thesis is that senior managers are indeed 
a vitally important link in processes which affect organizational 
strategies, behaviours and outcomes. But it is considered that 
the details of these processes are at present obscure at least to 
some degree, and are not necessarily directly and simply related 
to specific aspects of the man or his organization as decision-
making organisms. In other words the decision making processes 
and other critical activities of the senior manager may not be 
simply grounded in decision behaviours of the kind captured in 
the concepts of "economic man" or even "administrative man" 
(Simon 1945). Rather, the mechanisms and processes which lead to 
decision outcomes are considered to be wrapped up in other 
behaviours and in other aspects of the overall managerial milieu. 
This being the case, it is necessary to examine basic aspects of 
the senior manager's world in order to establish a framework for 
investigating aspects of his decision behaviours. In particular, 
what exactly does a senior manager do? What are the crucial 
42 
elements of his role that distinguish him from his 
management brethren? In order to to examine aspects 
middle-
of his 
computer adoption behaviours and information use, it is necessary 
to have some understanding of his general activities and the 
purpose of these activities in the context of his work roles. 
Ideally, one would like at this point to review comparative 
analyses of senior managerial behaviour and to discuss these in 
terms of a body of established research. Unfortunately, there 
have 
work, 
been few major studies of specifically senior 
although of these the work of Mintzberg (1970, 
been very influential. 
managerial 
1973) has 
It will be useful, therefore, to establish characteristics of 
managerial behaviour in general first, and then to draw 
attention to those aspects which are considered to be special to 
the senior manager. There is, of course, a huge literature on 
leadership and management; in order to select the most relevant 
aspects from a potential superabundance of material, only those 
elements of behaviour which are thought to be key in the context 
of computer use, decision making and strategic decision will be 
examined. 
In the search for better understanding of aspects of the senior 
manager's job and working behaviours, studies of managerial 
behaviour based on direct observational and diary methods have 
been very significant. Although neither of these methods are by 
any means foolproof, there is a substantial measure of agreement 
across several studies about aspects of managerial behaviour. In 
particular, such studies have provided insights into the 
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characteristics and specific activities which make up managerial 
work and form the basic empirical elements from which may be 
deduced crucial aspects of decision behaviour. 
Seminal works in this area include the writings of Carlson 
(1951), Stewart (1967) and Mintzberg (1970, 1971, 1973, 1975). A 
review of these and other authors in the extensive empirical 
literature in this area has been undertaken by McCall et al 
(1978) and a summary of consistent and replicated findings can be 
found in their work. More recent studies include those of Kotter 
(1982a, 1982b), Bennis (1983) and Shrivastava and Grant (1982) 
whose findings generally supplement (and do not contradict) the 
arguments and findings of the earlier commentators. 
It is possible to pinpoint several distinct themes among the 
attributes of managerial work, which together characterise 
something of the essential nature of management. These findings 
can be summarised and further supplemented by the work on the 
meaning of managerial activities and on managerial roles by 
Kotter (1982a,b), Mintzberg (1973) and Pettigrew (1973). 
It has been found appropriate to consider this material under 
five generic headings, although clearly these aspects are all 
closely related and intertwined, so that any breakdown must 
inevitably seem a little artificial: 
Managerial activity levels and characteristics 
Managerial communications and information processing 
Characteristics of managerial thinking 
The meaning of managerial behaviour 
Elements of managerial decision 
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Managerial activity levels and characteristics 
Several studies may be cited (Stewart 1967, Mintzberg 1973, 
McCall et al 1978, Kotter 1982a) which draw attention to the 
excessively long hours which managers work. variations are found 
depending on rank and functional responsibility, where the hours 
worked increase substantially with higher levels of 
organizational rank and decrease where the function is well-
defined (as in accounting for example). Higher executives carry 
out work outside the office in several forms, for example as desk 
work taken home or in contacts at social or business meetings. 
Mintzberg (1973) draws attention to the "unrelenting pace" of 
managerial work, and argues that managers are perpetually and 
inescapably preoccupied with managing their organizations. In 
fact he goes on to speculate that managers become conditioned by 
their heavy workloads, by the appreciation of the supreme worth 
of their own time, into adopting a continually superficial (but 
perhaps most efficient) approach to their work. These findings 
are of course a more accurate reflection of the stereotyped view 
of the busy manager to whom every minute is precious. 
Nevertheless, the truism appears to hold good, and it would be 
expected that any computer-based aid which saved the manager's 
time would be heartily welcomed, and conversely one which showed 
a perceived time cost would hardly be viewed with favour. 
Survey materials show that managers cope with large numbers of 
activities; these may amount to several hundred separate 
incidents or episodes in a single working day. A significant 
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element of these activities is represented by "fleeting contacts" 
{Stewart 1967) with others. The activity rate drops significantly 
at the higher organizational levels: 
Position 
Foreman 
Superintendent 
Area superintendent 
General manager 
A~v·erage no o of 
activities per day 
413 
309 
274 
91 
Thomason {1967, 1967) 
Chief executive 19-32 
Mintzberg (1970) 
A principal characteristic of managerial work, remarked on by 
many commentators, is the brief and fragmented nature of the work 
content. Most researchers comment on the rapidity with which 
managers at all levels switch from one activity to another (or 
are interrupted by others) to produce a discontinuous flow of 
apparently unconnected events. At higher management levels, 
decision stages are longer (Martin 1965, and Jaques 1976) and 
thus more susceptible to interruption. In this way decision 
sequences, especially at high levels, are dislocated and 
interspersed with information gathering and with other 
disconnected activities and other decision sequences. The 
disjointed nature of managerial work may not necessarily be 
dysfunctional; according to Kotter {1982b) this represents the 
most efficient way of performing essential tasks by virtue of 
opportunistic use of interpersonal contacts. 
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Associated with the temporal characteristics of decision is the 
wide range of different topic contents which are addressed by 
managers at all levels. The concrete or physical nature of the 
activities can be described in terms of five separate types 
(Mintzberg 1973): 
deskwork handling mail, reading reports and other 
documents and drafting documents 
phone calls although typically occupying only a small 
proportion of the manager's time, this medium represents a 
significant number of his personal contacts (Mintzberg 1970) 
scheduled meetings - these occupy much of the senior 
manager's time, perhaps as much as 60% for chief executives 
(McCall et al 1978), but less for lower ranking managers 
unscheduled/informal meetings - these represent a 
~ignificant proportion of middle to lower management level jobs 
(Stewart 1967) 
inspection tours/visits - these occupied a small 
of middle and senior managers' time (Stewart 1967 and 
1970) 
proportion 
Mintz berg 
The pattern of the people with whom the manager was in contact 
was also a significant indicator of managerial rank. All ranks 
interacted with a wide variety of different people, but the 
origin of these contacts was polarised. At lower levels these 
include mainly subordinates, peers and superiors within the 
organization. At the higher levels, contacts were largely with 
people from outside the organization; these contacts included 
government officials, press, members of the public, bankers, 
shareholders, competitors, suppliers, clients and customers 
(Kotter 1982b). 
The content of the activities, episodes and events which have 
been discussed is of course a major topic of interest. However, 
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there is an understandable difficulty in defining the subject 
matter of managerial work, both in the context of an operational 
field research definition as noted by stewart (1967) and also as 
regards the theoretical focus which is being adopted. Is it of 
substantive interest, for example, to discuss the simple 
functional idea of content, ie sales managers dealing with sales 
matters, production managers with production and so on? It would 
appear to be more useful to identify subject content as it 
relates to key objectives in respect of the manager's role set 
for example, or within a theoretical structure of increasing 
strategic importance; but such analyses are rarely made. 
Nevertheless, within the framework of functional content, it can 
be shown (McCall et al 1978) that lower level managers deal with 
a variety of matters, but within their functional area (ie 
production managers handle many aspects of the production 
function). However, in the case of senior managers the content 
variety spreads across many functional areas (ie a chief 
executive will tackle aspects of personnel, marketing, accounts 
and so on). Mintzberg noted that the difference between the 
subject matter of junior and senior managerial work was 
characterised by differences in orientation: 
"In comparing my study of chief executives with Sayles's 
(1964) study of lower- and middle- managers, for example, we find 
that the chief executives collected a wide variety of information 
to be used in strategy-making of a broad nature; the lower-level 
managers collected information to maintain the steady flow of 
their organizational units. Whereas our chief executives 
negotiated acquisitions, Sayles's managers negotiated delivery 
dates on orders." (Mintzberg 1973) 
The review by McCall et al (1978) found generally that managers 
at all levels spend much of their time within their own firms. 
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However, as rank increases so too does the amount of time spent 
outside the manager's own department and outside his 
organization. 
Communication and information processing 
Many studies have shown that the primary characteristic of 
managerial behaviour is the large proportion of time spent in 
verbal communication. Studies of middle managers show that 
perhaps half the manager's time is spent in this way, whereas at 
higher levels this proportion extends to perhaps 65-75% (McCall 
et al 1978), with levels of 90% found at the highest ranks 
(Mintzberg 1970). The proportion of this communication occurring 
in telephone conversations is less than 10% (Stewart 1967; 
Mintzberg 1970), so that a significant proportion of the 
manager's work activity is spent in face to face interactions 
during formal or informal meetings. At lower management levels, 
these interactions may be composed largely of individual meetings 
with others, "fleeting contacts" (McCall et al 1978). At higher 
levels, more time is spent in formal meetings and with groups of 
people rather than individuals (Mintzberg 1970, Stewart 1967). 
Just as much of the average manager's time is spent inside his 
organization, so most of his contacts are from within. The mix of 
interactions between subordinates, peers and superiors appears to 
follow similar pattern irrespective of level, whereby most 
contacts are with subordinates - in other words the manager 
spends more time managing than being managed. Horizontal peer 
contacts were also important, with substantial amounts of time 
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being spent interacting with others on similar levels. 
However, the patterns of interaction change markedly at the 
senior levels. Higher executives have fewer peers, and although 
contacts with subordinates continue to play a large part, 
contacts with peers are replaced to some extent by contacts 
outside the organization (McCall et al 1978). This is a 
significant (although not overwhelmingly salient) feature of 
senior managerial work, occupying as much as 30-40% of overall 
contact time. Managers in lower and middle ranks (with the 
exception of specific roles such as sales) tend to have few 
contacts outside the organization. Senior executives, in 
contrast, have a wide range of external contacts with similar 
organizations, with suppliers and customers, and with clients, 
associates and consultants (Mintzberg 1970). 
A particularly important characteristic of senior managerial 
communication has been pointed out by Mintzberg (1973) and 
others, whereby the manager's internal channels do not coincide 
with the formal lines of authority; on the contrary, he will 
bypass his own subordinates and peers to get information, and 
will encourage the subordinates of others to give him information 
directly. 
The use of information in management is still something of an 
obscure topic. According to the McCall et al (1978) review, the 
getting of information - as opposed to using it or giving it 
occupies a significant proportion of management time, with as 
much as half the manager's time spent in this activity. Much less 
time is spent on giving out information in the form of advice or 
50 
explanations, or in decision making. However, much of the 
information received in this way will be informal; ie it will be 
in the form of verbal communication (much the manager's preferred 
method of communicating), and the formal channels, as represented 
by reports and computer printouts will not form principal 
basis of decision activity. This is evidenced in a study by 
Aguilar (1967) which shows that managers' use of personal sources 
exceeds impersonal sources by 71% to 29%. 
Specifically, the formal information base lacks the immediacy and 
vitality of person to person contacts. Not only are immediate 
feedback and interaction denied, but much important information 
is missing: facial expression, gesture, tone of voice and other 
non-verbal communications are all lost in the formal system. But 
there are other aspects of the formal-informal information 
dichotomy for the manager; information is far too important for 
successful managers to leave this vital area to others: 
" while the MIS may effectively serve the routine 
operations of the organization, it may be too limited to serve 
the organization's higher managers. Experienced managers in turn 
develop their own information system - networks of contact men, 
informers, customers, trade organizations and other personal 
sources who feed them with external information on an informal ad 
hoc basis. In addition they train subordinates to bring them 
information via verbal channels ... " (Mintzberg 1975) 
A similar point is made by Kotter in respect of the interpersonal 
networks which are developed by senior managers: 
" the networks these GMs [general managers] created were 
incredible information-processing systems. They kept the GMs in 
touch with their responsibilities in a way that no formal or 
machine-based information-processing system could ever hope to 
do. These networks were capable of filtering masses of 
information and of passing on to the GMs only that which was 
important for agenda-setting purposes." (Kotter 1982b) 
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As a corollary to the discussion on managerial information-
related behaviours, it is possible to catalogue the specific 
weaknesses, from the manager's point of view, of the formal 
information system. According to Mintzberg (1975) these are: 
- Limitations of the formal system - the formal system lacks 
information which managers need; in the first place data relating 
to significant (and particularly external) threats to the 
organization is missing, and in the second place the system 
concentrates on the quantifiable (usually economic) aspects at 
the expense of the non-economic and the non-quantifiable 
- Formal systems aggregate data - this results in "bland 
amalgams" which can be too general for the manager, who requires 
tangible detail to illuminate the issues and trigger decision 
activity 
- Formal systems are too late - it takes time for events 
to become facts in the formal system; facts are first reported as 
rumours and gossip, and the manager pays much attention to the 
grapevine where information is not so precise, but may be both 
useful and timely 
- Formal information can be unreliable - the use of proxy 
variables, particularly in accounting information, can be very 
misleading; in addition, specific data used in important 
decisions such as market data may be of questionable reliability 
In summary, it can be said that managerial information processing 
is characterised by extensive and detailed (albeit highly 
personalised) knowledge of the organization at many different 
levels, which in turn is based on extensive (but largely 
informal) information gathering which occurs at all times and 
which has extended over periods of many years. 
Characteristics of managerial thinking 
In view of the earlier findings as regards the brevity and 
fragmentation of managerial activity, it will come as no great 
surprise to find that managers have little time to spend on 
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solitary reflection and "thinking", and this amounts to perhaps 
as little as 5% in all. Several studies (eg Carlson 1951, Stewart 
1967) show that executives spend less than one third of their 
time alone, but that this time is composed of brief and 
fragmented periods; the study by Stewart (1967), for example, 
showed that they were uninterrupted for half an hour or longer 
only nine times in four weeks. Time alone is spent largely on 
reading and writing: handling correspondence, administrative 
paperwork, reports from subordinates and other written materials 
such as journals and periodicals. 
"'I'm paid to think,' said an executive of Control Data in 
England; 'the system caught me at it once in 28 days.'" (a 
comment reported by Dahl and Lewis 1975, and quoted in McCall 
1978). 
This finding is particularly significant in respect of Decision 
Support Systems, because it implies that the individual strategic 
decision making role envisaged by DSS advocates may be largely 
non-existent. 
The manner in which decision-making and other supposedly "higher" 
managerial activities are grounded in the hurly-burly of everyday 
activity has been emphasised in earlier sections; the fundamental 
inseparability of these two has has been well-expressed by Sayles 
(1964, quoted in Mintzberg 1973): 
"We thus prefer not to consider planning and decision making 
as separate, distinct activities in which the manager engages. 
They are inextricably bound up in the warp and woof of the 
interaction pattern, and it is a false abstraction to separate 
them." 
The question arises as to whether managerial decisional behaviour 
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is associated with a certain type of person, or whether it is 
connected with the pressures incumbent in the job by way of a 
learnt predisposition. It seem reasonable to suppose that the 
manager's preferred patterns are in fact a natural, and probably 
highly desirable evolution resulting specifically from the 
character of work itself: 
" we have further indication that the manager adopts 
particular behaviour patterns as a result of the nature of his 
work. The pressure of the managerial environment does not 
encourage the development of reflective planners, the classical 
literature notwithstanding. The job breeds adaptive information-
manipulators who prefer the live, concrete situation. The manager 
works in an environment of stimulus-response, and he develops in 
his work a clear preference for live action." (Mintzberg 1973) 
In view of this finding, it is worth also emphasising that 
managers do not always accurately assess their own activities. A 
number of studies (see McCall 1978) indicate that managers 
significantly over- or under-estimate crucial parameters of their 
own work activities and roles. This phenomenon is particularly 
apparent in reported estimates of time spent, and also in the 
perceptions of the degree of freedom of choice they enjoy 
(Stewart 1976). 
"In general, the data suggest that managers perceive 
themselves as spending more time than they really do on 
technical, cognitive, and singular activities, and less time on 
formal and informal interactions. All that can be counted on is 
that managers make errors - sometimes quite large errors - when 
they try to estimate how they spend their time." (McCall et al 
1978). 
This finding has important implications at several levels. There 
is of course the danger of being misled in field research based 
on interview or questionnaire methods; however, it also has an 
important bearing on the way that managers will themselves 
54 
perceive the benefits of a computerised decision aid in the 
context of their own jobs. 
The Meaning of Managerial Behaviour 
Between the direct observational and diary material on specific 
managerial activities on the one hand, and organizational studies 
of strategic decision on the other, there is something of a gap: 
not a great one perhaps, but sufficient to render the precise 
nature of senior managerial decision making still somewhat 
obscure. 
" multiple method research designs are needed to 
reconcile how general management responsibilities (such as 
planning) are played out within the chaotic activity patterns in 
a manager's daily life. For too long we have accepted the 
generalities ... without examining their meaning in a behavioural 
context." (McCall et al 1978) 
The discussion thus far has focussed on the material aspects of 
managerial work because it is from these that there appears to 
have come most understanding of crucial managerial activity. 
However, it should be possible to discuss the meaning of 
managerial behaviour in such a way that the outcomes are still 
firmly grounded in accurate behavioural analysis, and this leads 
to various interpretations of behavioural research. 
An interesting analysis of specifically senior managerial 
activity by Kotter (1982a and 1982b) describes managerial 
behaviour in terms of two constructs: agenda setting and network 
building. According to this analysis, top managers do not begin 
their jobs with a clear-cut set of objectives and policies; 
instead, they spend time developing a loose set of goals and 
plans which together address a broad range of organizational 
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issues and which encompass events over short and long timeframes. 
The agendas discussed by Kotter were not the same as the 
organization's formal plans; they were not inconsistent with 
these plans, but contained many items not covered in formal 
planning processes and covered a much more extended timescale 
ranging from short term objectives a few days ahead through to 
long range aims stretching decades into the future. 
"The process by which the agendas were developed began 
immediately after the GMs [general managers] started their jobs, 
if not before. The GMs used their knowledge of the business and 
organizations involved, along with new information received each 
day, to quickly develop a rough agenda. Typically this contained 
a very loosely connected and incomplete set of objectives along 
with a few specific strategies and plans. Then, over time, the 
agendas incrementally became more complete and more tightly 
connectedo" (Kotter 1982) 
The second construct which Kotter uses to explain managerial 
behaviour is that of network building. According to this view, 
senior managers expend considerable time and effort in developing 
a personalised network of cooperative relationships with other 
people. This network extends far beyond immediate subordinates 
and includes representatives from many levels within and without 
the organization. The intensity and type of the relationships in 
the network varies enormously, but they have in common the 
objective of enhancing the executive's image, of creating and 
reinforcing desirable norms and values, of encouraging 
cooperative relationships and generally promoting the achievement 
of the objectives on the manager's agenda. Kotter identifies this 
network activity specifically with managerial effectiveness: 
"Almost all 
network building 
aggressively and 
example, create 
effective GMs [general managers] use this 
process, but the best performers do so more 
more skillfully. 'Excellent' performers, for 
networks with many talented people in them and 
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with strong ties to and among their subordinates. They do so 
using a wide variety of methods with great skill." (Kotter l982a) 
These constructs are illuminating, but of course hardly provide 
complete explanations of the wider gamut of managerial behaviour. 
It could be argued, for instance, that the behavioural paradigms 
identified by Kotter accurately represent the attributes of 
certain specific (albeit important) managerial situations, namely 
that of high ranking executive managers in large organizations, 
but not necessarily those of senior managers occupying other 
types of post or in different sized organizations; further, their 
are many managerial behaviours which are not entirely explained 
by reference to these two constructs alone. (Some alternative 
empirical support for these specific constructs can be found in 
Luthans et al (1985)). 
However, in order to widen the conceptual base it is very useful 
to examine in some depth the role theory used by Mintzberg to 
describe and explain the behaviours of his sample of senior 
managers (Mintzberg 1967, 1971, 1973). 
The importance of role theory to this thesis is that it provides 
an insightful and useful framework for reviewing managerial 
behaviour. In a later section, it will be shown that the 
fieldwork research of this project directly asks the question as 
to which of the many managerial roles perceived by the manager is 
actually being addressed by his own computer use. It will be 
seen, for instance, that computer adoption behaviours are 
typically associated with certain role requirements, whilst 
continued computer use is associated with other (different) role 
requirements. What is intriguing is that both these sets of role 
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requirements appear to be substantially different from those 
which are assumed (by system designers, analysts and so on) to 
be those addressed by the system. The assumption behind many of 
the implementations examined in the fieldwork (and indeed that of 
many computer professionals) is that only the manager's 
decisional role is salient (or important), whereas analysis shows 
that the manager undertakes activities which are consistent with 
many other roles which are equally important. 
The concept of role has been variously defined (see Levinson 1973 
for a detailed discussion of role concepts); here it will be 
taken in its broadest sense as implying at the same time aspects 
of a set of situational demands (expectations, norms, 
responsibilities) together with the role incumbent's perceptions 
of the part he has to play, which together result in various 
identifiable sets of behaviours. 
Mintzberg (1973) describes in some detail his theory of 
managerial roles which is based on his own deductions of the 
intentions and purposes of managerial behaviour as evidenced by 
an empirical analysis of senior managerial verbal contacts. In 
all, Mintzberg identifies ten different managerial roles which he 
further subdivides into three distinct groups: interpersonal 
roles, informational roles and decisional roles. In order to 
illustrate and explain the range of senior managerial behaviours 
discussed later, these role concepts will be reviewed in some 
depth. Mintzberg's ten managerial roles are as follows: 
interpersonal roles: 
figurehead linked to the manager's status and positional 
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authority, this role involves interpersonal activities in which 
the manager acts as a symbol (such as signing certain documents, 
or presiding over formal meetings) 
leader - as leader, the manager exercises power by virtue of his 
personal characteristics or the positional power of his office; 
most importantly he influences the whole organization by 
diffusing certain norms and values and by motivating and 
encouraging desired behaviour: 
" in virtually everything he does, the manager's actions 
are screened by subordinates searching for leadership clues." 
(Mintzberg 1973) 
liaison - this role is characterised by the network of internal 
and (more importantly for the senior manager) external 
relationships which the manager creates and maintains, and in 
which he undertakes reciprocal, exchange relationships with 
others. This role concept agrees well with the description by 
Kotter (1982a,b) of the manager's interpersonal networks 
described earlier. In general, this role is different at 
different managerial levels. At lower levels, it is concerned 
with horizontal relationships which assist the organization with 
its inputs and outputs; at higher levels it is more concerned 
with gaining special favours and information: 
"Chief executives build and maintain their system of status 
contacts in a variety of formal and informal ways - by joining 
external boards and performing public service work, by attending 
conferences and social events, by 'keeping in touch'... to keep 
the channels open." (Mintzberg 1973) 
informational roles: 
Here, Mintzberg specifically distinguishes between informational 
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and decisional roles; he identifies behaviours in which 
information is moved and/or recombined but which is not used at 
the time in significant decision activity. In other words, the 
manager can act, by virtue of his unique and privileged access to 
various routine and non-routine information sources, as a focus 
and switching point for information flows around his part of the 
organization. This leads to a rather favoured position: 
"He may not know as much about any one function as the 
specialist charged with it, but he is the only one to know a 
significant amount about all functions." (Mintzberg 1973) 
At senior managerial levels he becomes the focal point especially 
for external information relating to matters both within the 
organization and in its environment. 
"Tasks involving only one specialist function are easily 
delegated to the subordinate charged with that function. But what 
of tasks that cut across specialities or that involve the 
manager's special information? The manager, as nerve centre, has 
the best command of the relevant factual and value information, 
and hence is best suited to handle these tasks." 
monitor - in this role, the manager continually seeks (and in 
practice is deluged with) relevant and irrelevant information 
concerning the organization and its environment; the object is to 
identify problems and opportunities and to detect changes which 
require either further information or some form of action. The 
manager's preferences for informal information systems and for 
verbal communication channels have already been discussed; the 
essential point here is that he both receives and gives out 
information to a wide variety of internal and external sources 
and recipients. 
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"It is evident ... that the manager's advantage lies, not in 
the documented information that is widely available, and which 
takes time to process, but in the current, nondocumented 
information transmitted by word of mouth ... The manager develops 
an understanding of his milieu by piecing together all the scraps 
of data he can find." (Mintzberg 1973) 
disseminator role is concerned with the transmission of 
information within the organization. The manager has very special 
access to information from a wide variety of sources, he acts so 
as to send external information into his organization and 
internal information from one source to another. As well as 
specific factual information, a particularly important function 
of senior management is the dissemination of desired values 
within the organization. These transmitted values act so as to 
influence decision making throughout the organization, so that 
the senior manager although not having direct influence over all 
matters, at least has an important affective ascendancy over very 
many aspects of decision making. Managers at upper levels create, 
or choose the values which are transmitted, whilst those at lower 
levels are more likely to act so as to transmit onwards values 
received: 
"Chief executives, particularly those in large organizations 
with fragmented groups of 'influencers', are able to assume much 
power over organizational values ... On the other hand, managers 
who are dominated by one main influencer (for example the boss of 
a middle manager), probably exert less influence over the values 
they express. To a large extent, they merely transmit them 
unchanged from above to below." 
spokesman - this role is concerned with disseminating information 
outside the organization. Having both formal authority and a 
central position in his information network, the manager is 
expected to act as spokesman to various external groups, 
including customers and suppliers as well as other public and 
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private groups which may influence the running of the 
organization. Clearly, this role is more important at higher 
levels, and is particularly characteristic of more senior 
management. 
decisional roles: 
Mintzberg recognizes four distinct role patterns in managerial 
decision; two of these - entrepreneur and disturbance handler 
relate, roughly speaking, to the manager's proactive and reactive 
decision making requirements, and the other two - resource 
allocator and negotiator - relate to internal authoritative and 
external participative positions. These descriptions do not 
perhaps add materially to our understanding of the content and 
purpose of decision making, but they do provide excellent 
constructs for understanding the behavioural roots of managerial 
activity and for effectively categorising those behaviours. As 
regards senior managerial decision-making, Mintzberg clearly 
asserts the top manager's importance in strategic decision 
making: 
"One conclusion clearly emerges from my study: The manager 
takes full charge of his organization's strategy-making system ... 
[He] is substantially involved in every significant decision made 
by the organization." (Mintzberg 1973) 
In more detail, the decisional roles are: 
entrepreneur - here, the manager is specifically initiating and 
designing organizational changes from his own free will; he is 
exercising his discretion - and in the case of the senior manager 
this may well of course be considerable - and this role therefore 
encompasses those decisional activities associated with planned 
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and systematic change. The decision process itself is identified 
as a sequence of small steps, decisions and activities all 
intended to change some organizational situation. Mintzberg goes 
on to further characterise this decision role in terms of three 
sub-roles: delegation, authorization and supervision, which 
represent increasing levels of personal involvement in the 
decision process. 
disturbance handler - this role implies that the manager is 
making decisions which have arisen from matters beyond his 
control; he is in the position of fire-fighting, of taking 
involuntary decisions to handle unforeseen events which have 
resulted in unavoidable pressures on the organization. 
resource allocator - here, the manager is seen as the judge of 
the way in which organizational resources in terms of manpower, 
money, equipment, time and reputation are utilised. In many ways 
this is the most salient of managerial decision roles, and one 
which is most familiar to us from the large literature on 
normative decision making. Within this category, Mintzberg 
identifies three elements of the resource allocation role: 
scheduling his own time, programming the work of others and 
authorising the work and decisions of others. Of these, the 
authorisation element is salient, and one which will be discussed 
in more detail later in the context of strategic decision making. 
Clearly, the latter element becomes more important, and involves 
wider issues at the more senior levels. 
negotiator - this role concept refers to the part senior managers 
play in important discussions with significant people and 
organizations outside the manager's own organization; these 
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negotiations may concern acquisitions, union matters, consulting 
arrangements or indeed a whole host of external matters over 
which the organization has an interest, but not a direct 
authority or influence. 
Following this outline of managerial roles, it is of course 
necessary to point out that Mintzberg•s theory, as it relates to 
these ten specific roles, is not without its critics. In 
particular, Luthans et al (1985) cites studies which do not show 
direct empirical support for these role sets (although 
interestingly he does support the specific constructs of Kotter). 
However, it is argued here that what is vitally important for 
this thesis is not whether certain specific senior managerial 
role sets are universally prominent or not; rather, what is 
crucial is that it is recognised that a number of very different 
role sets 
directly 
exist in managerial work, many of which are not 
concerned with "decision making" or ''information 
processing" as these are commonly understood. Whether these 
different roles can always be correctly identified by labels used 
by Mintzberg, such as "negotiator", or whatever, is not of direct 
concern; what is important is that the multiplicity of roles and 
the role-based differentiation between senior and middle managers 
are both recognised as crucial elements in the understanding and 
description of the meaning of managerial activity. 
One purpose of this particular section has been to emphasise the 
importance of the meanings which we are to ascribe to observed 
managerial behaviours, to show that various interpretations of 
similar behaviour are possible, and that differences in 
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interpretation lead to important differences in theoretical 
viewpoint. Later, when reviewing the field research, it will be 
seen that the essence of the discussion revolves around 
interpretations of the meaning of various forms of managerial 
behaviour, and in particular the interpretation of the meaning of 
computer adoption and use in the context of the manager's roles. 
Discussion 
Following the review of the five aspects of senior managerial 
behaviour and decision making, we are now in a position to 
summarise the arguments and to develop some propositions about 
senior managerial computing. In the first instance, it is useful 
to tabulate the main managerial characteristics discussed, in 
order to clarify the essential features under discussion. (See 
Table 3.1 below.) 
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Table 3,1 Characteristics of Senior Managerial Behaviour: 
Some Similarities and Differences 
General Characteristic 
Extensive hours, time at 
a premium 
Time spent almost entirely 
within organization 
Large numbers of short 
fragmented activities 
high variety within 
functional specialism; 
local orientation 
Most communication are verbal 
Mainly dyadic interactions, 
informal, short time duration 
Many interactions with sub-
ordinates and peers 
Few contacts outside the 
organization 
Little time spent in solitary 
thinking or planning 
Informal information system 
strongly preferred over formal 
system 
Overestimation of cognitive 
and solitary activities 
Emphasis on functional 
activities 
Senior Management Characteristic 
More extended at higher ranks 
More time spent outside 
organization 
Lower activity rates, but 
decision process fragmented 
high variety across many 
functional areas; strategic 
orientation 
(The same) 
More group interactions, more 
formal and longer duration 
Many interactions with sub-
ordinates (fewer peers) 
Many contacts outside the 
organization 
(The same) 
(The same) 
(The same) 
Emphasis on creation of agendas 
and interpersonal networks 
From this table can be seen characteristics of managerial 
behaviour generally, with those peculiar to the more senior 
manager high-lighted. In order to further emphasise key aspects 
of senior managerial behaviour, it is useful to consider a 
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further summary of the key features (Table 3.2 below.) 
Table 3.2 A Summary of the Principle Characteristics of Senior 
Managerial Activity 
Long hours and hectic pace; every minute considered valuable 
More time spent outside the organization 
Fragmented decision sequences 
High variety across different functional areas 
Strategic orientation 
Mainly verbal communication 
More group interactions, more formal and longer duration 
Many contacts with subordinates (fewer with peers) 
Many contacts outwith formal channels 
Many contacts outside the organization 
Little time spent in solitary thinking or planning 
Inaccurate appreciation of own activities 
Informal information system preferred over formal 
Emphasis on selection and achievement of informal agendas 
Emphasis on creation and maintenance of interpersonal networks 
Having discussed extensively the characteristics which seem to 
identify the senior manager's work patterns, it is now possible 
to discuss some ideas relating to his possible computer use. The 
characteristics which have been discussed so far seem to mitigate 
for or against own-computer use on several dimensions. It is thus 
possible to speculate as to the effect of each characteristic on 
the extent and nature of managerial computer own use, and to 
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discuss these speculations in terms of specific propositions 
which can usefully be tested in the field research: 
pl. In view of the value placed upon the senior manager's time, 
anything perceived by him to save his time or maximise his time 
effectiveness will be welcomed - conversely, anything perceived 
to subtract from his time efficiency will be deplored 
p2. Senior managers spend less time inside their organizations, 
so fixed desk-top computer systems will be used proportionally 
less; conversely, there would appear to be scope for use of 
portable systems and for systems with communication functions 
p3. The nature of the fragmented decision process would seem to 
argue against the intensive own use of exploratory model-based 
DSS, on the grounds that this use does not fit in with the 
characteristics of the senior manager's usual work pattern 
p4. A strategic orientation would seem to mitigate in favour of 
DSS which catered for strategic issues, and against traditional 
MISs offering localised departmental or divisional data 
ps. A predisposition against formal information systems seems to 
mitigate against the use of computer-based decision aids in 
general, unless these contain data other than the typically 
economic, quantitative and summarised information traditionally 
available. An important consideration is that any computer-based 
information system has to compete with the successful senior 
manager's own excellent and personally unique interpersonal 
information network. 
p6. Increased group interactions, and more formal and preplanned 
meetings would seem to argue for the potential of systems which 
would make information available at these meetings and which 
would serve to augment arguments presented in the meetings, or to 
facilitate exploration and discussion of alternatives. 
p7. The large number of interactions with subordinates 
argue for systems which were relevant to the specifics of 
interactions or which facilitated them; but the content of 
interactions is not clear. 
would 
those 
these 
p8. Similar arguments hold for external contacts, but here it 
might be expected that traditional MIS and DSS are less likely to 
offer relevant external information. In view of this 
characteristic feature of senior managers, it would be expected 
that systems would be devised which are specifically oriented 
towards this external orientation. 
p9. Managers in general spend little time in solitary thinking; 
this seems to argue against the developmental use of model-based 
DSS where strategic options are systematically explored by the 
senior manager himself 
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Conclusion 
The general trend of these ideas is clearly against the use of 
present-day computer systems by the senior manager himself. If 
correct, they argue strongly against his using a computer 
although they might be said to support the idea of "chauffeured'' 
use. In fact it can be argued that in order to use a computer 
himself, the manager must modify certain behaviour patterns and 
adopt habits of thought and behaviour which up to now have not 
been conducive to his general mode of managerial activity. The 
question arises as to whether managerial computer users have in 
fact changed their habits, or whether they are making use of 
computers in new ways. 
It may well be the case that new systems, methods or techniques 
have been found which either mitigate against some of the 
apparent negative characteristics of computer-managerial 
interaction, or which offer significant advantages which make 
computer use irresistible. In any event, this discussion 
emphasises a number of aspects of the research questions; but in 
particular, if managerial systems are theoretically so 
unattractive why are certain managers using them, and what are 
they doing with them? 
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Chapter 4 
A Critical Review of Previous Work on Decision-System 
Implementation and Adoption Factors 
Abstract 
The literature relating to specific studies of interactive 
managerial computing is sparse (and that relating to senior 
managerial computing virtually non-existent). However, there is a 
large body of knowledge concerned with the general problem of 
decision system implementation. This chapter reviews part of this 
work in order to contribute to the theoretical base of the study. 
In order to make sense of the broad and varied coverage which the 
literature provides, a synthesis is provided which derives seven 
groups of factors which may be considered to influence computer 
use. Finally, an outline process model of computer adoption is 
derived, based on technology-diffusion theory. 
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Introduction 
The general problem of the acceptance of innovation in management 
decision has been addressed by practitioners and theorists from 
the very early days of computing and management science. 
"In implementation we deal with the most difficult subject 
matter confronted by science: people, and social groups.'' 
(Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff 1957). 
The authors point out that at that time there was no well-
formulated methodology of implementation available, and the 
current management science discipline was preoccupied with 
techniques. It is arguable that, although much work on the 
implementation problem has been undertaken in the intervening 
years, a well-formulated and generally successful methodology has 
still to be developed. 
Nearly twenty years later Churchman (1975) wrote: 
"Over the years ... many of us have been struck by the 
enormously important contrast between the development of the 
intellectual base and the implementation of this development into 
social change." 
A large body of work is concerned with the theoretical and 
practical problems of implementing decision systems, and a review 
from this perspective will capture a significant element of the 
relevant literature. The ideas which form the basis of an 
implementation approach are those which are concerned with the 
notion of a specific objective or set of objectives held by one 
group concerning the behaviours of individuals of a different 
group in relation to some system. Part of the literature is 
concerned with an 'implementation process', ie a progression of 
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organizational change whereby a significant difference in certain 
organizational parameters occurs and becomes permanent. This 
theoretical notion of the change process is based on the 
Lewin/Schein model (see Schein 1964) in terms of an 
unfreezing/refreezing process ~f""';' ~-1 1 --·_, ~ 0.~ J..U..L.J..UW;::.; 
1. unfreezing - creating an awareness of the need for change 
and a climate for receptivity to change 
2. moving - changing the magnitude or direction of the 
forces that define the original situation; developing new methods 
and/or learning new attitudes and behaviours 
3. refreezing - reinforcing the changes that have occurred, 
thereby maintaining and stabilising a new equilibrium situation. 
These concepts underlie much of the literature on implementation 
processes, both normative and prescriptive. Other authors who 
have taken up or expanded this basic model include Kolb and 
Frohman (1970), Sorensen and Zand (1975) and Walek (1975). This 
thesis is particularly concerned with implementation as a 
process, and a theoretical process model specific to individual 
managerial computer adoption will be developed at the end of this 
chapter. 
Implementation "success" (and this idea is measured in a number 
of different ways) forms the basic objective of much of the work 
in this area. However, this often seems to lead to prescriptive 
theories based on just the one or two areas or themes that a 
particular author has examined. An example of narrowing a complex 
field in this way is provided by Ginzberg (1981): 
"The implementation literature provides consistent evidence 
of the importance of only two generic issues for success in MIS 
implementation. These are management support and user 
74 
involvement." 
In contrast to this, the view is taken here that there are 
perhaps seven general topic groups within the subject, each of 
which contains a multitude of possible subject reference points. 
Implementation as an inter-disciplinary subject 
Implementation as a distinct field of study emerged largely in 
recognition of the very distinct gap which has always existed 
between normative decision theory, by which I mean the extensive 
literature on Management Science I Operational Research (MS/OR) 
techniques, and the far less extensive literature on management 
practice. This field is particularly relevant in the development 
of this thesis because of the close links between normative MS/OR 
techniques and DSS design, particularly in the creation of model-
based DSS and the emphasis on areas of planning and strategic 
decision making. However, it is necessary to make clear that 
there is a difference between the implementation of decision-
science recommendations within a social setting, and the 
implementation of a technological facility at a personal level. 
Unfortunately, such a distinction is not always established in 
the implementation literature. However, it is necessary to keep 
this in mind during the following review in order that the 
specific relevance of certain factors can be kept in perspective. 
The gap between OR/MS theory and management practice was 
recognised early on and received considerable attention from 
MS/OR theorists in the 1970s. For example Urban (1974) pointed 
out that very few of the descriptions of MS based decision theory 
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in the Management Science literature actually resulted in any 
distinct management impact: 
"In the period January 1971 to June 1973 Management Science: 
Applications contained over 150 articles, but less than 3% 
represented implementation in an organization ... " 
Computer implementation unfortunately has been less well 
documented, and there are very few examples of empirical work on 
the success rates of computer implementation in general. In 
particular, specific evidence relating to implementation with 
senior managerial subjects is extremely sparse. However, what 
indications there are (as evidenced by the growing literature on 
normative implementation prescriptions for example) imply a 
significant failure rate (depending of course on one's definition 
of failure). A significant objective of the implementation 
theorists was to alert practitioners in the OR/MS tradition to 
the necessity of taking into account human aspects at all stages 
of design and implementation; there being a tendency to 
concentrate exclusively on technical aspects of the project. 
"In general, few of the implementation failures of 
management science are due to inadequate or incorrect analysis 
from a technical viewpoint ... The obstacles appear to be human." 
(Hammond 1974) 
Towards a general model of implementation factors 
In order to examine the literature in detail an overall framework 
is necessary, one which will enable a realistic review of all the 
salient elements and at the same time provide a mental guide 
through the different themes and approaches. Within the 
literature the wide variety of diverse topics, themes and 
approaches almost defies categorization. The main problem seems 
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to be the widely differing approaches taken by different authors, 
and more particularly the different focal points adopted. In 
order to overcome this, the literature will be addressed first 
with a wide focus and then with increasingly sharp viewpoint. In 
this way, the attention is drawn logically from the wider 
environmental and organizational issues through to factors 
relevant at the individual and human-computer interface level. It 
has been found convenient and logical to consider the different 
factors in seven separate groups: 
1. wider environmental issues 
2. organizational variables 
3. situational variables 
4. manager/analyst issues 
5. individual differences 
6. attitudes and expectations 
7. manager/system interface 
Because of the multiplicity of different perspectives to be found 
in the literature it is of course possible to pick out different 
salient elements and to list them in of different ways, but it is 
believed that most of the main themes and issues can be included 
within this framework. Apart from its usefulness in anchoring the 
present research, it is hoped this way of summarising a very wide 
literature might be useful as a framework for other research 
efforts in this general topic area. 
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A review of themes in the implementation literature 
Some of the articles in the implementation literature revolve 
around normative prescriptions of a "how to do it" nature, 
usually based more or less on one or two key ideas which the 
author introduces as central to the problem. A key feature of 
virtually all the literature in this area is that the result of 
the intended implementation is a worthy object, the desired 
objective and focus of the effort. The general form of the 
empirical implementation research articles is one that relates 
implementation success (the dependent variable) to one or more 
independent variables which are expected to be associated with 
the dependent variable, Using the factor groupings depicted 
earlier, a discussion of key themes follows: 
1. Wider environmental issues 
This topic relates to problems and issues peculiar to larger 
social systems, ie groupings of national or international size. 
Within the social science literature there is of course a wealth 
of international cross-cultural comparisons and discussions, 
which show a diverse range of aspects of human existence which 
are affected by cultural influences. According to Hoffstede 
(1980): 
" different nations have different cultural heritages 
which are largely invisible. The invisible part consists of 
values, collectively held by by a majority of the population ... 
and transferred from generation to generation through education 
and early life experience... and through socialisation in 
organizations and institutions. These values have thus grown into 
societal norms which, in their turn, determine to a large extent 
the political and organizational solutions which are feasible 
within that particular national culture." 
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The author goes on to point out the inherent difficulties of 
introducing organizational techniques and solutions from one 
country to another, and particularly emphasises the exporting of 
American management theory to other parts of the world. However! 
an empirical study by De Bettignies and Evans (1977) of cross-
cultural issues shows fewer differences between senior managers 
in Europe and America than between those of European countries: 
" taken as a whole, the European business elite turns 
out to be less different from the American elite than popular 
stereotypes would warrant ... In many cases the differences 
between European countries are highly significant and seem to be 
affected by the broad stream of cultural tradition in a given 
society." (De Bettignies and Evans 1977) 
In other words, international cultural issues, although 
undoubtedly they exist, may not play such an important role as is 
sometimes imagined. It has been said, for example, that American 
managers have a very different view on direct computing from 
their British counterparts; but in fact such a belief may not be 
warranted. Turning to cultural issues in the more specific area 
of decision support there is far less evidence, and the issues 
are not so clear. Some direct inter-cultural analyses of MS/OR 
implementation have been performed, for example in an Indian 
setting by Mohan and Bean (1979), in Peru by Sagasti (1972) and 
in Colombia by Vertinsky (1972). The latter study found that co-
optation of personnel with the necessary innovating skills and 
knowledge was a significant factor in technological adoption: 
"Mobility of personnel with ... previous exposure to modern 
management values is ... a determining factor in the diffusion of 
managerial innovation in a developing country." (Vertinsky 1972) 
This of course might be expected, but it is altogether a 
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different phenomenon from the value-based cultural issue of the 
preceding paragraph. In addition to a national environment, at 
least one writer has commented on the specific societal milieu 
existing in respect of computer innovations in society, Kling and 
Gerson (1977 and 1978) point to the social elements of a 
"computing world" whose participants include manufacturers, 
service providers, and users. In all, some 14 participants are 
identified who play roles relating to technological innovation. 
Relations between these participants positively affect the 
diffusion rate: 
"Groups that innovate, diffuse and sell technological 
innovations can keep those people who wish to use the 
technology ... continually adapting to an ever changing technology 
which promises to solve new problems with each innovation ... 
Adapting to technological change is a continual demand placed 
upon participants of the computing world." (Kling and Gerson 
1977) 
This point is most interesting, contrasting sharply as it does 
with conventional views which would suggest that adoption is 
largely demand-led, or needs-led. According to Urban, for 
example: 
"Most important, the adopter must have a need for change; ie 
he faces a problem which cannot be resolved from existing 
technologies." (Urban 1974) 
There have been of course many other expressions of this view. 
For example, Zaltman et al (1973) state that the impetus to 
consider technological adoption arises from a perceived 
organizational need, in other words there is a perceived 
discrepancy between what the organization is doing and what the 
organizational decision-makers consider it ought to be doing, 
resulting in a performance gap that stimulates innovation. An 
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important point here is that there is some contention between the 
traditional view of needs-led technological development and the 
idea that, to some extent at least, the change is a self-
generating phenomenon fuelled by the computer industry itself. 
2. Organizational variables 
Surprisingly, there have been few attempts within the perspective 
of the implementation literature to discuss organizational issues 
such as size, structure, internal norms and culture. But of 
these, a study by Bean et al (1975) examined various structural 
factors including industry type, organizational size, level of 
decentralization and various other factors relating to the 
innovating group. Weak correlations between the posited 
variables and implementation success showed negative correlation 
with organizational size: 
"It may be determined 
implement a program [sic] ... 
(Bean et al 1975) 
that it is more difficult to 
in a large complex organization." 
The specific effects of organizational size in the context of 
senior managerial computer involvement will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8, when it will be shown that the field 
research findings from this thesis contribute to knowledge in the 
area. Returning to the published literature, the study by 
Vertinsky linked social norms in relation to organizational 
reception of management science techniques. The same study 
examined structural components of organizations in terms of their 
hierarchical or centralised/ decentralised structure: 
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" ... our study singled out organizational structure as the 
most important immediate bottleneck in the diffusion of 
innovation." (Vertinsky 1972) 
The author goes on to explain that in order to share 
responsibility, representatives of organizational power groups 
formed committees and lines of control and authority are 
ambiguous. Additionally, power equilibrium was maintained by a 
system of constraints which made change impossible. Few authors 
specifically tie structure with adoption processes, but MacLagan 
(1983) discusses the notion that knowledge utilisation, as 
represented by the adoption of new ideas, is facilitated through 
hierarchical structures "in so far as people can be ordered to 
accept them", but that the adoption under such circumstances may 
be of a superficial nature. Schultz and Slevin (1975) introduce 
the concept of "organizational validity" as an idea which 
represents the "degree of fit" of decision systems in 
organizations; the concept explicitly recognises the necessity of 
resolving organizational issues, but without specifying 
organizational variables in detail. Although created initially 
with reference to MS/OR models, this concept has been shown by 
Markus and Robey (1981) to be just as relevant to MIS 
implementation dynamics. 
3. Situational variables 
This category has received considerable attention from theorists 
and practitioners. Some authors have concluded that the personal 
involvement of the intended user-manager in the design and 
creation of his decision aid is a predisposing variable (-if not 
actually a prerequisite) for later adoption of the decision aid. 
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"Experience with managerial implementation has often 
indicated that acceptance is most easily gained from the decision 
makers who "suffered" through the development. This implies that 
diffusion horizontally and vertically in the organization will be 
most successful when new managers are involved ... " (Urban 1974) 
The point is made succinctly by Senn (1978): 
" ... successful management information systems efforts 
require the direct involvement and participation of the managers 
who will use the system outputs." 
Similar normative points are made by Scott Morton (1971), McKeen 
(1983), Zmud and Cox (1979), Lucas (1975), Swanson (1975), 
Ginzberg (1981) and many others. However, the situation in 
practice may be very different; Alter (1978) has identified 
patterns of implementation involvement occurring in practice 
which do not conform to the conventional wisdom as regards user 
involvement and describes situations where the system is "sold 
to" the user or "forced upon" him. Other authors have also 
considered the effects of behaviours which influence adoption. 
Lawless et al (1982) have identified a pattern of advocacy in the 
introduction of computer~based decision systems whereby an 
individual personally espouses the cause and provides the 
necessary organizational energy to mount a project: 
"The advocate has been introduced as the dominant need 
sensing and asserting mechanism where the initiative was 
internal ... a single person ... marshalled the resources ... and 
generally sponsored the entire project." (Lawless et al 1982) 
The authors go on to describe certain personal characteristics of 
the advocate; these characteristics amount to a "cosmopolitan" 
rather than "local" perspective and orientation, as defined by 
Kelly (1969). In general, the advocate is less committed to 
83 
current organizational wisdom and more likely to challenge 
existing approaches. Having higher than average educational or 
professional qualifications and a good standing within the 
organization (Lawless et al 1982), the advocate was able to use 
specialist expertise to establish credibility and gain confidence 
in his abilities to mount a new project. As a result of this 
confidence the advocate performed a key role in initiating and 
controlling the evolution of the project. 
" advocates can use their unique position to engage in 
interpersonal behaviours that enhance organizational 
acceptance ... " (Lawless et al 1982) 
In other words, the advocate is able to mobilise resources in 
order to effect the organizational changes required in order to 
enable the implementation to proceed. However, the above authors 
also point out that the advocate often avoided managing the 
project through to completion, but left the organization or 
division before the final implementation phase. The role of 
internal and external advocates is also mentioned by Alter 
(1977b) in the context of his study of different types of DSS; in 
particular he notes that certain types of DSS are more likely to 
be initiated by internal or external entrepreneurial behaviour by 
systems experts because they are more difficult to conceptualize 
and require "selling" to management. The role of the advocate is 
clearly a crucial aspect in managerial acceptance of decision 
aids; consideration of his role and activities again adds weight 
to the arguments expressed earlier against the view that 
technological innovation is purely demand led. 
A study by Gibson (1975) of MS/OR implementation gave due weight 
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to the perceptions of various actors in the system of the role of 
the system implementation in terms of their own personal career 
development. One would have thought that, a priori, such 
considerations would form an essential ingredient in 
understanding implementation behaviours, but few authors mention 
these considerations specifically. 
A point brought out by many authors in the implementation 
tradition (see for example Gibson 1975, Manley 1975 and Senn 
1978) is the necessity for personnel involved in the 
implementation process to perceive that their top management 
support the innovation. This point has been well expressed by 
zmud and Cox (1979): 
" their (top management] direct role in implementation is 
to develop a sense of commitment within implementation 
participants. This is accomplished by exhibiting an appreciation 
for the project and establishing an environment that encourage 
involvement by and interaction among the participants." (Zmud 
and Cox 1979) 
The nature of implementation as essentially an organizational 
process is discussed by Gibson (1975). He points out that 
successful implementation requires the "exercise of influence" 
and hence requires a power base sufficient for bringing about 
organizational change of a substantial order. 
" implementation is best conceived as a process, taking 
place over time, and as a complex, multivariate process of 
interpersonal influence ... " (Gibson 1975) 
The issue of specific resistance to technological innovation is 
first described in detail by Manley (1975). Essentially, this 
view identifies a natural pattern of resistance, rather along the 
lines of organizational development and change theorists such as 
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Bennis and 
dimensions, 
conformation 
Benn (1961). Manley identifies several resistance 
among which are general hostility to the technology, 
with peer group resistance patterns, personal 
natural resistance to change and learned resistance owing to past 
performance of similar ideas. 
The concept 
developed by 
of resistance to implementation has been 
Markus (1980). This author discusses 
further 
various 
dimensions of resistance theory from different viewpoints but 
leans towards organizational-political factors in resistance 
motivation. In general, Markus uses the idea of resistance in the 
same way that earlier writers discuss implementation "failure" 
ie as the general term for the outcome of an unsuccessful 
implementation attempt. Despite the nature of some of the 
comments in the more popular press relating to irrational 
managerial rejection, the concept of resistance as introduced in 
this context by Manley, and developed by Markus, is a useful one 
and it remains to be seen what light will be shed on the subject 
of resistance by empirical field research. 
4. the manager/analyst interface 
In order for a manager to achieve any benefits from a decision 
system it is necessary for a considerable technical effort to be 
expended, in terms of systems analysis, choice, design and the 
manipulation and modification of various elements of hardware and 
software. In addition to specifically computer-related activity, 
there may also be a requirement to investigate, translate or at 
least understand elements of management science techniques 
involved in mathematical model building or basic accounting 
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concepts for accounting models. There is thus an extensive range 
of expertise, parts or all of which may be brought to bear at 
some stage in a decision support project. 
This gives rise to the necessity for the manager to relate at 
some stage to one or more "experts" who will undertake to 
translate his wishes into an appropriate technological solution. 
There are many different specialisms and experts within the field 
we are examining, and they are known by a variety of descriptions 
and titles. In general, there is the management scientist, the OR 
specialist, decision analyst, systems analyst (in the sense of 
the generic systems discipline), information scientist, computer 
systems analyst, and more recently, the knowledge engineer. One 
or more of these roles may be incorporated in one or more people, 
and in fact various terms are used indiscriminately in the 
literature. Kaiser and King (1982), for example, theoretically 
identify at least six different modes of relationship between 
user/analyst groupings. The essential point however is that the 
manager must form a relationship with somebody who is fulfilling 
a very specialised role; for the purposes of clarity this role 
will simply be described as "the analyst" unless further 
discrimination is required. 
The problems inherent in this relationship where recognised at a 
very early stage: 
" inevitably, these new experts find that other members 
of the management team do not share their desire for change ... 
The computer technologist... has to get unfamiliar concepts 
across to line managers ... with whom he has little in common." 
(Mumford and ward 1966) 
Considerable attention has been focussed on characteristics of 
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the relationship between manager and analyst, in order to 
ascertain those aspects which may mitigate against successful 
implementation. Some of this attention has been focussed upon 
aspects of the manager himself, some upon the analyst and some 
upon the nature of the relationship between them {often referred 
to as the "manager/analyst interface••). A succinct statement of 
an important aspect of the manager/analyst problem has been made 
by Churchman and Schainblatt {1965): 
"Much management science has been conducted under the 
naive philosophy that a certain kind of reason must prevail, 
that once this reason has been made clear, the manager 
either accept it or be charged with gross negligence or, 
worse, gross stupidity." 
very 
and 
will 
still 
The extent of the concern with the manager/analyst relationship 
is due to the many obstacles which appear to materialise owing to 
the very nature of the relationship. Pettigrew (1974) has pointed 
out that the analyst has his own needs and ambitions and that 
these will be reflected in the way that he advises, negotiates 
with, persuades or otherwise attempts to influence the manager. 
In other words the analyst and the manager have different 
political interests (perhaps markedly different) and this will 
affect the way in which the relationship develops: 
" different groups of executives and specialists have 
varying sets of needs, expectations and reference group 
affiliations. They operate from different cultures. They also 
relate to others with differing sets of political interests ... 
{Pettigrew 1974). 
According to Hammond (1974), there are a number of contextual, 
psychological and social differences which together form 
obstacles to successful interaction. These obstacles fall into 
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three categories: different expectations by both parties as to 
the purpose of the implementation, different (and strongly held) 
preconceptions as to the nature of the decision elements in the 
system and significant cultural and other differences at a 
personal level which tend to impede effective collaboration. 
"The manager is the problem giver; the management scientist 
is the problem solver ... Each effectively does his own thing with 
a minimum of overlap ... Meetings held while the analysis is under 
way are more to answer the management scientist's questions and 
to seek data than to discuss the problem. Changed signals on the 
part of the manager regarding his perceptions of the problem are 
annoyances ... rather than progress in problem solving." (Hammond 
1974) 
Hammond goes on to point out that the manager may have a strongly 
held internalised concept as to the nature of the problem under 
discussion which may be immune to insights from the analyst. 
Equally, the analyst for his part may be completely shackled to 
the solution set as represented by one management science 
technique (it may be the only one he knows, or the one he feels 
most competent with); a significant variation on this theme is 
the computer analyst who has gained considerable fluency (no 
doubt at great personal cost) in the technical ramifications of 
one particular DSS package or technique. Under these 
circumstances it is of course very difficult to break free from 
such constraints. 
However, the differences between manager and analyst are not 
confined to those created by specialist expertise alone. The 
third problem area which Hammond discusses relates to the nature 
of the personal differences in outlook which are likely to 
characterise the two parties. These differences, which are 
effectively demarcated along departmental boundaries, may be 
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essential to the functioning of each separate department but act 
so as to create obstacles when members from different departments 
are attempting to work together. Hammond (1974) identifies eight 
different dimensions of this personal differenciation: 
goal orientation - the manager will be pragmatically 
oriented towards his sub-unit goals and those recognised by the 
organizational control systems, the analyst's orientation will be 
towards external (perhaps professional) recognition, and 
normatively oriented towards organizational as opposed to 
departmental goals 
time horizon - the manager is concerned with shorter time 
horizons than the analyst (this point will be taken up in a 
contrary sense later in the analysis) 
comparative expertise - the managers expertise will be 
high in his operational context and low in formal decision 
technology, the analyst will have the opposite orientation 
interpersonal style - the experienced manager will be more 
concerned with fostering interpersonal relationships, the analyst 
less so 
cognitive style - the manager is expected to be "heuristic" 
in style and the analyst "analytic" this is discussed in greater 
depth in a separate section 
problem definition - the manager will tend to describe his 
problem less explicitly but with broad scope; the analyst will 
have the opposite tendency 
validation of analysis - the manager will be concerned more 
with the method and excellence of the analyst's presentation, 
and with the presence or absence of mutually shared values; the 
analyst is more concerned with the internal logic of the solution 
degree of problem structuring - the manager is more 
accustomed to handling ambiguous and ill-structured situations, 
ambiguity is a source of anxiety to the analyst who tends to deal 
only with the more structured aspects of the problem 
Hammond emphasises that not all manager/analyst pairs will 
90 
automatically be differentiated along all eight of the dimensions 
and notes the danger of typecasting all managers, or indeed all 
analysts, into a single category: 
" there is a real danger of stereotyping a particular 
manager ... instead of dealing with him according to his unique 
characteristics, and a similar danger in lumping all management 
scientists into a single class ... " (Hammond 1974) 
Many aspects of the problem are exemplified in the systems 
analysis "methodology" commonly employed in practice. As has 
already been mentioned, it is a tenet of good implementation 
practice for the user to be involved closely in design and 
development phases; in practice, although lip service may be paid 
to the principle, a technique known as the "back-room boy" or the 
"hit and run" approach (Docherty 1980) is commonly used. In this 
technique, the analyst is initially in close contact with the 
user while information is being collected; however, the analyst 
then retires to his office to design a system on his own which is 
then handed over to the user at implementation time. A 
significant source of difficulties can be ascribed to the lack of 
knowledge, on the analyst's part, of the realities of managerial 
work (and particularly senior managerial work). The 
characteristics of senior managerial behaviour discussed in 
chapter 3 will simply not be known by most analysts, who have had 
little exposure to these issues either by way of training or by 
practical experience. This state of affairs can only exacerbate 
differences of culture and outlook and thus reinforce those 
stereotyped views of managerial attitudes and fears which are 
often used to rationalize implementation failures. Wright (1984) 
provides a good example of this stereotyped viewpoint. 
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The need for non-technical training for the analyst is taken up 
by several authors (see for example Brightman and Noble 1979). 
The notion of training systems experts specifically in 
interpersonal skills is discussed by Weiss (1983), who maintains 
that this group as a whole are poor at interpersonal 
relationships and quotes evidence which indicates that the group 
has a lower than average "social need" score (ie the need to 
interact with others, similar to McGregor's (1960) need for 
affiliation, n-Aff.) Weiss's work is based in turn on theories by 
Argyris (1971) which directly relate interpersonal competence 
with the ability to realise technical potential, and her training 
solution was foreshadowed by Mumford almost twenty years 
previously: 
"This is the essence of our 
developing the social skills of our 
(Mumford and ward 1966) 
third problem: that of 
technical change-makers." 
However, training as a solution to the manager/analyst problems 
is described as too simplistic by Kaiser and King (1982); these 
authors maintain that differences will not be reduced simply by 
training more analytically oriented managers or more "business" 
oriented analysts: 
"The differences that exist, whether they are intrinsic or 
merely learned... are probably too great. Moreover, the 
"knowledge demands" of each function are so great as to preclude 
the development of "Renaissance Men" who can know their primary 
field as well as that of a second field that is quite different 
in nature and skill requirements." 
Nor, indeed has the situation changed much over the last decade; 
according to the study performed by these authors: 
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" the overall results of this study present a negative 
picture for those who believe that a greater user orientation is 
critical to progress in MIS. The disparity between theory and 
practice appears great despite the decade or more that has been 
devoted to diagnosing and prescribing remedies for problems at 
the user/analyst interface." (Kaiser and King 1982) 
5. Individual characteristics 
Personal variables such as age, education, career pattern and 
previous exposure to computing have not been discussed to any 
great extent within the literature of the implementation 
perspective, even though it seems reasonable to suppose that 
these elements will be relevant. Age, for example, as has already 
been mentioned, is a putative cause of senior managerial 
resistance to computing according to some sources. However, a 
case can be made for including such variables as prior 
experience, amount of formal computer training and so on; indeed, 
a case will be made in chapter 5 and chapter 9 for examining such 
variables. Returning to the literature, Smith and Kozar (1978) 
make a point about managers' computer education: 
" it is not surprising to see that many new techniques 
designed to improve the managerial effectiveness of 
organizations, techniques which are of necessity computer-based, 
are unused. A vast majority of managers, neither by experience 
nor education, have come to view the computer as an integral 
component of their professional roles." (Smith and Kozar 1978) 
However, apart from the assertion, no studies seem to have been 
performed which empirically relate computer education to computer 
adoption and use, even though a relationship between these two 
things is assumed in the above quotation (and others like it). 
Moving outside the implementation literature, theories of 
innovation adoption in general have been proposed which do 
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concentrate on personal characteristics of the adopter; in 
particular, Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) discuss the social, 
psychological and other characteristics of early adopters, late 
adopters and so forth, where these are considered as discrete 
groups. Much of the Rogers and Shoemaker discussion of 
innovation adoption revolves around communication and attitudinal 
processes during adoption; relatively little of their material 
concerns subsequent discontinuance processes. However, they do 
describe a disenchantment decision, whereby the adopter ceases 
to use an innovation because he perceives it to be inappropriate 
(either realistically or from misuse); they also discuss various 
social and personal variables in connection with discontinuers as 
a discrete group: 
"Generally, high discontinuers have less education, low 
social status, less change agent contact, and the like, ~hich are 
the opposites of the characteristics of innovators. Discontinuers 
share the same characteristics as laggards, whom we know to have 
a higher rate of discontinuance." (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971) 
Following this line of reasoning we might expect our senior 
managers, who will tend to higher education, high social status 
and more change agent contact to have a very low rate of 
discontinuance indeed. However, this is not borne out by the 
research evidence which will be presented later. 
A theme that has been discussed extensively from within the 
implementation perspective is the idea that individual decision 
makers have certain psychological characteristics which affects 
their relationship to information and hence makes them more or 
less likely to utilise a decision system. A frequently used basis 
for this approach is the Myers-Briggs style indicator, a system 
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for evaluating individuals along four personal style dimensions 
(see for example Myers 1980). The approach itself is based on 
earlier work by Jung on psychological types, and in fact the 
whole area of ''typing" has a considerable body of work behind it 
from main-stream psychology (cf. the work by Eysenck on 
dimensions of extraversion/introversion). The four Myers-Briggs 
style dimensions are: 
1. Extraversion - introversion 
2. Sensing - intuition 
3. Thinking- feeling 
4. Judgement - perception 
A seminal paper by Mason and Mitroff (1973) discusses the need to 
take into account more than one psychological type when designing 
and implementing MIS systems, and argues that management science 
and information experts have tended to be sensing/thinking types 
and hence the design of information decision systems has 
reflected this psychological orientation. The importance of this 
is that information approaches which are suitable for one 
psychological type may not be suitable for another: 
"Each of these types has a different concept of 
information ... If one is a pure thinking type, information will 
be entirely symbolic, eg some abstract system, model, or string 
of symbols ... If one is a sensation type, information will be 
entirely empirical ... For intuition types, information will be in 
the form of "imaginative stories" .... " (Mason and Mitroff 1975) 
The general approach and the availability of a ready-made testing 
instrument has also encouraged empirical studies. A variation of 
the cognitive style variable was tested empirically by Lucas 
(1975): 
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"Individuals with differing decision styles have differing 
levels of use of information systems, perform different analyses 
of data and take different actions based on information." 
The author reports on an experiment using the Myers-Briggs 
indicator which, surprisingly, appears to show a positive 
correlation between intuitive style and information use. This 
result is in direct contradiction to the work of Botkin (1973) 
who argues that computer systems are generally designed for and 
are of value primarily only to systematic types. Botkin goes on 
to call specifically for a DSS which would support the intuitive 
type of manager, and claims that it is essential that this type 
of viewpoint is brought in to systematic organizational decision 
process. However, he also points out that designing and creating 
a computer system is itself a systematic activity thus requiring 
a translation process between the two styles. 
"The design and programming of an intuitive system ... is a 
systematic process at the working level. That is, a translation 
function is necessary to get the intuitive conception into a 
systematic computer. This translation process must be done by an 
individual or group of individuals capable of utilizing both 
cognitive styles." (Botkin 1973) 
This seems to place a heavy burden on the analyst (or analyst 
team), and refers back to the earlier discussion on the 
manager/analyst interface. McKenny and Keen (1974) working on 
similar premises, use the cognitive style issue to argue for 
special care to be taken in the design of computer systems for 
decision. In particular, they call for the manager and the 
analyst to recognize the other's differences and to accept that 
these differences in outlook will lead to different approaches 
during development and implementation. A better result will be 
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created by both parties co-operating and compromising at 
appropriate stages in the process. The effects of these 
information processing, thinking or decision~making styles are 
further examined and discussed by DeWaele (1978), Robey and 
Taggart (1981), Schepanski (1983), Wright (1980), Benbasat and 
Dexter (1979), Benbasat and Taylor (1978), Lusk and Kersnick 
(1979), Wright (1980), Doktor (1976) and Dermier (1973). 
The style or type paradigm has been further extended to yield a 
more detailed conception called cognitive complexity which has 
been developed to a behavioural theory (Stabell 1974) within a 
cognitive science framework. Additionally, there has been some 
discussion of a physiological basis for the differences in terms 
of right and left brain processes (Young 1983). Although the 
terminology 
author to 
recognition 
and dimensions of individual style or type vary from 
author, the general import of these studies is the 
of a requirement for systems, techniques and 
processes which reflect the personal cognitive characteristics of 
the intended user (and not the style of the creator, or of the 
MIS/MS/OR tradition). It is of some interest to note that this 
advice seems generally to have been ignored by MIS and DSS 
practitioners in the decade since these ideas have been 
discussed. 
Another aspect of the characteristics of the individual which is 
largely unmentioned within the computing and implementation 
literature relates to the individual's own personal needs and 
predilections. For most people, their jobs and organizations 
satisfy far more than simple financial needs (see McClelland 
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etc). Working in an organization enables people to engage in 
activities which satisfy various personal requirements, and these 
activities will not necessarily be tied simply to the economic 
wellbeing of the organization. This means that certain aspects of 
computer use may relate to the satisfaction of purely personal 
requirements (such as a desire to learn about computing for its 
own sake, or to express a certain personal image to others within 
the organization). Behavioural matters such as these are no doubt 
recognized by commentators, but they seem to remain under the 
surface and have found little overt expression in any research 
conducted in this area to date. Part of the reason for this may 
be methodological or even philosophical; there is a tradition in 
the computer and MS/OR literature which seems to favour a logical 
positivist research approach, and this is not always conducive to 
addressing matters where inner mental states may be significant. 
6. User attitudes and expectations 
As has already been mentioned, there is a feeling among many 
computer professionals (expressed in word of mouth discussions as 
well as in the academic literature) that managers are frightened 
of computers for their own use. As the use by middle managers of 
desk top machines has increased, so the view has been changed to 
one where the more senior managers are frightened of computers. 
This view has been put to me by several computing practitioners; 
the prevalent argument invariably is that the older men reject 
computing, and that age particularly is the ingredient that 
causes the rejection on the grounds that "you can't teach an old 
dog new tricks". Myths, legends and apocryphal tales of senior 
managers who cannot (or will not) touch a keyboard are common. 
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Computer professionals who work closely with managers are often 
genuinely astounded at the lack of success of decision aids (see 
the discussion under the manager/analyst interface) and impute 
attitudinal and other problems to the manager in order to 
"explain" the problems. This assumption of irrational managerial 
rejection of computer-based decision support systems has been 
taken up by advocates of computer systems: 
"The plain fact is that many people are afraid of the new 
technology which is invading the office. They are worried about 
their jobs, their status ... " (Business News and Communications 
1983) 
Examples of such assumptions can also be found in the academic 
literature, notably in articles by Wright (1984), Kiechel (1984) 
and elsewhere. According to Wright for example, quoting American 
sources, some 90% of American managers are "computer illiterates" 
due to fear of the machine, fear of loss of status and/or 
general ignorance: 
" the recent trend to have managers input their own 
requests for data directly into the machine - thus using a 
keyboard, a task traditionally reserved for the lowly secretary -
has caused resistance throughout North America. Age can also be a 
factor that contributes to cyberphobia." (Wright 1984) 
Similar statements can be found in the computer press and 
elsewhere; but one further example will suffice: 
" executives in general have so far been remarkably 
resistant to using new forms of office equipment personally ... 
even IBM managers ... expressed significant apprehension about 
their personal abilities to use the system ... " (Tisdall 1982) 
In general the research results presented later indicate that 
this supposed "fear" reaction of senior managers is largely 
mythical, and assumptions that managers are too frightened to use 
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a particular system are more likely to reflect a lack of 
understanding for the real reasons behind the rejection (or in 
some cases a refusal to come to terms with the rejection). 
However, the myth remains a strong factor in implementation lore. 
In addition to the "cyberphobia" tradition, there is an extensive 
literature comprising a number of empirical studies on the 
various dimensions of attitudes relating to computers. Before 
examining this literature, it would be as well to discuss the 
concept of attitude itself in order to establish its relevance to 
our topic. For most writers in the field of applied psychology, 
the concept of attitude relates to the idea of a submerged or 
latent socio-psychological variable which may be used to explain 
behaviours which otherwise would not be fully explicable. In 
general, attitudes are considered to be a predisposing force 
towards action. 
"Attitudes, the end products of the socialisation process, 
significantly influence man's responses to cultural products, to 
other persons and to groups of persons." (Shaw and Wright 1967) 
Attitudes are an enduring tendency to respond in a certain way. 
Once formed, attitudes will not only remain constant in the 
absence of forces to change, but may be resistant to change 
particularly where they are especially important to the 
individual for some reason (Reitz 1977). According to some 
authors (see for example Thomas 1971, and Warren and Jahoda 1974) 
attitudes have a more detailed structure, usually consisting of 
three components: the affective, cognitive and behavioural 
components; but others deny such a structure. Also, some authors 
(notably Fishbein 1971 and 1972) seriously question whether there 
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is a direct and simple relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour. 
Lucas has explored the attitudinal component of implementation 
failure extensively (Lucas 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1977, 
1978). In an early empirical study, he proposed user attitudes 
and perceptions as one of three key variable areas which affected 
voluntary information system use: 
"Favourable user attitudes and perceptions of information 
systems and the information services staff lead to high levels of 
use of an information system." (Lucas 1975a) 
His analysis of attitude questionnaire data suggest that the 
attitude components which he measured were in fact positively 
correlated with information system use. However, he also points 
out that where subjects are forced to use a technically poor 
system, then unfavourable attitudes will emerge. In other words 
there is a doubt as to causality - has the presence of favourable 
attitudes caused use of the system or vice versa? Other writers 
have stated similar propositions, for example: 
" surveys and experiments show that attitudes towards 
various features of an MIS, systems development personnel, and 
computers in general are related to user behaviour." (Robey 1979) 
A review of MIS attitude surveys by Swanson (1981) showed the 
need for a more detailed understanding of the various components 
of attitudes and their relationships to various aspects of the 
computing milieu. Swanson points out that those components of 
attitudes which are specifically tied to information system use 
are still not well understood: 
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"Identification of these usage-relevant components is 
needed to advance further research in the field... In the 
run the concept of 'user attitude' may itself be too broad 
useful theory development." (Swanson 1981) 
There can be little doubt that prior attitudes play some part 
much 
long 
for 
in 
influencing usage processes; the question of interest is the 
precise nature and extent of the influence. An early study by 
Schewe (1976) showed the complex interplay of attitudes and 
perceptions which acted in MIS use, and especially that these 
variables interacted in a complex way with, and in conjunction 
with, other variables: 
"As the user becomes sufficiently educated about the system, 
the atmosphere or environment within the company becomes a more 
important motivator of attitudes and system usage ... At this 
level, top management support ... and a feeling of corporate 
sophistication will do more to initiate use of the MIS than MIS 
capability and user education. (Schewe 1976) 
Schewe's study examined a number of specific attitudinal 
components; a key result was the general lack of empirical 
support for propositions which directly linked system usage to 
positive attitudes. According to the Schewe study, attitudes in 
themselves were not primary determinants of user behaviour and 
intervening situational constraints acted so as to override any 
attitudinal effects in system usage. This study is of course in 
marked contrast with the work of Lucas and others which appears 
to show evidence of direct causal links. Taking account of the 
Schewe evidence and referring back to our earlier discussion of 
attitude theory it is considered that computer system usage is 
more likely to be directly influenced by situational and other 
factors, and attitudes of themselves will play only a minor 
causal role. 
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On a different level, the presence and the effect of certain 
expectations on the part of the user has been discussed by one or 
two authors. Expectations in this particular context arise as a 
result of information gathering immediately prior to 
implementation, and consist of a variety of specific beliefs and 
assumptions relating to the proposed system. They differ from 
attitudes in this respect in that the attitudes discussed here 
can be considered in terms of non-specific predispositions 
regarding aspects of a computer system, whereas expectations can 
be regarded as specific beliefs about certain aspects of a 
computer system. According to Ginzberg (1981) expectations formed 
prior to implementation have an effect on user satisfaction and 
usage after implementation, in that the degree of realism of the 
expectations is associated with implementation success. 
"The degree 
expectations was 
success measures." 
of realism of user's pre-implementation 
positively correlated with a range of project 
A review and experimental study of the general phenomenon of 
expectancy disconfirmation by Weaver and Brickman (1974) 
indicated that only subjects with high initial expectancies 
suffered disproportionate dissatisfactions. (It was certainly 
found in the present study that some managers had unrealistic 
expectations, and this seemed to affect at least part of their 
adoption cycle). Ginzberg reviews a more general literature in 
this area and finds evidence for two separate phenomena: firstly 
where subsequent ratings of satisfaction are biased towards 
initial high expectations, and secondly where initially 
unrealistic high expectations lead to lower subsequent 
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satisfaction. In general, it might be anticipated that the former 
relationship will obtain only where the subject has some personal 
stake in the result. 
7. the manager/system intetface 
This section refers to the issues surrounding the nature of the 
systems which the manager is intended to use. Clearly, there will 
be aspects of the system which will mitigate for and against 
continued use of the system. The quality of the system, its ease 
of use, the nature of the facilities which it offers, its 
usefulness and the degree of relevance to the user's job tasks 
will all affect the extent of use in some way. In the words of 
Rubinstein and Hersh (1984): "Using a computer should always be 
easier than not using a computer."! 
However, in practice all systems have drawbacks to some extent. 
Anybody who has himself attempted to use a computer system 
directly will be familiar with at least some of the issues that 
arise in this context. A significant aspect of the problem is the 
mismatch between the way in which a human being thinks, and the 
way in which information is physically presented to him by the 
system interface. Attempts to reduce this particular mismatch are 
usually described as 'human factors engineering' and there is an 
extensive body of literature concerned with the cognitive and 
engineering aspects of the problem. Natural language processing 
has itself been a field of intense study for a number of years 
(see for example Addis 1977, Reitman 1983 or Winograd 1981) and 
attempts to build problem solving systems and other more "human-
like" systems have occupied artificial intelligence workers for 
decades. 
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Recent technical advances such as the light-pen, mouse, touch-
sensitive screen and partial voice recognition seem unlikely to 
totally replace the screen and keyboard combination for some 
time yet. In general, it would seem that it will be a long time 
(Michaelis, Miller and Hendler 1982) before improvements in the 
technical interface enable significantly easier man/machine 
interaction. The problem goes far beyond simple engineering; any 
human being is possessed of a brain, the subtleties and 
complexities of which are only now beginning to be realised. 
Insights into this subtlety can be seen in comparisons between 
human and computer interactions within the artificial 
intelligence field (see for example Michaelis, Miller and Hendler 
1982). Attempts to improve the man/machine interface essentially 
require that the machine should possess, or be able to simulate, 
certain human-like attributes and this would appear to be a very 
tall order at the present time. 
In the meantime, the significant difficulties which face every 
would-be computer user will remain as a primary stumbling block 
to computer-based decision system usage. Within present day 
technology, some systems are claimed to be more user-friendly 
than others. There has been much discussion of user-friendliness 
but few attempts to seriously define what such a term could mean 
in a way that could be experimentally tested. Aspects which are 
discussed revolve around several factors, a representative list 
of relevant items (adapted from Reisner 1981) would include the 
following: 
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1 ease of learning - time taken to initially learn to use the 
system 
2 immediate comprehensibility - the ease with which system 
concepts can be employed, once learnt 
3 productivity - how well the system can be used by a skilled 
user 
4 retention how easy the system is to remember 
5 relearning ~ how easy to relearn after a period of time 
The dynamics of the learning processes involved here are still 
being uncovered. Even learning how to use a word processing 
package requires considerable effort expenditure on the part of a 
naive computer user: 
"Learners must analyze basic procedures in terms of the 
context of various word-processing goals. This is not a matter of 
rote learning and passive assimilation; even the simplest 
procedures like word deletion or replacing a letter reveals the 
difficult task of identifying relevant elements of these 
procedures and trying to integrate them into a smooth operation. 
Learners' understanding of procedures works by successive 
approximations." (Carroll and Mack 1984) 
An example of recent research into the efficacy of a a 
particular type of conceptual user interface can be seen in 
Savage and Habinek (1984); here, the authors examine types of 
menu-driven interfaces and with subjects who posessed varying 
degrees of experience. An attempt to establish factors which 
might make the interface more enjoyable, by referring to 
pleasurable aspects of computer games has been described by 
Malone (1984). As with other examples of human factors research, 
results are largely specific to the particular research situation 
and it is difficult to generalise concepts that hold true for the 
general situation. Essentially, apart from some very broad 
generalisations it is not yet wholly clear why, or under what 
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circumstances, some types of interface are more effective than 
others. The problem is not a technical one; it relates to 
cognitive and behavioural characteristics of users which are ill-
understood at present. 
Lucas (1974) has empirically tested the relevance of system 
quality and found, not surprisingly, that its influence was 
positively correlated with attitudes and system use. Lucas 
conceives of system quality as a separate or "absolute" entity, 
and thus his measure of "quality" is taken separately from 
observers other than the managerial subjects on which the 
dependent variables were measured. Maish (1979) showed that 
managers' positive feelings about the information system as a 
whole were correlated with positive feelings about the perceived 
on-line system quality; this correlation was shown to be stronger 
than relationships with feelings about computer staff, or 
involvement in design for example. O'Reilly (1982) studied a 
number of personal and situational variables and has shown that 
perceived information accessibility dominates as an explanatory 
variable of information use over perceived information quality. A 
study by Culnan (1983) investigated the choice by individuals of 
various forms of external information acquisition, and also found 
that usage of an information source was positively correlated 
with perceived accessibility (i.e perceived ease of access), but 
that other variables were also involved in the choice. 
In general, practical guidelines for systems analysts and 
programmers on the development of usable systems interfaces are 
only now becoming available (see Rubinstein and Hersh 1984 for 
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example), but even here the emphasis is very much on the marginal 
improvement of existing practices - verbal style of error 
messages, number of items on a screen menu and so on - rather 
than significant or fundamental changes in the way that the 
interface lS handled, As in other areas of computer-related 
literature there is a distinct gap between theoretical aspects of 
human behaviour and recommendations for practitioners, 
Discussion 
In order to build an initial model of the implementation 
process, it is necessary not only to identify key variables but 
to show how these are related to each other. Many of the 
discussions of implementation in the literature do not describe a 
specific model of the implementation process, rather the model in 
the author's mind remains implicit. However, some authors have 
attempted an explicit description of theoretical models which 
relate one or more variables together and these will be briefly 
reviewed. 
Many of the early models of the implementation process are based 
(explicitly or implicitly) on the Lewin/Schein model which has 
already been discussed in an earlier section. Essentially, this 
model considers an overall organizational change process although 
at a rather abstract level (ie detailed behavioural processes are 
not made explicit). Kolb and Frohman (1970) have developed this 
into a normative process model which shows seven stages in terms 
of an interventionist's behaviour: scouting, entry, diagnosis, 
planning, action, evaluation, termination. The model shows an 
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essentially serial pattern with two feedback loops. This model is 
used by Ginzberg (1981) as the theoretical framework for 
empirical analysis of several factors relating to MIS usage. The 
viewpoint of these models is essentially that of the change 
agent, or interventionist; factors relating to individual subject 
behaviour are not explicitly entered into the model (although 
these factors may well be discussed by the author in connection 
with it). 
With a similar viewpoint are those models based on the 
development life-cycle. Many such models have appeared 
systems 
in the 
literature. A representative example is given by Reisman and 
Kluyver (1975) who consider six discrete stages: feasibility 
study, preliminary design, detailed design, prototype, 
implementation and dissemination-use-revision. McKeen (1983) 
considers analysis, design, coding, testing and implementation. A 
more detailed version is provided by Kling and Scacchi (1980) who 
discuss ten stages of project development and implementation. 
Moving on from these distinctly prescriptive models, there have 
been far fewer attempts to create frameworks which address 
implementation with a view to describing elements of human 
behaviour during implementation. Of these, Manley (1975) 
considers a two-state decision process by the user (described as 
a "client" in his analysis), whereby the user accepts or rejects 
a MS/OR proposal. Manley also proposes a system of variables 
which affect user adoption. These variables fall into two 
categories: factors creating resistance to implementation and 
factors creating pressures towards accepting implementation. 
Manley shows these two sets of variables acting against each 
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other to create an equilibrium or balance point of user 
resistance. 
overcome by 
This resistance is of course seen as something to be 
appropriate organizational change techniques; in 
(if all relevant factors had been included) the model principle, 
could be used predict the level of resistance which is to be 
overcome. 
Considering specifically computer based applications, Schewe 
(1976) proposes a model which relates sets of beliefs and 
attitudes to computer system usage. According to this model, 
there is a serial process whereby the user's beliefs are 
evaluated to give a set of attitudes, which in turn affect system 
usage. Lucas (1974) suggests a model (some of the elements of 
which he tests empirically) which includes ten distinct aspects 
relating to system use; these aspects are related in complex ways 
in the model, which is clearly intended to be a complete 
representation of the relationships between the variables which 
affect system use. The most significant elements of the model 
include: user attitudes and perceptions, situational and personal 
factors, decision style, technical quality of system, job 
performance and information services department policies and 
attitudes. Of all the models considered so far, the one by Lucas 
is by far the most complete and differs from most others in 
considering multiple aspects of the situation. This is not 
intended as a criticism of less complete models where the author 
is perhaps deliberately separating out specific elements for 
consideration; however, it does sometimes appears as if some 
authors writing later than the Lucas study are not aware of other 
aspects of the implementation process which would be relevant to 
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their models. 
None of the models described above take the viewpoint of the 
individual user of technology. The intention in this thesis is to 
create a an adoption model which includes all the likely elements 
of behavioural variables and establishes a more comprehensive 
model of adoption behaviour. In other words, the theoretical 
model should be reasonably complete. Of course, not all of the 
elements of the model will be tested in field research; the 
elements for test will be dictated various constraints as well as 
by decisions on those aspects considered most theoretically 
suitable - but that is no reason for not showing them all in the 
first instance, 
Following the review and discussion of factors in the following 
elements represent the author's distillation of that material and 
are presented for inclusion in a new general model of computer 
adoption: 
1. wider and national environment 
national culture and norms 
structural effects (including the availability of technical 
expertise) 
effects of the computer milieu 
2. organizational environment 
culture and norms 
structural and size effects 
political and power issues 
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3. situational issues 
user involvement in design and choice 
top management influence 
advocacy 
4. manager/analyst interface 
differences in goal orientation, 
outlook and cognitive style, and 
in knowledge base 
5. individual characteristics 
personal characteristics 
cognitive style 
6. attitudes 
managerial attitudes, perceptions 
and expectations 
7. manager/system interface 
quality of interface 
nature of facilities 
relevance of facilities 
A model showing the interrelationships between between the groups 
of factors is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 A theoretical model of managerial computer adoption 
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Having selected these items as putative variables, the 
relationship between them and the dependent variable (computer 
system adoption and use) could be described simply as follows: 
p(A) = f( Fl + F2 + .,. Fn) ( l) 
where the probability of adoption and use, p(A) is some function 
of the various factors Fl through Fn. 
113 
In other words, there are a number of factors which separately or 
together act so as to predispose a manager towards adopting and 
using a computer; it is not certain all the factors have been 
listed, but it is hoped that most of the significant ones have 
been included. In principle we could experimentally isolate one 
or more of these variables and determine the strength of its 
association with the dependent variable. This in fact is the 
underlying, non-explicit model of many of the studies of 
implementation discussed in the literature. The model could be 
usefully extended by considering the independent variables in two 
groups (rather after the fashion of Manley 1975), ie factors 
acting in favour of adoption (Fl through Fn) and factors acting 
against (Rl through Rn): 
p(A) = f( Fl + F2 + ,,, Fn) - g( Rl + R2 + ... Rn) ( 2) 
This formulation is useful both as a mental construct and aide-
memoir and also as a theoretical basis for considering research 
designs; ie experimental evidence may be gathered concerning the 
relative size of the coefficients in the model - in this way the 
relative importance of the variables would be determined, an 
aspect which would be of great interest to implementers. However, 
it is considered that the variables from the list will act 
together in subtle and complex ways, and it will be very helpful 
to attempt to specify further the theoretical direction of some 
of the main relationships between these variables, and between 
them and the independent variable. Some of these relationships 
have already been suggested by previous authors; some even have 
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been tested empirically. In general, however, the relationships 
of the model must be based on a synthesis of the implementation 
literature together with general organizational and behavioural 
theory. 
Towards a process model 
The adoption model shown in figure 4.1 shows the principle 
factors and their relationships in the adoption process. What it 
does not show is the adoption process itself. In addressing the 
theoretical basis for this adoption process it is necessary to 
choose a viewpoint and focus which will reflect the dynamics of 
the adoption decision situation from the viewpoint of the 
individual manager within an organizational context and which 
will provide a framework for discussing his behaviours. 
The discussion of models from the implementation literature 
indicates that it is necessary to go further afield in search of 
an appropriate framework for the dynamics of the adoption 
decision process. A suitable process model for our purposes at 
this point can be found in theories of diffusion of innovation 
where the wider social processes of adoption have been discussed. 
The innovation literature does not hitherto seem generally to 
have been brought to bear on computer system adoption; 
nevertheless, it would seem that examination of process models 
from this area will serve our purposes and prov i.de useful 
insights. In addition, the innovation literature provides a 
number of useful terms and concepts which will be brought in 
where appropriate; in particular, the term "adoption" seems more 
appropriate (and has been used throughout this thesis) to the 
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senior~managerial situation, where considerable discretion 
exists, rather than "implementation" which carries overtones of 
limited choice on behalf of the user. 
and Shoemaker (1971), the process of 
technological adoption can be viewed in terms of four phases: 
knowledge, persuasion, decision and confirmation. This is of 
course only one of several versions of this process to be seen in 
the innovation literature; a review of this literature by 
Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek (1973) shows at least seven similar 
theoretical configurations. Although the full process model is 
not entirely suitable for our purposes, it has the benefit of 
being more explicit than the Lewis/Schein change model, and more 
general than the Manley model. 
The complete model of the innovation-decision process according 
to Rogers and Shoemaker concentrates on aspects of social 
communication which are not relevant to our purpose. Although it 
is felt that a process view is important, both as a theoretical 
view and as a research framework, this does not necessarily mean 
that the particular conceptual view of the process offered by 
Rogers and Shoemaker is especially relevant; therefore the 
details of the process will be left to one side pending the 
emergence of data from the research. The model has therefore been 
simplified and modified to show its relation to computer system 
adoption and is shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 A dynamic model of the computer adoption process 
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The main features of this arrangement are that there is a 
decision process rather than a finite yes/no choice at one 
instant in time, and that the decision has multiple outcome 
possibilities. The model shows that the potential adopter moves 
through a decision process which is influenced by various 
variables; he then either adopts or rejects the innovation under 
consideration. Subsequently, he either continues with the 
adoption or discontinues (if adopted) or (if rejected) he adopts 
later or continues the rejection. 
The original Rogers and Shoemaker model contains three classes of 
variables (whereas our previously described model of adoption 
variables contains seven classes of relevant factors). The 
process model has been shown here to include one set of adoption 
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variables only, in order to concentrate on the principle process 
elements. It is not of course clear at this stage which (if, 
indeed, any) of the items amongst our seven sets of variables 
will interact at any particular stage of the adoption process. 
Indeed it is one of the main purposes of the field research to 
establish empirically the relationships between variables within 
the framework of this process model. Chapter 16 will show the 
development of a new process model which is based on the results 
of the field research, and which shows crucial modifications to 
the model presented here. 
Conclusions 
This review of the issues which have been found to affect the 
implementation of computer systems has been a sampling of a wide 
and diffuse literature. There have been many different themes and 
perspectives, and some of the views found are in conflict; much 
of the literature is normatively oriented and empirical work is 
sparse. However, a variety of useful concepts and insights has 
been reviewed, and these have provided the basis for putative 
theoretical models of the adoption process. Two models have been 
developed, a general model and a dynamic process model which 
together can be used to guide the shape .of the field research. 
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Chapter 5 
Introduction to the Field Research: Methodological Issues 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the issues and arguments behind the choice 
of research strategy. A programme of interviews was undertaken 
which was designed to explore research questions and create 
comparative materials for theoretical development. Some of the 
difficulties in the method are discussed, in particular that of 
gaining organizational access at high management levels. Finally, 
the steps taken to enhance the validity and generality of the 
findings are discussed. 
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Choosing a research strategy 
The purpose of the research was to contribute to understanding of 
those processes and phenomena which influence the use of 
computer-based decision aids by senior managers for their own 
decision activities. Several questions have been developed over 
preceding chapters and these include the following: what role 
does the computer (in direct use) play in the working lives of 
top managers, and how does this come about? What are the 
differences and variations in the nature of this role, and what 
causes these differences? Are the senior manager's skills 
enhanced by the system? How are the ideals and aims of decision 
support systems achieved given the apparent mismatch between the 
nature of these aims and the practicalities of senior managerial 
work? 
The problem arose as to how best to research these questions, 
bearing in mind both the limitations of time and cost which beset 
a doctoral project and also the need to show a demonstrably valid 
and appropriate methodology. several relevant research strategies 
for investigating managerial behavioural issues have been used 
successfully by researchers in the past, and these include 
participant observation, direct/structured observation using 
diary studies and other materials, personal interviews, and 
postal questionnaire survey methods. 
There are advantages and disadvantages in all these strategies 
and it was not immediately obvious which (if indeed any) of them 
would be the most suitable in the present project. On the one 
hand small numbers of respondents investigated in depth over time 
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might yield valuable qualitative materials and insights - but 
problems of generality, validity and reliability would have to be 
faced. On the other hand, a large postal survey would provide 
quantitative data which could be investigated statistically 
but, such research would necessitate adopting a clearcut 
perspective at the outset and would be primarily a verification 
rather than an exploratory study. Of course, various combinations 
of these and other techniques are possible; but a danger of 
attempting too much could be the risk of falling between two 
stools and not achieving a sufficiently substantial result. 
The approach adopted was something of a compromise between these 
positions. A study was carried out which involved a programme of 
interviews with top managers from a number of organizations, in 
order to create materials for intra- and inter-organizational 
comparisons. The main body of the results came from interviews 
with senior managers in five organizations (although many other 
organizations took part in the study as will be explained later). 
Interviews were also carried out with intermediary and systems~ 
providing staff wherever possible. In addition, reference was 
made to written materials in the form of reports and memos etc., 
where these were thought to be relevant to systems implementation 
considerations. 
The interviews with top managers had three elements: 
l pre-defined short-answer questions designed to test specific 
hypotheses 
2 open-ended questions intended to explore specific pre-determined 
aspects 
3 exploration of matters arising in conversation 
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It is felt that this strategy was a reasonable one for the 
purposes of the research; it avoided the fixed viewpoint of 
questionnaire research, which was arguably inappropriate bearing 
in mind the current state of knowledge of the topic, but at the 
same time it enabled a good measure of comparison to be made 
between managers, thus improving confidence in the generality of 
the findings. Some pros and cons of alternative methods are 
discussed in the next section. 
In the event, it is believed that the information coming from the 
interview programme has enabled the construction of a conceptual 
framework which is a useful starting point for other studies 
using different methods. An additional, and very strong argument 
was that to the author's knowledge (and bearing in mind an 
extensive review and computer based literature search), a 
comparative interview survey of this nature had not been carried 
out with senior managers before in this context and was long 
overdue. 
Discussion of alternative research methods 
The argument against "remote" questionnaire methods is that, used 
alone, they tend to provide information about, and in terms of, 
the conceptual framework which is used to devise the 
questionnaire. In this instance it was felt necessary to explore 
the validity of the theoretical framework specifically, and to 
accept (indeed welcome), and explore any modifications which 
arose out of disconfirming evidence from the direct discussion 
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with respondents. 
An alternative to one-off interviews was the direct observation 
of senior managerial computer use within the organizational 
setting, preferably undertaken over an extended period and 
encompassing the whole of an adoption cycle. The value of this 
method would have been that the researcher could (at least in 
theory) directly observe aspects of decision behaviour allied to 
computer use, in a way this may have yielded better information 
than could be acquired by simply asking respondents to report 
their own behaviour. Of course the problems of managerial self-
reporting are well known, (see Mintzberg 1973, Stewart 1967, 
Ives and Olson 1981, and Tisdall 1982), and opting for an 
interview 
However, 
programme meant taking on board these 
it was felt that given the acknowledgement 
problems. 
at the 
outset that self-reports were likely to be inaccurate and must be 
checked at every opportunity, then it would still possible to 
gain reliable information if suitable precautions were taken. 
The argument against participant and direct observation was 
essentially one of resources versus reliability. In a doctoral 
project the researcher is his only resource and must be used to 
the most economic effect. Within the constraints of the project 
timescale it would have been difficult to study more than one or 
two managers intensively, always supposing, of course, that 
suitable and willing participants could be found, by no means a 
minor point, as will be discussed later. The decision was 
influenced by the conflicting evidence pertaining to senior 
managerial use presented in the literature (see chapter 1) In the 
light of this evidence it was felt to be vital that a reasonable 
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spread of managers was addressed. With the benefit of hindsight, 
it is felt that the study of only one or two people could have 
been extremely misleading. 
"It is obvious that however ingenious the testing of 
hypotheses in one organization, we can never be sure of their 
generalised validity. On the contrary, we can be almost certain 
that such hypotheses are only valid under certain conditions and 
for certain types of organization. This being the case, the only 
way to find out what these conditions are is by the appropriate 
comparison of more than one case." (Mouzelis 1967) 
A further point about observation methods relates to the 
difficulty of viewing the interactions which affect the 
implementation process; there will be significant meetings, 
significant chance remarks and influences from a host of 
different directions. The observer would be lucky indeed to be 
present at more than a very tiny proportion of these perhaps 
crucial events - and again, the point arises as to the meaning of 
such events; unless the observer can step in and ask what the 
consequence of an interaction was, then he is no better off than 
if he interviews respondents afterwards. The problem with 
interviewing is of course that the subject will suppress, be 
unaware of, or be unable to articulate, crucial material. 
Clearly some variables are better measured by observation and 
some by interview or other techniques. The choice of measurement 
method must suit the variable to be measured. At an exploratory 
level, the interview (providing it was well prepared and 
conducted) seemed the most likely method to generate the most 
insightful material at the level of research envisaged here. 
An important point has been expressed by Dainty (1983): 
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" ideal cases of experimental, survey or ethnographic 
studies are moderately rare and are not necessarily the best way 
of tackling a research question. In practice, research is not one 
that follows styles, but one which tries to answer questions by 
the most appropriate means. . .. the most appropriate means may 
well be an ad hoc combination of methods designed to maximise 
generalisability and inclusiveness within the available resources 
and circumstances." 
Another option which was considered after the interview programme 
had been in progress for a while, was the possibility of 
supporting interview materials by the administration of a Kelly's 
grid (Easterby-Smith 1980, 1983) to senior managers in order to 
explore aspects of their mental constructs at various points in 
the adoption cycle. Again this was not taken up in view of the 
anticipated difficulties of gaining access to sufficient willing 
participants within the project timeframe; however, such an 
exercise remains an attractive proposition which can be explored 
at a later date. 
Organizations in the survey 
The approach adopted was to interview as many senior managers as 
possible within the project timeframe, selecting respondents and 
organizations with a view both to the requirements of the 
research questions already formulated and to emerging theory. In 
the event, over an 18-month period, over 70 senior managers were 
interviewed from 42 organizations. A breakdown of the interviews 
by organization type is shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5,1 Organizations and respondent groups 
Organization 
2 Private multinationals 
6 Large private companies 
16 Small firms 
1 Public corporation 
12 District councils 
1 County Council 
Senior Manager 
Respondents 
17 
8 
16 
6 
11 
4 
1 Higher Education Establishment 7 
Other/miscellaneous 2 
71 
In this way, 41 respondents came from private industry and 31 
from the public domain. The private firms ranged from a very 
large multinational through medium-sized and small companies down 
to one firm of only 4 employees. The firms were involved in a 
range of activities from chemical process operations through to 
retailing. Many of the firms were manufacturers however, and 
service industries are not well represented. See appendix 3 for a 
full list of these businesses. Organizations in the public domain 
included a port authority, a higher education establishment, and 
county and district councils. Confidentiality was explicitly 
requested by some organizations or respondents, and was implicit 
with others; in order to preserve this confidentiality, codes are 
used for all organizations and all respondents throughout this 
thesis. 
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In addition to the senior managers, system-providing or 
intermediary staff were seen wherever possible (and appropriate); 
the systems providers were interviewed in order to establish the 
technical nature of the computer systems introduced and also to 
establish their view of the reasons behind the implementation and 
generally to achieve an alternative view of the implementation 
and adoption process. 
Table 5.2 Organizations and intermediary respondents 
Organization 
2 Private multinationals 
6 Large private companies 
1 County Council 
Other/miscellaneous 
Defining top management 
Intermediary -
systems provider 
or analyst 
respondents 
8 
1 
1 
1 
11 
The nature of senior management has been discussed in some depth 
in earlier chapters; the interest here was in organizational 
managers who have responsibility for significant decisions in 
their organizations. In order to operationalise this concept in a 
concrete way, it was decided to interview only board members (or 
their equivalent in public organizations) and to check decision 
significance with questions relating to their resource allocation 
133 
authority. This latter enquiry proved enlightening, as in some 
organizations (notably the multinational computer firm) the title 
of director and even managing director appeared to be used 
somewhat indiscriminately. (A further discussion of the pros and 
cons of various operational definitions of business elites can be 
found in Giddens 1974, and Pahl and Winkler 1974). Identifying 
top managers in the public domain was not always 
straightforward. Departmental directors were selected from the 
County Council, and chief officers from the District Councils; 
the higher education establishment had two distinctly separate 
strands: administrative and academic, so the vice chancellor and 
three top administrative officers were seen, together with deans 
of major academic faculties. A more detailed discussion of this 
issue is contained in appendix 2. 
The problem of access 
In practice, the selection of managers and organizations proved 
difficult owing to access difficulties encountered in most of the 
organizations contacted. It was necessary to gain access to 
respondents from various points of the adoption cycle, as well as 
from organizations which represented a reasonable sample of 
organizational sizes and types. Both these constraints are 
necessary concomitants of the theoretical aspirations discussed 
earlier, in order to generate theoretical insights with general 
validity. In the event, gaining access to managers at the right 
level proved to be difficult and this in itself acted to 
constrain the research effort in various ways. 
Senior managers are, of course, notoriously difficult people to 
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gain access to, which is perhaps why relatively few in-depth 
studies have been undertaken. In a study of company directors by 
Pahl and Winkler (1974), the authors made the following 
observations about the access problem: 
" we anticipated ... a very high rate of refusals in 
ordinary, unsponsored approaches, wasting effort and invalidating 
the very rigour the formal procedure was designed to achieve. 
This anticipation proved to be correct. Even with personal 
introductions, we were refused access to 85% of the more than 130 
companies we approached." 
In this project, most access attempts were sponsored to some 
degree and the refusal rate was not so high; nevertheless, access 
difficulties had an affect on considerations of research design 
and especially validity, so that a discussion of the implications 
is essential. The problem was that if a very high rate of access 
refusals were experienced then inevitably the question of bias 
could be raised (to say nothing of the practical difficulties 
engendered by the excessive time and financial costs involved). 
Alternatively, if the line of least resistance were taken towards 
acquiring willing participants then a charge of "convenience" 
sampling could be levelled which would imply, at the very least, 
that the sample was simply not a sample of anything in 
particular. These problems were at least partially resolved by 
gaining access to organizations where possible, but then 
attempting to interview all the senior managers within the target 
organization. 
In general, although there are substantial amounts of literature 
on all aspects of research methodology, there is unfortunately 
very little discussion of the practical (but essential) steps 
involved in gaining access to difficult respondents. In 
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addition, most research reports simply do not discuss how access 
was gained, or mention it but cursorily. More seriously, the more 
evangelical descriptions of DSS use at senior level found in the 
literature make no reference to the way in which particular 
respondents were selected, which leaves room for some doubt, at 
the least, about the generality of the reported phenomena. 
It was found in practice that success in gaining organizational 
access was critically dependent on the method employed. This was 
discovered after some expensive practical experience. For 
example, an attempt to gain access to the board of ABC from 
introductions at middle management level proved to be an 
immensely time-wasting failure. Each attempt to move up a rung of 
the management ladder was met with delays and difficulties of 
various kinds, so that although useful background information had 
been acquired, the researcher was still several rungs below the 
top even after months of negotiation. In the end, board level 
access was eventually gained by a direct personal introduction 
from outside the organization (so that all the intervening 
management levels were bypassed). With hindsight, there are, of 
course, very good reasons why the "bottom up" access path should 
be difficult: top managers regard their time as a very precious 
commodity, a view shared by their subordinates who themselves 
depend on access to the top for their success; additionally, 
there will be political and social reasons which make upwards 
introductions difficult. However, even direct approaches can have 
their problems. On one occasion, the chairman of a large 
organization had agreed to be seen; but on contacting his 
secretary for an appointment the researcher was told: "Yes, he 
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has agreed to see you, but looking at his diary, this year is out 
of the question and next year looks very difficult!" 
Several organizational access methods were tried over the life of 
the project; these can be categorised as shown in table 5.3 
below. These methods met with varying degrees of success, with 
method 1 being the most successful, and method 5. the least 
successful. 
Table 5.3 Organizational access methods reviewed 
Access Method 
1. Indirect approach via facilitator 
2. Direct approach by letter and phone call, 
naming a contact as reference (sponsor) 
3. Direct approach as above, but with no 
named reference 
4. Indirect approach via senior manager 
5. Indirect approach via middle manager 
Value 
most 
successful 
least 
successful 
A facilitator, in this context, is a person who is known to the 
researcher, who personally knows the target respondent(s) and has 
the necessary standing to arrange contact. Having gained an 
appointment to see one senior manager, it was then usually 
slightly easier to arrange to see his colleagues using his name 
as a reference (although as the above table indicates, this was 
not usually arranged via the senior manager contact himself). 
Examples of the different types of introductory letters used are 
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shown in appendix 4. Although some stress has been placed on the 
method of access as the first factor in gaining entry, it did 
seem as if some organizations had a culture which favoured 
contact with "outsiders" (and academic enquiry) whilst others did 
not. 
In order to overcome access and selection difficulties and to 
attain as balanced and bias-free a sample as possible, a strategy 
was developed whereby many organizations were approached at the 
top level, and their suitability judged in terms of top level 
computing experience (it being necessary to find respondents at 
all stages of the adoption process). Having interviewed one 
respondent, a vigorous attempt was made to see all the board 
level managers in that organization, even though this move was 
not always welcomed either by the main contact or by the 
respondents themselves. The procedure primarily consisted of a 
carefully worded introductory letter (see appendix 4), mentioning 
a contact if possible, followed a few days later by a phone call 
to the manager's secretary. It was generally not sufficient 
simply to ask to see people; it was necessary to gain the 
confidence and interest of personnel at various levels, whilst at 
the same time avoiding leading respondents' opinions. In 
practice, most respondents required at least one letter and 
several phone calls to arrange an appointment. It was rarely 
possible to interview more than one respondent from an 
organization on one day, so that in general, the accessing and 
interviewing process was extremely expensive in terms both of 
time and cost. Interviews were always followed by a personalised 
follow-up letter thanking the respondent for his time. 
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In actively pursuing respondents in target organizations, a 
balance had to be struck between being persistent enough to gain 
access to the desired respondents, and yet not so assertive as to 
run the risk of causing annoyance or damaging the efforts of 
other researchers. Naturally, there were refusals of various 
kinds; but in five organizations a majority of board-level 
managers were eventually interviewed, giving five case studies 
where respondent selection was relatively bias free. These five 
case studies formed the backbone of the research effort. 
Table 5.4 Analysis- of interviewed and target respondents 
Interviewed Target 
Respondents Respondents 
1. ABC Multinational (Division) 7 8 
2. BCD Multinational 10 15 
3 . PHA Public Corporation 5 7 
4. CCC County Council 4 6 
5 . NHL Higher Education Est. 7 10 
6. Small firms group 16 20 
7. District council group 11 12 
In some other organizations, investigations were curtailed owing 
to denied access. This resulted in individual interviews from 
respondents which, while interesting in their own right and 
valuable in general analysis, did not have quite the same 
usefulness as the organizational case studies where a majority of 
respondents were seen and important cross comparisons and 
evaluations could be made. This "miscellaneous'' group was used in 
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statistical analysis (see chapter 9), but not in the qualitative 
analysis because of the lack of comparative and corroborative 
materials. 
In addition to the organizational case materials, there were two 
other sets of data, relating to small firms and local district 
councils respectively. In these two categories of organization, 
slightly different selection procedures were applied. Firstly, 
with respect to the small-firms group a decision was made to 
interview only the managing director/owner manager (referred to 
as the chief executive, or CE from now on) from each firm. This 
was done in order to get a larger sample of firms, and in the 
knowledge that the CE himself occupies an unusually significant 
role in the direction of small firms (see Gibb 1983). Secondly, 
with regard to the district councils an opportunity (using a 
named contact) arose to interview chief housing officers from 
most of the district councils in the North East of England. This 
opportunity was accepted in order to explore similarities and 
differences in one role occupancy across different organizations; 
time constraints precluded further investigations of different 
local council officer roles. 
The composition of the sample 
It was intended to interview respondents at different stages in 
the hypothetical adoption cycle, and to gain contrasting data 
about adoption and rejection processes. Using the theoretical 
process model from chapter 4 (see figure 4.2), respondents were 
categorised into four groups: 
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Table 5.5 Theoretical respondent categories 
l, Those who had undertaken some recent use of a direct computer 
facility (in their senior managerial capacity) 
~ adoption 
2. Those who had not undertaken such use 
- non-adoption 
3. Those who had subsequently continued their use 
- continuance 
4. Those who had subsequently discontinued 
~ discontinuance 
A prime methodological consideration therefore was to select 
organizations so that eventually, a number of respondents in each 
category would have been seen. This aspect of sampling is 
described by Glaser and Strauss (1968): 
"The researcher chooses ... groups that will help generate, 
to the fullest possible extent, as many properties of the 
categories as possible, and that will help relate categories to 
each other and to their properties ... " (Glaser and Strauss 1968) 
In fact, the study concentrates more on the issues and processes 
associated with the categories 1,3 and 4, and not so much on 
those who have no experience (or no exposure to) computing, in 
their senior managerial capacities. The district council group 
fell entirely into category 2, and although respondents provided 
interesting background and confirmatory materials they 
unfortunately contributed little to the theory developed later in 
the thesis, and will not be discussed in detail. This material 
was not wasted, because experience from these interviews . helped 
to shape the focus of the research effort, and to clarify 
boundary positions. The interview materials from the 
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miscellaneous group could also not be used in their entirety 
because in those instances there was no comparative data 
available, but at least the data could be used in the statistical 
work. 
In practice, it was rarely possible to ascertain the category of 
senior managers in any one organization without actually 
interviewing them personally. It was found that statements made 
about senior managerial computer use by others were generally 
unreliable. For example, BCD (a computer manufacturer) publicly 
announced in the national computer press [reference suppressed to 
preserve confidentiality] that its top management team were 
routinely accessing a certain DSS system; this turned out not to 
be the case when the researcher personally interviewed the 
managers (and was still apparently not true some 18 months 
later). 
Similarly, while researching in ABC the author was assured by the 
head of a computer providing team that the directors all 
personally regularly accessed a certain system, and comments to 
this effect were made in the organization's house journal; this 
also was incorrect (most of them had long since discontinued 
their use). It was also found that senior managers themselves did 
not know if their colleagues were making use of computers or not, 
either wrongly ascribing own-use to managers who made no use of 
their computers, or, less frequently, being unaware that a 
colleague had a computer on his desk. As research data emerged, 
it became apparent why some of this obscurity should be found; 
but in practice it made organizational access and selection a 
frustrating business because it was rarely clear until much 
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spadework had been done, as to whether an organization was of 
interest or not. 
Nevertheless, sufficient organizational cases studies were 
eventually built up to give a reasonable spread of respondents 
across all categories. A final analysis of the 71 respondents 
interviewed shows that about half had had recent experience of 
direct computer use (ie had adopted a system), and about half had 
not. Of those who had adopted a system, 60% had continued their 
use and 40% had not. These numbers thus provided an opportunity 
to investigate and compare the reasons for adoption and non-
adoption, continuance and discontinuance, and generally to 
explore the research questions outlined earlier. 
The numbers of senior managers from each organization type in 
each category is shown in Table 5.6 below: 
143 
Table 5.6 Numbers of respondents in theoretical categories 
Organization 
Private 
Multinationals 
Private large 
Companies (*1) 
Private small 
firms 
Public corp'n 
County council 
Higher Educ. Est 
District councils 
( *2) 
Other (*1) 
Totals: 
Notes: 
Total 
17 
8 
16 
5 
4 
7 
11 
3 
71 
Respondent Category 
1 2 3 4 
Computer No Comp. 
Use Use (Non- Contin- Discon-
(Adoption) Adoption) uance tinuance 
15 2 8 7 
4 4 4 0 
7 9 2 5 
3 2 3 
2 2 0 2 
2 5 2 
0 11 
2 1 2 
35 36 21 14 
*1. Data used in statistical work but excluded from qualitative 
analysis 
*2. Data excluded from further analysis 
The interview: formats and questions 
The interview format used was semi-structured. The session 
started with a short set of factual background questions which 
the respondent could easily answer from memory. This was followed 
by the introduction of a set of topics. All the topics to be 
discussed were noted on a computer printed list (see appendix 4 
for details). A topic would be introduced and the respondent 
invited to describe his experience in relation to it; reference 
to the detailed questions was made as a checklist to ensure that 
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all aspects of the topic were covered. The interview took 
different paths according to responses to early questions. Where 
the respondent made a point of interest, or said something which 
the interviewer did not understand, or wished to check or discuss 
further i then he would be asked to expand on - .... 1-...:- -.l-. ;:,uujt::l-l..o A 
summary of the topics introduced is shown in table 5.7 below: 
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Table 5.7 Summary of interview topics 
1. Personal factors 
Position in organization and responsibilities 
Career history 
Age; education 
2. General computer exposure 
Formal training 
Past experience 
Home computer ownership and use 
3. Computer Facilities in the organization 
General facilities 
Facilities available to the subject 
4. Category of user 
Non user, discontinued, slight, medium, heavy 
s. Factors in adoption/rejection 
6. System introduction processes 
Introduction process 
Subject's relation to design I choice processes 
Training facilities and use 
Manuals and written materials 
Time spent on learning 
7. Computer System Usage 
Systems use (amount per day) 
Nature of use 
Most used I preferred systems I what is of most use 
Why used personally 
Perceived difficulties I disadvantages 
8. System use in relation to job and job roles 
Job facilitation and general relevance 
Role changes I job changes related to adoption 
Relation to strategic decision - making 
9. Changes in perceptions of value of systems 
Views expressed after experience 
Views expressed before experience (4 respondents only) 
10. Factors in continuance I discontinuance 
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Four detailed interview 
different circumstances: 
checklists were developed for 
1 senior managers in 
organizations, 2 chief executives of small firms, 3 
providers and intermediaries 4 second (repeat) interviews 
use in 
large 
system 
(only 
used for two respondents). These checklists are shown in appendix 
4. A list of the quantitative variables showing the ranges of 
values into which responses were categorised is shown in appendix 
5. 
The sequence of topics and questions was designed to follow a 
logical flow, but respondents frequently introduced topics 
themselves so the interview would be allowed to proceed in the 
respondent's own sequence as far as possible, relying on the 
checklist to ensure that all the appropriate ground had been 
covered. The interview was scheduled to last one hour; 
occasionally, a respondent would continue talking after this 
time, but more usually he was very conscious of the approach of 
the end of the session and of his next appointment. Every effort 
was made to cover all the key areas on the schedule, but 
inevitably in some instances the researcher's control over the 
interview situation was somewhat limited. 
The interview format was piloted firstly with business school 
colleagues, and then with middle managers in two of the survey 
organizations. Some useful reference was made to Gorden (1969), 
and Seldon (1984) in refining interview technique, but it was 
found that experience in the interview situation itself 
substantially improved the quality of data collection. 
Inevitably, some aspects of the interview changed as experience 
and insights were gained. 
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The researcher did not use a tape recorder, but relied instead on 
long-hand notes together with a pre-printed schedule for scoring 
"yes/no" and other short responses. There are of course two 
schools of thought about and there are advocates of both 
systems. The advantages of the note-taking method seemed to be 
that problems of microphone shyness were avoided and this is an 
important point when sensitive organizational or personal issues 
are discussed, also the respondent's responses were pre-analysed 
to some extent by the nature of the note-taking process. The 
disadvantage was of course that the respondent sometimes talked 
rapidly and crucial points could be missed; this seemed to be 
less of a problem as experience was gained because responses 
could be anticipated to a certain extent, enabling the researcher 
to concentrate on significant or exceptional items. Another 
problem was the difficulty of noting down the response to one 
issue while simultaneously choosing the next topic for 
discussion. In practice, some managers interviewed were very 
sensitive about their computer use (or discontinuance) while 
others gave very personal or private insights into themselves or 
their organizations, and on balance it is felt that the avoidance 
of tape recording was the appropriate choice in this instance. 
Controlling content in the interview 
The interview situation was not always a straightforward one. A 
detailed account of the methods employed and some of the 
difficulties encountered has been described in an early 
methodological paper, see Martin (1985). One interesting aspect 
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was the failure of some respondents to follow the conversational 
"chain rule" (Denzin 1978) and these high-status men would not 
give the floor back to the interviewer. This required the 
researcher to cut in on a monologue; not always an easy thing to 
do with a managing director of a multi-million pound 
organization. But the main problem was the perspective adopted by 
some respondents: 
"Managers tend to censor their reports of activities to show 
themselves in a good light. Activities and behaviours which 
reflect unfavourably on a manager are "played down". Thus, 
defensiveness operates to reduce the accuracy of self report data 
concerning activities which managers.,. think contradict what is 
expected of them." (McCall et al 1978) 
The same could equally be said of their desire to present the 
organization, as well as themselves in a good light. With the top 
management respondents interviewed this was often a significant 
issue; as has been discussed at length in chapter 3, figurehead 
and leadership aspects are critical parts of top managers' roles. 
And of course in many instances the topic under discussion was 
the manager's "failure" (and some saw it as that) to utilise a 
computer, at a time when computer use has very significant 
cultural overtones associated with it. So certain parts of the 
interview rubbed against emotive issues. 
The outcome was that some managers exaggerated their computer 
involvement; for example the chairman of the large multi-national 
implied that he used a messaging system to communicate directly 
with his board colleagues, although the researcher had 
established that all but one of his colleagues had discontinued 
their own use, thus making his claim technically (and physically) 
impossible. Another respondent implied extensive direct use of 
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messaging systems when in fact questioning revealed that it was 
his secretary who was directly using the system. Other 
respondents discussed extensively the systems which they were 
"about to have installed'', or had used in the past, which made 
exploration of their present use very difficult indeed. In 
general, topics had to be probed in some depth in order to 
establish a realistic picture. 
"A participant can fabricate "tales of self" that belie the 
actual facts, and the other party lacks objective evidence to 
counter such tales." (Denzin 1978) 
The researcher took a sceptical approach to assertions of 
computer use and invited respondents to describe down-to-earth, 
factual aspects of their activities (how long used per day, which 
programs, how outputs used exactly, who they were communicated 
to, and so on). Wherever possible, respondents' evidence was 
checked and compared with others in the organization (peers, 
subordinates, system providers) and in any event they were 
questioned very carefully about any claimed computer use. 
A final example was the manager who spent some time in the 
interview describing the attributes of a system which was 
available to him; when questioned closely about his use it 
transpired that his description was of elements told to him by 
his system providers, and did not reflect his own personal 
experience at all (he finally admitted that he made no use of the 
system he had described). This respondent's interview data had to 
be abandoned altogether, because his later statements denied the 
validity of the earlier ones. The point is that the real 
relationship of this manager to the computer facility only 
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emerged after some quite intense questioning; it would have been 
very much easier to have simply accepted the first version as 
being representative of the respondent's actual relationship 
rather than his desired image of that relationship. Again, one is 
left wondering about the reliability of reports of managerial 
computer use where some form of cross-checking was not done. 
Another problem was the wide range of communication skills found 
in respondents which affected the way they described and reported 
on issues. An example would be the contrast between the head of 
NHL (institute of higher education) whose description of aspects 
of his computer use included some masterly and convincing 
statements, compared to some of the small business managers who 
found difficulty in either thinking about, or articulating issues 
under discussion. At some level, these respondents' accounts are 
simply not comparable. That some respondents were significantly 
more articulate than others was not necessarily anything to do 
with intelligence or other personal attributes, but probably 
related more to the respondent's working environment. In any 
event, with some respondents it was necessary to supply concepts 
and ideas in discussion for them to consider and react to, 
because they themselves had not considered matters in these 
terms. With other respondents, they rejected the researcher's 
concepts and supplied their own. 
The point in this section is not to denigrate the respondents, 
many of whom gave superbly reflective and helpful material and 
all of whom gave their precious time to be helpful; rather, it is 
to emphasise that there was a significant problem, one which will 
151 
affect all researchers who investigate similar areas, and one 
which has been carefully addressed in this project. 
Data documentation and analysis 
Data were analysed in several ways. Short answer questions were 
tabulated in various configurations, and have been analysed 
statistically in chapter 9. But the more valuable insights came 
from qualitative analysis of information from open ended 
questions, and answers from open discussion. Each interview was 
written up into a complete summarised account (see appendix 6 for 
examples of these accounts), showing key questions and answers, 
and the researcher's comments and notes. There were thus three 
documents for each respondent: the pre-printed interview schedule 
with short answers filled in, a separate set of long-hand notes 
taken at the interview, and the final summary account. In 
addition, the researcher maintained a separate journal in which 
were kept notes and self-addressed memos of important points and 
ideas. 
The written summary accounts were content-analysed individually 
and in groups at various stages of the analysis as the 
researcher sought categories of factors and other patterns in the 
data. Full descriptions of the way in which qualitative 
information was used is contained in the case analyses in 
chapters 6, 7 and 8 where the data is analysed into conceptual 
categories and supported by direct quotation from the interview 
source materials. The statistical analysis is dealt with in 
detail in chapter 9. Chapter 10 shows a synthesis of the features 
identified in earlier chapters in the form of a summary (table 
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10.1). This is used to deduce the variables thought to be most 
relevant in the context of senior managerial computer adoption in 
the particular circumstances outlined (table 10.2). 
Issues of validity and reliability 
The preceding discussion has indicated that the researcher was 
conscious of (and made stringent attempts to overcome) various 
kinds of bias arising from the circumstances of the research. 
These biases include the susceptibilities of the researcher as 
well as those arising from the circumstances of the research and 
the different perspectives of the managers. Issues of validity 
and reliability in this context are dealt with in some detail by 
Miles and Hubermann (1984) and their treatment has been used as a 
guide here. 
"When we come up with 
assume it to be typical, 
general phenomenon. But is 
(Miles and Hubermann 1984) 
a finding in a field study, we quickly 
representative, an instance of a 
it? And if it is, how representative?" 
The efforts made here to substantiate the validity of the 
investigation can be considered under 3 headings: 
1 majority sampling 
In the key case studies, the researcher took great pains to 
interview the majority of target respondents in each organization 
(whether the respondents or organization were pleased about the 
prospect or not). This was vital because it elicited views from 
managers who were not keen to describe their lapsed computing 
efforts, or who had views opposed to the more optimistic claims 
of advocates. In general the method probed views and experiences 
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which are not usually reported in the pro~computing 
and forced 
researcher 
literature, 
Where the 
then the 
the researcher to take an overall view. 
could not see the majority of top managers, 
information from respondents was not included in the main 
qualitative analysis. 
2 comparisons and cross-checks 
The information from respondents in the main case study 
organizations was subject to cross-checks of several kinds. 
Wherever possible, issues were checked with the respondent's 
peers, with his subordinates, and with his system-providers or 
intermediary. As the research proceeded, the researcher had to 
hand experience of other organizations and situations with which 
to compare and test emerging issues. In particular, there was 
the contrast of private and public organizations and of large and 
small organizations. Finally, rigorous statistical techniques 
were employed in the evaluation of certain background variables 
in order to check that more simple variables in the sample did 
not provide a more parsimonious explanation than the theoretical 
model proposed. 
3 a sceptical approach 
Interview questions were included which explored concrete aspects 
of the managers' experiences, and efforts were made to check 
assertions from different angles. Wherever possible, statements 
about the manager's current behaviours were preferred to reports 
of the past, and certainly over his intentions in the future. The 
researcher tested his own opinions, concepts and ideas by 
describing them to the respondents where possible (sometimes to 
meet scepticism in return!). Finally, the researcher's 
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qualitative analysis of information from the case organizations 
was subjected to critical review by colleagues and supervisor, 
who offered valuable comments and insights on the treatment of 
Summary 
Several alternative research strategies and their associated 
methodological characteristics have been discussed in the context 
of the present research aims. A research strategy was adopted 
which involved enacting a programme of interviews with 
respondents from several organizations in order to generate 
comparative materials. A key feature of the method was the 
majority sampling of top managers from five organizations, which 
yielded the data from which the bulk of the findings are derived. 
The aim has not been to describe some "perfect" methodology, but 
rather to indicate that the problems encountered - particularly 
those resulting from difficulties in gaining organizational 
access - have been recognised and successfully addressed. 
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Chapter 6 
Senior Managers in the Private Sector: Case Analysis of Two 
Large Companies 
Abstract 
This chapter examines evidence from two organizations in the 
private sector. Interview materials and other data are used to 
develope a picture of the behavioural features of computer 
adoption and use. Insights from both cases provide complementary 
ideas on important situational factors which influenced the 
managers' behaviour. The structure of the adoption process begins 
to emerge from the evidence discussed, and is seen in terms of a 
two-phase process. Ideas about computer s·ystems and managerial 
roles are discussed in terms of a mismatch between the managers' 
real roles and the effective outputs from the systems. 
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Introduction 
Information from the study of the large private organizations is 
presented in the form of two separate case studies. Each study is 
used independently to develop ideas about the features of various 
stages of computer adoption and use. 
Case 1 : The ABC Organization 
Background 
Part of a large multinational chemical group, ABC operates as a 
semi-autonomous division manufacturing organic chemicals. This 
long-established organization had a multi-million turnover and 
employed over 6000 staff. The organization has a long standing 
reputation for conservative (but successful) long-term operation, 
characterised by slow change and careful investment in new fields 
[from literature in the public domain]. The top managers had much 
in common with each other. Five had first degrees (three from 
Cambridge) and the sixth an equivalent accounting qualification; 
one had a doctorate all had further professional 
qualifications. Five were in their mid-fifties, and one man was 
in his late thirties. Although initial access was difficult, once 
this had been gained the respondents displayed considerable 
hospitality and charm, and were generally very helpful. 
Six out of seven directors were interviewed (the seventh having 
declined); two respondents were interviewed again some nine 
months later in order to check their progress on a new computer 
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adoption cycle. Four staff involved in computer systems 
development and implementation were interviewed and internal 
reports relating to relevant computer systems were examined. Some 
study was also made of published materials in the public domain, 
have been referenced here ln order to preserve 
confidentiality. In addition, the author was able to familiarise 
himself with at least some of the computer facilities and 
documentation (mainly those available in the public domain) which 
were discussed by the directors. 
Responsibilities at the top of this organization seemed clear-cut 
and straightforward, with a traditional board of executive 
directors each of whom had various functional responsibilities. 
The respondents described themselves as board members first and 
functional executives second; without exception they saw their 
main function as a long term policy-making team, of which members 
had certain "portfolios" according to personal interests and 
other factors. For example, the personnel director also presently 
headed the Management Services division, previously headed by the 
financial director. All the respondents had very significant 
personal resource allocation responsibilities according to the 
financial and personnel measures outlined earlier. In addition to 
these responsibilities, the respondents had multiple 
chairmanships and/or directorships of a complex web of subsidiary 
and associated companies. 
The extent of computer adoption 
This is of course the primary dependent variable in the study. As 
regards the respondents' present computer use, the following 
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table illustrates the position: 
Table 6.1 Senior managers and computer use categories 
A 
Respondent 
Sl Chairman 
S2 Deputy Chairman 
S3 Dir. of Personnel 
54 Dir. of Finance 
SS Dir. of Research 
S6 Commercial dir. 
Computer use status 
Non-user 
User (heavy) 
Non-user 
Non-user 
Non-user 
Non-user 
very interesting fact emerged from the study of this 
organization, which was that all six of the respondents had at 
some time attempted own-use of a computer facility, but five had 
subsequently discontinued their use. This came as something of a 
surprise as, prior to the interviews with the men themselves, the 
researcher had been given to understand that only two of the 
directors had any interest in computing. The description of the 
circumstances of this use naturally differed from individual to 
individual, but it was possible to piece together a largely 
coherent picture of past events. 
Briefly, five of the six respondents had passed through a cycle 
of computer system adoption followed by discontinuance (two of 
them were about to pass through another cycle and were 
interviewed again later in order to review their experiences and 
views after this second cycle). The sixth respondent (S2) was a 
special case; essentially, he had been using a computer himself 
for some time and acted as an advocate ("opinion leader'' in the 
terminology of Rogers and Shoemaker) in the adoption processes of 
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th others, he was continually involved in trying new systems 
personally and was renowned for his enthusiasm for computing. 
Features of system introduction and adoption 
All the respondents were asked about the events and processes 
which led to their adoption of the computer systems. Their 
responses varied, and of course there are several different, but 
perhaps equally valid, versions of motivations, events and 
consequences. Understandably, individuals have put their own 
interpretation on the relative importance of various factors and 
influences. The intention in this description is to give a 
simplified account, but without reducing it to a simplistic (and 
inaccurate) picture. 
Over a period of a few months, the directors had been involved in 
a scheme (sometimes described in retrospect as an experiment or 
trial) whereby they would accept and utilise computer equipment 
for their own use. This was part of a specific policy agreed 
between them, under the strong leadership of the chairman. The 
deputy chairman, S2 was acknowledged by the others as a powerful 
advocate of computing who had influenced the chairman and the 
board generally. 
The reasons given for the adoption varied from individual to 
individual; but they had agreed together to adopt the technology, 
and the reasons for the adoption were expressed as follows: 
"It was thought [ie agreed by the board as a 
policy] that each board member should have a 
relationship ... so they could learn about it." (S6) 
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matter 
hands 
of 
on 
"I was the MSD [management services division] director, so I 
had to have a go ... It was time for change, we must get the 
directors behind change." (S4) 
"I believe in leading in computing. I took it and did some 
experimenting and found out about the potential ... To see what it 
was like for others." (S3) 
"~n order that I should be seen doing it myself. My job is 
not to have a computer and use it myself, but to see that the 
business is using it sensibly" (Sl) 
"I chair the computer and systems steering panel." (S2) 
"We must all be wired up; it's the IT era, we must all loose 
our dark age habits. This was the agreement at the time." (S5) 
All the respondents were making a similar point: they felt the 
need to promote computing within the organization, and one way to 
assist in this process was to be seen adopting it themselves. In 
other words they were fulfilling an important duty with respect 
to their leadership roles. As has been pointed out by Mintzberg 
(1973), virtually every action taken by top management is 
monitored by subordinates who are searching for leadership clues; 
these managers were well aware of this and were deliberately 
acting so as to encourage others in the organization by 
promulgating positive values as regards computing. Apart from 
being a deliberate, preplanned and concerted effort to influence 
the attitudes and values of others within the organization, this 
concerted action indicates quite clearly that the attitudes of 
the directors themselves must have been favourably disposed 
towards computing generally, otherwise presumably they would not 
have agreed to take part in the project. 
Apart from promoting computing in a general way throughout the 
organization, one director (S6) had an even stronger reason for 
encouraging direct computer use. Part of his responsibilities 
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included a several hundred strong salesforce, who were about to 
be issued with computer terminals which would give direct 
messaging (to headquarters) and other facilities. In fact part of 
the facilities provided to the directors were based on the 
facilities issued to these salesmen. 
"I had a go because the salesmen were going to use it. I had 
a go - to understand what was happening. If I didn't show 
enthusiasm for something new, then the others [ie subordinate 
staff] wouldn't ... a need to be knowledgeable because the others 
were using it." (S6) 
This respondent is clearly explaining the importance of his 
leadership role: if he did not take up the computer-based 
messaging system, then his salesforce might read this as a cue 
that he was not wholly in support of the scheme. By visibly 
taking up the system himself he was making a clear statement: "If 
I can do it, you can (must) do it!" 
Not all the directors were as whole-heartedly enthusiastic about 
the proposed project: 
"I did not agree to using it - I acquiesced! The chairman 
[Sl] said we must all have them." (SS) 
This air of compliance (rather than conviction) was also 
expressed by S4, and in fact may have been an element in the 
adoption patterns of one or two of the others. Certainly, Sl 
strongly supported by S2, seems to have been the principal 
proponent. This finding is quite crucial when considering that it 
might have been justifiably thought that these powerful senior 
managers would have had complete discretion in their use of 
computing; that this is not so, and that part of the board was 
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acting to some extent "under orders" came as something of a. 
surprise. In any event, it is surely intriguing that none of the 
respondents mentioned the expected information value of the 
computing system as a reason for adopting the technology! 
As has been pointed out, the respondent S2 played a particularly 
crucial part in the adoption scheme. It emerged, from the 
interview with him as well as from the comments of his 
colleagues, that he was the principal high-level advocate of 
direct computing for the board. 
"I pioneer computing in ABC [group]; I am a champion of 
computing in ABC [division] ... I am a computing buff." (S2) 
Here, the respondent S2 specifically acknowledged his role as 
advocate of own-use systems. But in describing his reasons for 
adopting the equipment himself, he was less clear: 
the 
they 
(S2) 
"I've always pressed for my needs. It takes the pressure off 
rest of the board. My colleagues are scared of computers ... 
won't try them in the office because of their position." 
This really can be understood as a rationale, or case, for acting 
as the champion of computing. In other words, S2 claims, if he 
did not advocate and encourage his fellows (peers) they would be 
too frightened to adopt it themselves. The "fear" myth has been 
discussed earlier (see chapter 4); in this case, the fact that 
all his colleagues attempted to use the systems (most of them 
with apparent gusto, and all with some thoroughness) argues 
against the value of the "fear" argument. Nevertheless, the value 
of S2's champion role was specifically acknowledged by at least 
one of his colleagues: 
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"[S2] is genuinely enchanted with new things. He helps with 
change processes; he helps to drive things - he is our most 
important change agent." (S5) 
It is of course possible to speculate on the motives of S2 in his 
role as computer advocate (and some unkind corrunents were rnade by 
one or two of his colleagues), along the lines that such high 
level and visible advocacy of the upcoming technology acted so as 
to create and confirm a public image of himself as a go-ahead, 
dynamic leader of the new technological era. In a sense, all the 
directors were acting as "opinion leaders" (Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971); but S2 seemed especially keen to be associated with with 
this role. Such image-building would be useful preparation for 
any moves to affect power distribution within the organization. 
In other words, it is possible to impute political behaviour as 
an element in the adoption processes, 
Other sources of advocacy were present in the situation. The 
adoption of own-use systems at board level was part of a general 
and much larger movement towards managerial computing use at all 
management levels throughout ABC; this process was building to a 
peak at the time that the first round of interviews was 
undertaken. The high-level advocate S2 had his counterpart among 
the information providing staff. P8 was a middle-ranking manager 
in the Management Services Department, interviewed on two 
occasions with a separation of some months. He gave the 
impression of being an ambitious, vocal and articulate advocate 
of on-line management computing at all levels, stressing the 
importance of new technology in improving managerial decision and 
performance generally. He was not involved directly in the 
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technical team which devised the senior managerial systems, but 
was involved in managing the overall implementation strategy both 
at the senior and middle manager levels. He claimed to have 
influenced the board, and particularly S2, and certainly had 
acted as a of the new systemse rT1\....- ---.L.--J,... J.UC CAI...CHL. 
of his influence at the higher level was not clear (and was 
difficult to check); possibly he and S2 were simultaneously 
advocating similar broad lines and for similar reasons. In any 
event, P8 was recognisably the chief middle-management 
protagonist of managerial computing at ABC. It was learnt, some 
months later, that he had succeeded to the leadership of the 
Management Services Department - a prestigious and important 
appointment within ABC; an event surely not unconnected with his 
high-profile, timely (and very successful) advocacy. Whether 
similar benefits would accrue to the deputy chairman (S2) in the 
course of time is a matter of question. 
Systems and facilities 
The physical systems with which five of the directors had been 
provided consisted of the following: 
1 A display terminal linked to the organizational mainframe, and 
hence to certain of the main organizational databases 
2 A separate Prestel terminal linked to the general 
service (which included ABC generated databases as well 
usual commercial Prestel information on a host of topics 
from the weather to share prices and train timetables) 
Pres tel 
as the 
ranging 
These systems were physically located on a separate table next to 
the manager's desk, so that he could operate the keyboard(s) from 
his normal working position. Three of the respondents still had 
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equipment at their desks at the time of the interview, in other 
instances it had been moved out. At some stage in the 
development, the two terminals had been replaced by a single 
terminal giving the same facilities for some respondents. But 
some of the directors had ceased their usage by this .J.."--l. .Lit It: , so 
usually their comments refer to the separate facilities. 
The information which had been made available at the terminals is 
summarised in table 6.2 below: 
Table 6.2 Computer information provided for senior managers in 
case 1 
a ~ summaries of internal data (financial and operating data) 
b ~ analyses from internal databases (personnel records, and some 
production data) 
c - Messaging (to other board members and immediate subordinates) 
d - A diary management facility (indicating appointments for all 
board members) 
e - access to commercial data on the Prestel system 
The sixth director (S2) had the above facilities plus in 
addition an IBM pc which offered wordprocessing, spreadsheet, 
database and modelling facilities. He also had access to other 
mainframe-based files, including an external technical 
information archiving system. 
None of these items fall easily into the DSS categories outlined 
by Alter (1977b). The summaries and analyses were more akin to 
ordinary traditional financial or operational management reports, 
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ie they were not "single data items'' but on the other hand 
manipulation of the data was not possible from the terminal. The 
messaging and diary facilities do not form part of Alter's 
scheme, and neither do the data items available on the commercial 
Prestel system. This leads to an extension of the Alter 
classification to include the facilities found; a point which 
will be taken up later. 
System implementation 
Questions naturally arise as to how these particular systems were 
chosen and the nature of the senior manager's own involvement in 
system design and choice processes. Although it might be imagined 
that as much, if not more, effort would have been expended on 
designing the directors' information systems as would be expended 
on any other new system, this does not appear to be the case. 
Instead, it appears that they were simply given certain 
facilities which already existed and/or which had been designed 
for use by other personnel. It was not clear how the choice of 
these facilities (amongst many that were available) was made, but 
apparently the directors themselves had little say in the matter: 
"It was an experiment. The MSD people said: 'we'd like you 
to try this.'" (Sl) 
"It wasn't developed for me ... it was designed by MSD in 
conjunction with [S6's subordinates]. I was not involved at 
all."(S5) 
"THe system was put up by MSD. I don't know who exactly 
first suggested it." (S6) 
"MSD did the whole thing - I was not personally involved at 
all" (S3) 
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Sl and S4 also said they had had no input into design or choice 
mechanisms. S2, on the other hand, who was the advocate of the 
systems introduction and described himself as a "computer buff" 
claimed that the impetus had come from him: 
"Occasionally, chaps downstairs [MSD] say: Have you seen 
this? But usually it comes from me." (82) 
This refers to the fact that this respondent had a continuing 
interest in computing, and had experimented with various systems 
over an extended period of time. (This was learnt from a 
discussion with systems provider POS). Nevertheless, the systems 
which he had acquired were all either standard ABC systems (or 
standard IBM pc packages), and they had not been designed 
specifically for him. He had selected from what was available on 
an apparently largely experimental basis. The other five 
respondents had had virtually no say at all in the systems which 
they were offered by MSD, and certainly little attempt seemed to 
have been made to investigate their personal information needs. 
In fact the system implementation process seems largely to have 
followed the "backroom boy" or "hit and run" approach, as 
described by Docherty (1980). According to this characterization, 
low ranking system-users are excluded from design and decision 
processes owing to the prevailing organizational norms relating 
to both expertise and management control issues. However, in this 
instance the intending users were of course major organizational 
power holders who could easily have insisted on choice at all 
stages. In fact, the circumstance seems at first rather 
extraordinary, if the main intention had been to provide 
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personalised information systems; but if the primary objective, 
as far as the managers themselves was concerned, was "pour 
encourager les autres" then perhaps one system would serve as 
well as another. (But it must be said that the managers attempted 
to use the equipment as if they were expecting it to be of use to 
them). 
An internal organizational report on the systems described the 
project as an "experiment'', and implied that the object of the 
exercise was primarily to "test out the viability of the systems" 
(and not, by implication, actually to help the high-level users). 
This is of course, a completely different rationale from that 
used by the managers themselves, who seemed to see it as a means 
of encouraging others to use computers (and again, by 
implication, not to help themselves particularly). 
The systems in operation 
In practice, not all the respondents had found the systems 
particularly easy or pleasant to use. Difficulties at the 
man/machine interface were identified by four respondents as 
follows: 
"The palaver of (entering] in security codes" (SS) 
"Some bits were irritating. The time element was the 
worst ... I don't get enough practice." (S6) 
"I would get into the system, then get lost and not be able 
to get back. It's OK if you become expert, but... you have to 
know the [incantations, command and code sequences]. It was too 
slow, too frustrating." (S4) 
"Getting into the system was a problem - the codes and so 
on. Having to use the keyboard was an irritation - not being able 
to type fast." (S3) 
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Five of the respondents had discontinued their use of the systems 
after various periods of attempted use. The sixth, 82, who was 
the strong advocate of computing, was still making considerable 
use of his own system and his case will be discussed separately. 
The others had all experimented with the system, and in 
anticipating that it would be useful to them personally had 
learnt how to use all (or most) of the facilities. The 
researcher checked this by asking the respondents to describe the 
facilities, which they all did in sufficient detail to indicate 
that they had indeed extensively familiarised themselves with 
the equipment. 
The five who had discontinued made various comments about the 
systems and their reasons for discontinuing. These can be taken 
in two groups; those referring to the information facilities, and 
those referring to the messaging. 
"I spent a few days working through every thing they had on 
it, but found nothing on it that was of any use to me personally. 
A week out of date production figures were on it; personnel 
numbers and grades. But of no interest to me. I don't need to 
know if the chaps worked overtime last week, or if sales were up 
last month." (85) 
"A waste of money; the information you want is just not on 
the computer ... the key things aren't in it. I don't need to know 
that we employ 6500 people!" (84) 
"There's nothing on it that I want. I don't use it because 
seeing the piece of paper is quicker -more convenient. If I'm 
digging too much into the data I'm doing the job of the next 
chap down." (S6) 
"The limited personnel data was of only marginal use... as 
it is at the moment, it's no use." (83) 
"I couldn't get the trends that I wanted ... I wanted to 
analyse the data for my own personal use, but I couldn't" (81) 
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The point being made consistently here is that the information 
systems provided were not relevant, or rather, not sufficiently 
relevant. The systems appear to be addressing aspects of the 
managers' informational and decisional roles; but in practice, 
the managers were finding that there was a mismatch between the 
information on the systems and reality of their work roles. A 
point made by several of the respondents was that the information 
available on the system was more relevant to lower management 
levels; for example: 
"The amount of hard information I require is low. My 
assistant can do that." (S4) 
And very similar points were made by others, either in this or in 
other contexts. Essentially, the information was aimed at the 
wrong functional orientation. As has been pointed out in chapter 
3 senior managers use a wide variety of information in strategic 
decision making, whereas lower managers are more oriented to 
operational matters; the information presented on the systems was 
criticised by the managers because of its incorrect orientation. 
The messaging system had addressed a different aspect of the 
senior managers' job, but here again the respondents had not 
found it useful: 
" I didn't use it. Maybe I'm too well served - people can 
phone my secretary. My contacts are 50% outside ABC, and on the 
inside few of my contacts are on the system." (S5) 
"I'd use it maybe once or twice a week; time is the reason 
that I didn't use it more .... typically, I'm away 2 or 3 days 
each week." (S6) 
"I was not prepared to put in the vast amount of time 
required to use it." (S4) 
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"At board level you don't write letters to each other - you 
need the meeting of minds!" (Sl) 
The reasons for lack of use here are not so clear cut; but 
generally it seemed that the messaging system did not convey 
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using it. Certainly, having regard for what has been said about 
managerial communication in chapter 3 it seems most unlikely that 
the system could realistically convey any sensible advantage. In 
general, all five respondents agreed that no aspects of the 
system were relevant to their jobs; in particular, they all said 
that the systems did not relate to any strategic decisions which 
they were involved in. Respondents did discuss some aspects of 
the nature of their jobs and felt information needs, by way of 
illustrating the incompatibility between the present system 
intentions and their real work: 
"My timescale is years, decades ... I monitor today's prices 
to monitor my staff. But I act on trends." (Sl) 
"I need to watch science and newspapers and 
profile of papers and magazines in my area ... 
improve my own reading and sampling ... A more 
keeping abreast." (SS) 
Universities ... A 
I would like to 
effective way of 
"Little data or information requires instant action or 
response by me ... At the end of the day, decisions are made by 
debate about judgements." (S3) 
"The next level down - they need to know precisely what is 
happening; but my role [is to] establish and agree general 
guidelines ... We [board members] pull away from day to day 
control... For example, we need to guide politicians and 
lawyers ... ABC are the biggest so we need to fulfil this role ... 
I need data on what's happening in Europe; I need to talk to 
[senior officers of commercial and political organizations] ... 
face to face. We agree ... negotiate ... " (S6) 
These comments all illustrate aspects of the senior managers' 
informational roles, interpersonal roles or decisional roles. But 
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the present computer systems did not address these aspects 
sufficiently well. 
The question arises as to what extent man I machine interface 
difficulties occasioned by the technical design of the hardware 
and software facilities influenced the eventual abandonment - ie 
whether this would have happened anyway even if the systems did 
deliver some value to the users. It could be argued that if the 
respondents had perceived sufficient value to themselves (in 
terms of enhancing or in any way benefitting their work effort in 
any role) then they would have continued their use despite 
difficulties (after all, they had adopted it initially on this 
basis); the fact that they did not do so seems to argue that 
there was insufficient value to warrant the continuing 
expenditure of the time and effort. 
Following discontinuance 
The managers' views about the systems which they had tried 
appeared to have changed in the light of their personal 
experience; in particular, although some gave a positive cast to 
their views, there was a noticeable disenchantment effect: 
"It is OK for some people. But not worth having for me. It's 
the wrong system for my type of work." (Sl) 
"It's limitations have been exposed more clearly. I took it 
and did some experimenting and found out the potential. I will 
now chuck it. I know the potential; it has served its purpose." 
(S3) 
"Yes, I realised that it was useless, for me!'' (S4) 
"The system might be good for people two levels down, but 
they provided it!" (S6) 
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Despite this disappointment in the value of these systems for 
themselves, the directors all expressed strong continuing 
enthusiasm for computers in the organization generally, 
Not only were strongly positive attitudes still being expressed 
about computers in the organization, but two of the directors (Sl 
and S3) had agreed to undertake a second "trial" of direct 
computing, using some different equipment; in other words, they 
were about to undertake a new adoption cycle. They were most 
enthusiastic about the new venture and felt sure that the 
problems which they had experienced before would be overcome by a 
different approach. On this occasion the trial was not co-
ordinated between the two senior managers, who proceeded along 
independent lines. There appeared to have been a tacit admission 
that direct computing was not every board member's forte, and 
there was no longer an overt united policy on the matter. 
In the second trial, the expression of the leadership role as the 
reason for intended adoption was accompanied by a clearer belief 
(particularly with Sl) that the new system would offer specific 
benefits to them personally: 
"You have to lead by example ... Do as I do, not as I say. 
Everybody who walks in that door will see me using it! I saw 
[S2) using his pc. It really does look as if it is a big help to 
him." ( Sl) 
Clearly, Sl was intrigued by S2's apparent success with the pc 
and was anxious to involve himself in the technology. S3 on the 
other hand was responsible for the MSD (computer) division, and 
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was taking up a new trial at least partly because of this 
position. However, he too expressed specific intentions for the 
new system: 
"I will use my new PC for access to personnel database, 
rnessaging; getting a feel for tne age structures of the 
workforce, because of the need to reduce the workforce - what 
will happen to the age structure ? I hope to play with the 
database myself ... Maybe use it for budgeting.'' (S3) 
Both expressed considerable enthusiasm for the new project, and 
seemed convinced that direct personal benefits would accrue. 
These respondents were both interviewed again some months later 
in order to explore their experiences in the new adoption cycle. 
In many respects, the features of the previous cycle had been 
repeated. Neither respondent had had purpose-specific systems 
designed for him; Sl had been issued with an IBM pc with standard 
pc software packages, and S3 had a terminal with a personnel-
oriented database package which his subordinates planned to 
acquire for their own use. Both respondents had expended 
considerable personal effort on learning to use the system, and 
both had virtually discontinued their use at the time of the 
second interview. Again they had found that, despite their 
previous enthusiasm and their beliefs concerning the forthcoming 
effectiveness of the new systems, that these systems did not in 
practice provide sufficient value to them personally to warrant 
sustained use. 
Both were able eloquently to justify their involvement in this 
trial in terms of benefits accruing to the organization 
generally, but their actual usage (or lack of it) demonstrated 
that the new systems were of no more benefit to them personally 
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than the last, in terms of tangible personal advantage which 
would vindicate their continuing efforts. 
The computer's role in the work of the senior manager 
Five of the respondents had abandoned their use of the computer 
after finding out that its capabilities did not seem to match 
their work tasks sufficiently well; they had all specifically 
stated that their job was not facilitated by the system. The 
sixth respondent, S2, had not followed this pattern. He had been 
making use of the computer for some time on his own behalf and 
had at his disposal a number of facilities. The respondent used 
the computer for over an hour each day at work, and perhaps more 
at home. This placed him in the "heavy user" category (ie using 
his computer for more than one hour per day). The facilities 
which he had available included: 
Summaries of internal data (financial and operating data) 
Analyses of internal databases (personnel records, plant 
output, sales etc) 
Messaging (to other board members and immediate subordinates) 
Diary management 
External databases (Prestel) 
Internal database (eg reviews of press references to ABC) 
In addition, the IBM PC had available various software packages: 
Database (DB2), Wordstar and Starindex (Word Processing), 
Brainstorm, Spreadsheet (Lotus 1-2-3 and Symphony), ESP Adviser 
(an Expert System shell) and Visischedule (PERT networking). 
The respondent was asked about each facility in turn in order to 
find out how the computer was assisting in his work tasks. In 
some instances there seemed to be a direct application of the 
computer facility: 
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"This [internal database] gives reviews of all press 
conferences referring to my division. I look for triggers 
looking for problems to solve ... I use it [Visischedule] for 
scheduling the division as a whole - otherwise I would need a 
tame planner. I can't keep that many entities in my head, so I 
use the system." (S2) 
Here the respondent is describing two areas where the system 
appears to be offering benefit: firstly helping him in an 
informational role, monitoring the external environment, and 
secondly helping him to visualize the overall organizational 
plan. He also described his use of the wordprocessing package in 
the context of confidential board meetings, where he would take 
minutes and circulate confidential material himself. However, his 
answers were not always as informative. The respondent was able 
lucidly to describe the capabilities of each facility in 
abstract, but was less forthcoming about the way in which it 
actually helped him personally. For example: 
" this shows salesman messages, client details, credit 
data, staff overtime and so on ... [this shows] ... oil and gas 
prices daily, and money rates ... Heathrow departures ... often we 
have visitors ... I get plant output, budget control and sales-
say twice a month ... " (S2) 
Here the respondent provided few details of the context in which 
this information was useful to him, and, when pressed on this 
point argued that further comment was not possible for security 
reasons. A similar impasse was reached on other areas of his use. 
Of course, other directors had rather contemptuously dismissed 
this level of information, on the grounds that it was not 
suitable for their level of work. Was this director then 
operating at a different level or in a substantially different 
way? Unfortunately, this issue could not be fully resolved within 
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this study, A methodological difficulty was apparent; in order to 
establish in a full way the nature of the relationship 
the respondent's work roles and the computer facility, 
between 
it would 
have been necessary to observe the respondent in situ over a 
period of time and to incorporate knowledge of the details of the 
context in which he operated. 
a spreadsheet and used it 
Then if, for example, he developed 
to communicate some problem or 
requirement 
could be 
with others, the exact nature of this 
observed and understood in the context 
transaction 
of his work 
roles. In the course of a one hour interview it was simply not 
possible to investigate properly these aspects of his work 
behaviour. 
Other questions to this respondent relating to the amount of use 
he made of various facilities revealed that he used one facility 
(the spreadsheet package) most of the time, and the other 
facilities but little ~ perhaps in the ratio 95% to 5% (figures 
mentioned by him). In this way it is possible to consider that 
although he had familiarised himself with all aspects of the 
facilities which he had available, he used only a small part of 
it at all frequently. The question remains as to why this 
respondent was occupying a significant part of his time with the 
computer, in contrast to his colleagues who had abandoned their 
use. It is tempting to consider that much of the respondent's 
claimed computer use was simply part of his "act"; he was 
fulfilling a significant evangelical role as computer advocate 
and change agent, and much of his computer activity may have been 
oriented towards these ends rather than strictly towards 
impacting the efficiency of his own managerial decision 
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processes. This is not to suggest that these uses were in any way 
wasteful or not legitimate, on the contrary, the respondent's 
role as change agent was acknowledged by his peers as a useful 
function; however, the uses were not those which are 
traditionally expected according to the ideals of the DSS 
movement. 
ABC's view of senior managerial computing 
There had been a review of the progress of the system, and an 
internal report published (reference withdrawn). As has been 
mentioned earlier, this report described the project in hindsight 
as an experiment, intended to test out the value of the systems. 
The report concluded that the project had failed, and identified 
part of the reasons for this (lack of training and support, and 
poor man/machine interface, for example); however, its 
recommendations (roughly, that there should be "more of the 
same") seem curious in the light of the evidence presented here. 
There was no direct acknowledgement that the computer information 
presented was unsuitable in any way. 
Discussion - findings from the case study in relation to 
theoretical materials discussed in earlier sections 
This study throws light on several aspects of the adoption of 
computers by managers for their own use, and particularly on the 
nature of the mismatch between the intended uses of computer 
systems and the behaviour which it is intended to support. These 
two aspects will be discussed separately. 
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As regards the adoption of computing, this has been seen in this 
case study to follow a clear cyclic pattern whereby the adopter 
is initially enthusiastic, spends considerable effort on learning 
to use the system but later becomes disenchanted and abandons his 
use (or attempted use) of it. There are several salient features 
of the adoption cycles outlined in this case study. These can be 
outlined as follows: 
1 the presence of a high level evangelical advocate at board 
level 
2 the presence of a powerful middle manager advocate within the 
systems providing department 
3 adopters were enacting aspects of their leadership role by 
promulgating positive values regarding computers 
4 systems were "issued" to the managers, who had little or no say 
in the choice or design of these systems 
5 systems were issued to the managers which were "off the shelf", 
or based closely on existing systems, and seemed to take no 
account of any special features of senior managerial work 
6 the managers experienced difficulties at the man/machine 
interface, such that access was effortful and time consuming 
7 the systems failed to address successfully aspects of the 
managers' real roles; (or failed to do this well enough to 
compete with their present information resources) 
8 the systems were abandoned when it became clear that, for most 
of the respondents, little advantage was to be gained for the 
effort and time costs required to access the systems 
As regards the models of adoption processes and factors discussed 
in chapter 4, it would seem that some of the features which 
appear to be salient here are not altogether surprising. For 
instance, the presence of advocacy at different levels has 
already been discussed theoretically (although not perhaps in 
terms of the high-level advocacy which is an important feature in 
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this case), as has the man I machine issue. 
However, what is new in this case study is the identification of 
the usefulness of role theory in improving understanding of the 
behavioural processes in the adoption cycle. Firstly, the 
leadership role itself can be seen as a feature in adoption - it 
was the further enactment of this role in particular which seemed 
unexpectedly salient in the adoption, rather than anticipated 
gains in the efficiency of decisional or informational roles. 
Secondly, the computer systems can be viewed as intended to 
address various aspects of the managers' roles (other than the 
leadership role), but failing to to do this because they were 
incorrectly 
managerial 
shortly). 
oriented as regards the particular nature of 
work. (This point will be discussed in more 
senior 
detail 
This role-based view does not necessarily invalidate any of the 
factors previously put forward in the adoption model, but it does 
cast a significantly different light on the matter. For example, 
how important is the quality of the man/machine interface in 
managerial adoption? According to some commentators this is a 
vital issue - but in fact it can be seen from this case that the 
managers overcame severe problems in order to use the systems, 
only to abandon them because they were not sufficiently relevant. 
It seems reasonable to assume that even if the man/machine 
interface had been superb, the managers would still have 
abandoned the systems because they could not compete with their 
existing resources. It is also surely not too unreasonable to 
assume that even with the poor man I machine interface, if the 
systems had in fact conveyed significant advantage then the 
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managers would have made use of them. In other words, the 
man/machine interface issue may be important, but another issue 
seems to be more important and may override it. 
This leads on to a second major point, and this is that certain 
features seem to be more important at certain times during the 
adoption cycle. Prior to the adoption, the presence of powerful 
advocacy at various levels seems to have been significant, as 
does the enactment of the leadership role; but after the adoption 
had occurred, other factors became more important. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that neither the advocacy nor the 
leadership requirement suddenly disappeared, but rather the 
presence of other overriding factors forced the managers to 
ignore them. This leads to a modified model of the adoption 
process which shows different factors acting significantly at 
different points in the cycle. This point will be taken up again 
in chapter 10, when a new process model will be developed based 
on features from all the case studies. 
A mismatch between systems and managerial behaviour 
Considering now the computer systems, these clearly were intended 
to suppport various aspects of managerial roles. The systems in 
the first adoption cycle were identified in Table 6.2 as follows: 
a - summaries of internal data (financial and operating data) 
b - analyses from internal databases (personnel records, and some 
production data) 
c - Messaging (to other board members and immediate subordinates) 
d - A diary management facility (indicating appointments for all 
board members) 
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e - access to commercial data on the Prestel system 
These systems could arguably be addressed to various managerial 
role behaviours (following the role sets identified by Mintzberg 
1973 and discussed in chapter 3) as follows: 
Table 6.3 The Relationship Between Systems and Managerial Roles 
Role 
Interpersonal 
1. Figurehead 
2. Leader 
3. Liaison 
Informational 
4. Monitor 
5. Disseminator 
6. Spokesman 
Decisional 
7. Entrepreneur 
8. Disturbance handler 
9. Resource allocator 
10. Negotiator 
System 
------
a 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
b c d e 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
But most of the managers found these systems unsatisfactory, in 
terms of the roles to which they were intended to be addressed. 
(Intriguingly, at least one manager used the systems to address 
his leadership role, not a function intended by the system 
designer!) The reasons for this can be described in terms of the 
key features of managerial behaviour discussed in chapter 3. The 
data available was not suitable for their monitoring or resource 
allocation roles because it reflected issues which would be of 
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interest at a lower managerial level ~ senior managers tend to 
have differently oriented information needs from lower ranking 
managers. In addition to this orientation failure, it is likely 
that the computer based data could not compete at any level with 
the quality of information which these managers had available via 
their personal networks and other sources which they would have 
developed over long periods. Similarly, the liaison and 
dissemination roles were not enhanced by the computerised 
messaging system because the system did not include important 
contacts who were part of the manager's interpersonal networks, 
and because it lacked the immediacy of face to face contacts or 
the efficiency (bearing in mind the managers' secretarial 
assistance) of traditional methods. 
This is not to say that computer systems could not of themselves 
be useful to managers; but rather that these particular systems 
were not useful to these particular managers. It is always 
possible to envisage circumstances where similar systems could 
successfully address aspects of a manager's role set and be 
permanently adopted into his working methods. Examples of such 
apparent successes will be described in subsequent case 
descriptions. 
It is possible to speculate that if the man I machine interface 
difficulties had not been quite so severe, the managers might 
have altered their roles to reflect the new sources and methods 
available to them. But there was little evidence of any such 
alteration, and it may well be that the roles enacted by these 
managers were largely prescribed by constraints embedded in the 
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organizational milieu in which they worked, and as such were 
hardly likely to be altered as a result of minor changes in 
computer system availability. 
The exception here was of course S2, the one respondent who had 
adopted and continued to significantly utilise various systems; 
significant in that he expended an important segment of his 
working day on the systems. However, there was little evidence to 
suggest that he had altered his roles in any way as a result of 
the technology he was using; rather, it seemed as if he had 
incorporated certain aspects of the systems into his present 
roles in a way that provided various rewards in terms of his 
influence within the organization, and not necessarily in terms 
of the efficiency with which his work tasks were enacted. In the 
next case, that of BCD, a number of continuing adopters were 
interviewed and some salient features of their continuation were 
identified which shed some light on the behaviour of this 
respondent. 
Summary of case 1 
The general picture which emerges here is that the directors 
agreed together to adopt or trial the equipment, that they were 
all influenced by S2 who acted as a strong advocate, and was 
evangelical in his approach. This approach was endorsed and 
legitimised by the chairman Sl, who used his authority and 
effectively insisted that the trial went ahead. The reasons for 
adopting the systems were mainly to do with influencing others. 
At that time they all believed strongly in the value of computer 
technology generally for the organization, and were concerned 
187 
that they should encourage others as much as possible. In other 
words, the respondents were acting in their role as leaders. Of 
course, the details of these events are inevitably more complex 
than this; for example, some respondents mentioned their 
curiosity about, and interest in the systems and there will 
undoubtedly be other situational elements present. Design of the 
system was left largely to the technical providing team; there 
was little communication between it and the would be users, so 
that standard systems (ie designed for other purposes) were 
issued to the senior managers. 
Following their adoption of the system, the directors generally 
found that not only were there difficulties and frustrations 
involved in using it, but that the real, tangible benefits which 
they perceived after some direct experience did not appear to 
warrant the expenditure of time and effort involved, so that the 
usage was discontinued. In particular, the systems did not seem 
to successfully address the real roles which the managers were in 
fact enacting in the organizational setting. Some disappointment, 
or disenchantment was perceived because the system did not live 
up to their expectations. Despite this, all the respondents 
still expressed strongly favourable attitudes towards computing 
in the organization, but this no longer extended quite so 
favourably towards own-use computing for themselves. 
Nevertheless, two respondents (Sl and S3) undertook further 
trials of new systems which they were convinced would be useful 
to them, only to display a similar pattern of learning and 
attempted use, followed by discontinuance. 
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Case 2 : The BCD Organization 
Background 
The BCD organization is a large multinational company (in excess 
of 20,000 employees) whose business is manufacturing and 
marketing computers and computer products. Within the UK the 
organization is dispersed geographically into a number of 
manufacturing and administrative centres. In the course of the 
research the author visited three sites in central London and 
other locations in the home counties and in the north of England. 
In accordance with its physical dispersal the organization was 
structurally complex, being comprised of a number of seemingly 
overlapping responsibility areas which altered over time. As an 
illustration of the structural changeability encountered, the 
formal organization chart of April 1984 shows a structure with 
two boards and twelve business entities; six months later the 
formal chart has changed shape, and although the two boards are 
still present, only four of the business entities show any 
similarity to the previous chart. This structural flexibility may 
well be a reflection of the need to cope with the rapidly 
changing conditions in the computer market; a market which was 
showing greater than usual volatility at this time. In this and 
in other ways, the organization was in marked contrast to the 
previous case. 
In addition to having a naturally ephemeral structure, the 
organization was the subject of a take-over during the research 
period which added further complications to the top management 
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disposition. In order to overcome the difficulties created by the 
labyrinthine (and rapidly changing) structure, it was decided to 
take only the two top main (and partially overlapping) executive 
boards of directors and to exclude incoming directors from the 
takeover organization. 
Ten directors from a target population of fifteen were eventually 
interviewed. Although three respondents proved too elusive (or 
specifically declined to participate) two of the target directors 
were in the process of leaving the organization and could not be 
contacted, so that the ratio of refusals is not quite so severe 
as it might appear. Additionally, four systems-providing 
personnel were interviewed and some use of internally published 
materials was made. Published material in the public domain 
(mainly press announcements) were accessed, but these will not be 
specifically referenced here in order to preserve 
confidentiality. In addition, the researcher was able to 
familiarise himself with at least some of the computer facilities 
and documentation (mainly those available in the public domain) 
which were discussed by the respondents. 
The directors did not form a cohesive social group in the sense 
of the previous case, and there was a broad range of ages, 
backgrounds and responsibility levels among respondents; the 
average age (44) however, was significantly less than that of 
ABC. Unlike the last case, the functional responsibilities of the 
respondents were by no means clear cut, for example there 
appeared to be significant overlap of responsibilities between 
some directors, and little consistency in the scope of their 
responsibility. Similarly, the respondents' strategic influences 
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were by no means straightforward. Some directors were clearly 
part of what might be termed a "strategic club" (whose membership 
did not appear to coincide with either of the formal board 
alignments) and who mentioned similar long-term interests, 
whilst others did not seem to be part of this world. 
Most of the respondents had taken part in one or more computer 
adoption cycles, although with a significant exception these 
seemed to be singly initiated, sporadic and separate events, 
rather than a result of a generally agreed strategy. The 
exception was a significant one and involved the highly 
publicised trial of a direct-use computer-based DSS facility by 
some of the directors as part of a specific policy. 
a report in the national computing press, BCD 
According to 
had issued 
extensive DSS facilities to its senior management, as a prelude 
to marketing these facilities to the top 5% of managers in large 
companies. (Although in practice it was found that only three BCD 
directors had received these specific DSS facilities, even some 
months after the announcement). 
Discussion 
indicated 
initiated 
directly), 
with members of the providing team for this project 
that the publicised DSS implementation had been 
by the BCD chairman (unfortunately not interviewed 
in the form of a directive to the effect that BCD was 
to make greater use of its own products internally - to be seen 
as "taking its own medicine". The provider pOl described the 
project as a "showcase" activity; ie executed specifically for 
its public relations and marketing value. The top managers 
involved in this project were, as far as he was concerned, 
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effectively guinea pigs for the development of a product which 
was to be marketed externally. This feature of the computer 
adoption process is described here because it is an issue that 
naturally runs right through the discussion of this case study. 
Clearly, because BCD is a computer company, it has special 
circumstances as regards computer adoption. Nevertheless, it will 
be seen that this particular issue is not quite as important or 
all-pervading as might be thought, and the nature of the adoption 
factors not so very different from the previous case. 
The extent of computer adoption 
All but one of the respondents had passed through one or more 
adoption cycles. The present status of respondents' direct 
computer use is shown in table 6.4 below: 
Table 6.4 Senior managers and computer use categories - case 2 
Sll 
S12 
Sl3 
Sl4 
SlS 
Sl6 
S17 
Sl8 
Sl9 
S20 
Respondent Computer use category 
Director External Technical Relations 
Group Managing Director 
Director of Finance 
Director of Sales 
Director of Management Support Centre 
Director of Information Services 
Director of Technical Services 
Director of Personnel 
Managing Director (UK board) 
Director Mainframe Division 
non-adopted 
discontinued 
discontinued 
discontinued 
discontinued 
user (slight) 
user (slight) 
user (medium) 
user (medium) 
user (heavy) 
Thus out of the ten respondents five were currently utilising 
some form of direct computer system, four had discontinued use of 
a system and were not currently using anything, and one had not 
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passed through an adoption cycle at all. 
A case of non-adoption 
The respondent Sll is the first example so far of somebody who 
has computer resources theoretically available to him, but does 
not adopt the technology for his own use. In the description of 
the previous case materials, the circumstances surrounding 
respondents' computer adoption have been discussed and certain 
features which seemed salient have been identified; the position 
here is one where it seems necessary to "explain" why the 
respondent has not done something - a somewhat less satisfactory 
task. It was clearly not simply a matter of "awareness'' (a factor 
much beloved of commentators in the computer press) because here 
the respondent was surrounded by computers and computer users on 
all sides. Nor was it a matter of simple availability. In common 
with other directors at this location, there was in principle 
directly available to him a whole range of computer facilities 
including mainframe terminal access to extensive organizational 
databases, external databases, messaging and diary systems, and a 
wide range of pc facilities including spreadsheet, wordprocessirig 
and database packages. Again, in principle, he could, as a 
director of the UK's largest computer manufacturer, 
virtually anything feasible in present-day technology 
available to him simply for the asking. 
have 
made 
Neither was it simply a matter of computer knowledge; the 
respondent had been involved in the design of computer hardware 
over many years and probably knew as much about this aspect of 
computing as anybody in the UK. Nor was it a matter of systems 
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understanding - he was able to describe in general terms the 
theoretical benefits of certain aspects of own-use computing in 
particular and managerial computing in general. Nor was it simply 
a matter of "attitudes"; the respondent expressed quite strongly 
positive values and attitudes concerning computers and computing 
in organizations. When asked directly why he had made no attempt 
to even try out direct computing for himself, he answered as 
follows: 
"I've considered my job content and what aspects could be 
assisted. I think having hands-on access would not make a 
measurable difference. [What is important is] .. the ability to 
interpret data - the considerations as to why it's up or down or 
whatever. For example at the moment I can ask the [financial] 
controller: he can interpret the data. The exact numbers aren't 
important; it is the forces that make it so - and this man knows 
the forces." (S11) 
Here the respondent is effectively saying that his present 
information sources (including especially the information 
interpretation) are superior to that which he expects from the 
computer. 
"I've not ever given anything a trial ... I've not found a 
use. I keep myself aware of what's available. My activity now is 
policy, rather than running specifics ... I spend my life on the 
phone - not on the keyboard. Basically, I spend 99% of my life 
talking - only 1% manipulating in the abstract. My business is 
not concerned with numbers on a database ... It's much easier to 
walk down the corridor and get the bloke who's used to it ... 
Messaging- my secretary does it much better than I." (S11) 
Here, the respondent is referring to his role attributes and 
pointing out that direct computing is not oriented correctly, for 
him. He also infers (perhaps correctly) that the effort involved 
in his use of the messaging system may be more efficiently 
expended by his secretary. In general the respondent's comments 
represent a view (and perhaps a well-informed view) which he has 
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taken about direct-use computer systems. But there is something 
missing from these statements. The respondent was asked why it 
was then, that many of his senior managerial colleagues used 
computers themselves - what did they find useful that he did not? 
And here, the respondents answers were not altogether accurate; 
he had an incomplete view of of his colleagues' computer 
activities (a phenomenon which has been noted before). 
"The answer must be job content ... [Why do other people use 
messaging themselves?] They don't have secretaries to do it for 
them! ... People who do it are more using it as a means of access 
to stored information ... People who use [the messaging system] 
have staff geographically spread." (Sll) 
The first point implies that his colleagues worked at a lower 
managerial level; this might be true in some cases, but 
definitely not in the cases of Sl9 or S20 who had very 
substantial responsibilities relative to Sll. His remarks about 
his colleagues' use of the messaging systems are not correct 
because they certainly had secretaries, and geographical 
considerations were not among the main reason which they advanced 
for their use of the messaging, a point which will be explored 
later. 
However, there are other issues which can be put forward as 
important. This respondent had not been involved in the 
publicised DSS trial - indeed, he did not seem even to have been 
aware of it; this may be partly a reflection of the convoluted 
organizational structure. It is possible that the parts of the 
organization concerned with the DSS trial had passed him by 
certainly he mentioned that he spent much of his time on European 
matters, and he was uninvolved in issues pertaining to the UK 
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exercise. In any event, there did not appear to be a high-level 
advocate of own-use systems within his direct orbit. Also, having 
only a small personal secretarial staff, there appeared no direct 
reason for him to personally advocate computer use among them 
himself. In other words, the salient features present in other 
instances of computer adoption - powerful advocacy, and the 
requirement for leadership role enactment - were not present in 
this instance, and the lack of these features are interpreted 
here as a significant element in his decision not to adopt. It 
does not seem entirely accurate to portray this respondent as 
having specifically rejected systems available to him; it seems 
to be more a case of the requisite adoption factors being absent 
from his milieu. 
Features of adoption 
The respondent Sl5 was head of a division whose function was to 
market "end-user" computing and "management support" products. 
The reasons he gave for his adoption related directly to his 
capacity as leader of this division: 
"When people come to see me - they see that I am 
automated." (815) 
This referred to the fact that he had a terminal on his desk; 
although he no longer used it directly in the sense of entering 
data or retrieving information. In other words, people from 
inside and outside the organization would infer from the presence 
of the system that the owner was a direct user. This was partly a 
leadership function and partly a figurehead function; he was 
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making statements about himself and the organization which 
carried messages both to subordinates and to potential customers. 
"I had it put in to find out how difficult it was to use. I 
am a test-bed.,, a guinea pig." (Sl5) 
There is an interesting parallel here with the respondent S3 from 
ABC who was also a guinea pig in a trial of application software. 
In this case, however, the respondent is putting himself in the 
place of a potential customer, in order to establish his own view 
of a product as well as to provide feedback for his developmental 
staff, This behaviour relates to several managerial roles, but 
mainly informational ones in conveying intelligence about a 
product to his subordinates, and in forming a view about the 
product himself. The latter role parallels that of S6 from ABC, 
who also was forming a view about a computer system. What this 
behaviour clearly does not relate to though, are the presumed 
direct informational and decisional roles for which the systems 
were designed. This contrast between the roles to which the 
systems are addressed on the one hand, and the roles in which the 
senior manager incorporates his systems use on the other has 
already been discussed in the discussion section of the preceding 
case and elsewhere, and each case adds weight to this finding. 
The respondent Sl2 (although referring to an adoption cycle which 
took place completely separately from SlS) made very similar 
statements which related to both these role aspects: 
"To encourage others, I had one installed. To be head of a 
large computing organization and not to use one! [ie it would be 
inappropriate] ... To test out what people were saying about ease 
of use. To help me understand customer views... To help 
understand my own use of the terminal." (Sl2) 
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As with previous respondents, this manager is referring both to 
his leadership role (encouraging others by sending positive 
messages about computer use) and to his own informational needs 
regarding the efficacy of the system as a potential product. Sl3 
on the other hand, whose adoption cycle again took place under 
separate circumstances, refers to slightly different strands in 
his adoption: 
"A policy decision was made to see if these things could 
improve managerial performance. It was installed as an 
experiment. As a deliberate test ... I was in charge of the data-
so I championed its being made available. Somebody has to 
champion new ventures, [it's] worth a punt on a speculative 
basis." (Sl3) 
Here the leadership role is again referred to, but in the context 
of advocate for the manager's own division ("I was in charge of 
the data -so I championed its being made available ... "). The 
other strand is again the idea of the manager as guinea-pig, 
finding out for himself and for others if the principle was an 
effective one. 
The adopters who were still using systems at the time of the 
interviews gave similar reasons for the adoption: 
" in my role as IS (Information Services] director. It's 
my job to provide [internal information systems]. I used it to 
find out how good they are, what they're like, how user friendly 
and so on. Messaging was developed as a product by IS for 
internal use ... " (Sl6) 
Here the respondent is championing his own division's product; he 
is acting in a leadership role in order to disseminate values 
internally concerning his division, as well as providing 
information to his subordinates about their product. This is 
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different from advocating computer use through the organization 
generally, and it seemed that the respondent was as much 
concerned with divisional as with whole-organizational issues< 
In the case of 818 and 819, the respondents referred to the 
publicised DSS system which had been issued to certain directors 
under a directive from the company chairman, and which required 
their participation. For example: 
"It was developed as a showcase; to show our products. If it 
works, I'll use it; if not I won't" (Sl8) 
Here, both respondents had had previous experience of direct 
computing and had passed through earlier adoption cycles; the 
chairman's directive refers to their present system. The last 
respondent S20 had a strong interest in direct use computing 
which he had developed over many years; in some respects he 
resembled the respondent S2 who had been such a powerful advocate 
of computing in ABC, and took a close interest in development of 
direct systems: 
"I have been using this , Or something like this for about 6 
years ... [the messaging system] was developed for me- then I 
sold it to the rest of the group. Of course, I am hooked up to my 
own product ... to see what my customers will make of it ... The 
best way of making my reports [direct subordinates] use it is for 
me to use it." S20 
Here, the respondent makes several points about his computing 
adoption. He describes his general computer advocacy in similar 
terms to S2 of ABC(" ... then I sold it to the rest of the 
group."); then he refers to the "experimental" function which has 
been mentioned by several of his colleagues (" ... to see what my 
customers will make of it."); and lastly he describes a specific 
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leadership role, whereby he encourages computer use by his direct 
subordinates. 
The effect of high level advocacy has been described at the 
beginning of this case study, whereby the chairman had prescribed 
the use of BCD products internally. The direct effects of this 
dictum could be seen specifically in the adoption patterns of 818 
and Sl9; it was not possible to ascertain the more general 
effects of this encouragement although undoubtedly they existed. 
The respondent 820 described his own evangelical role in the 
promotion of the internal messaging system, implying that his 
influence encouraged the development of this system and its 
spread throughout the organization. 
The presence of middle-level advocates among providing groups was 
inferred after discussions with representatives from four of 
these groups. Unlike the organization in the previous case (ABC) 
which appeared to have a single and largely monolithic systems 
development 
appeared to 
organization, BCD had several separate groups which 
be not only overlapping, but to be in active 
with each other. competition 
fewer than 
organizations 
organization's 
responsibility 
(For example, the author met no 
three individuals from three separate internal 
who each claimed personally to have devised the 
messaging system). Some of these groups had the 
of developing saleable products (which might 
also be used internally), others had responsibility for devising 
internal application systems (which might eventually be developed 
for sale outside), including managerial DSS systems; all the 
groups would benefit from internal use and exposure of their own 
"products", whether these were sold outside or not. 
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The general features of the adoption part of the respondents' 
adoption cycles can be described as follows: 
1 High level advocacy. The company chairman had specifically 
encouraged senior managerial adoption of internal direct DSS 
systems. Of course it was difficult to establish the precise 
extent of the influence of this advocacy; but there is no doubt 
that it was present for at least two of the respondents (818 and 
819) who were participating in the prescribed DSS project. The 
respondent 820 described his own evangelical role in the 
promotion of the internal messaging system. 
2 Middle level advocacy within providing groups. Systems-
providing groups competed for internal exposure of their systems. 
Even though the effects of the continual surrounding buzz of 
influence about computers and application systems could not be 
measured directly, it was undoubtedly present, and presumably 
constituted a factor in adoption even where the precise 
initiation source could not be directly ascertained. 
3 Enactment of the leadership role. Most respondents referred to 
this role requirement in one context or another; either for the 
organization as a whole (eg 812) or as regards the promotion of 
their own divisional interests (813, 816). 
4 The experimental sampling by senior managers, on their own 
behalf or on behalf of development staff, of systems as products 
for internal or external consumption (815, 812, 813, 816, 820) 
Although differing somewhat in detail and emphasis, these issues 
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do not vary so very much from those discussed in the context of 
the ABC case. A new feature is the special interest in systems as 
a product for internal or external consumption, 
Systems and facilities 
The computer facilities which had been provided for the directors 
varied considerably from one respondent to another. As has been 
pointed out, with the exception of the formal DSS project the 
respondents' system adoption appeared to be the result of 
separately initiated, sporadic activities. A generalised list of 
all the facilities found is as follows: 
A Mainframe based 
a Summaries of internal data (financial, product, personnel and 
competitor data expressed, mainly financially, at company and 
divisional level) 
b Analyses of (or details from) internal databases (eg personnel 
records, stock, production and accounting data) 
c Graphical analysis of internal data 
d Financial modelling of certain internal data (in practice the 
managers could not access the modelling language directly, so 
this consisted of pre-defined data analyses) 
e Commercial databases (Prestel; sometimes provided on a separate 
monitor with special keyboard) 
fl Messaging (internal, to some BCD UK sites) 
f2 Messaging (external, to some BCD international sites) 
g Diary management 
h Project management (PERT based) 
B PC based 
a Spreadsheet, wordprocessing, database packages and Basic (the 
programming language) 
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b Telephony features (the PC was 
external telephone networks and 
special dialling and switching 
answering messages) 
connected to the internal and 
provided a directory, plus 
facilities, and personalised 
The formalized DSS project entailed the provision of a 
facilities which included elements of most of the above features. 
(Details of these provisions were elicited from the manager in 
charge of the technical implementation, provider plO.) In 
particular, it featured the provision of board-level financial 
data on company and product status and profitability, and 
competitor activity. Graphic features were provided in the shape 
of about twenty fixed graphs (ie showing the same standard 
variables). The financial modelling element consisted of two 
models which had been assembled by analysts and presented in the 
form of a company financial (budgetry) analysis, and a manpower 
analysis. 
This group of facilities represented by far the most 
comprehensive and sophisticated set of computer-based decision 
aids which was encountered during the whole study; by any 
yardstick, it must represent the current technical leading edge 
of managerial decision support systems. The technical intentions 
of the systems are quite clear, and were confirmed by provider 
plO and others. These intentions included particularly: 
1) the provision of information for managerial decision (and 
particularly strategic decision, as indicated by the company wide 
financial status and manpower information) and organizational 
monitoring 
2) support of internal (organizational) communication 
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3 ) support of decision making with the aid of personal 
spreadsheet and database facilities. 
Respondents had attempted use of various parts of these systems 
during their adoption cycles. Not all the systems were physically 
available to all the respondents, for example Sl5 had only a pc 
with no mainframe connection because his site (outside London) 
was not physically connected to the central organizational 
mainframe network at that time. The question of "availability" is 
in general more subtle than this however, because in principal a 
link could easily have been established to the mainframe via an 
acoustic coupler, for example, and so the non-availability is an 
organizational matter rather than a technological one. In fact 
Sl5 was provided only with "one or two spreadsheet and 
wordprocessor files" by a subordinate, and made no use of the 
software facilities himself. At the other extreme, S20 seemed to 
have tried everything and was acknowledged as a "computer buff" 
by himself and others. The nature of both discontinuance and 
usage of these systems will be taken up shortly. 
System Implementation 
In most cases, the system adopted had been issued (by a providing 
team or department) to the respondent who had had little or no 
say in the choice or design of the facilities he was to receive. 
For example: 
"It was not designed for me ... I was involved to some extent 
[in the choice of facilities] but I did not put enough time into 
it. II (Sl2) 
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"Messaging was designed by [my division] as a product for 
internal use. No input by me into its development ... It was there 
when I came" (Sl6) 
"IS [Information Services] put the system up. I wasn't 
involved at all in the design or the specification - the system 
is a standard product." (Sl7) 
This lack of involvement of the respondents in the design and 
choice of their systems parallels that found in the ABC case. It 
is tempting to blame the systems providing staff for failing to 
communicate effectively, or to understand the requirements of the 
users for whom the systems were developed. However, as a member 
of one providing team pointed out, it was by no means easy to 
establish what would be useful for the directors within the sort 
of project framework in which these systems were developed 
(usually as a product for other purposes). 
"The senior managers really could not say what it was they 
wanted; we could not nail it down. So in the end we just said: 
'This is what you're going to get; take it or. leave it.'" (pOl) 
This, of course, is the classic computer and management science 
implementation syndrome which has been discussed in the 
implementation literature since the early sixties. More effort 
was expended at implementation time, but even here difficulties 
were encountered. According to the system provider: 
"There are two teams involved with the implementation: the 
development team and the implementation team. Unfortunately, they 
don't talk to each other much, and part of my job is to try and 
improve the communication between these two sides. One lot has to 
put up with all the flak and the other lot [the development team] 
are more or less working in an ivory tower." (pOl) 
Not all the respondents were remote from the systems choice; one 
or two said that they had asked specifically for a certain 
system: 
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"[the messaging system] was asked for - by me... I have a 
small development group. Five years ago, I was involved... but 
now no... [But] Information Services Division offered the 
corporate stuff to me." (S20) 
In general, though, it seems clear that the systems were not 
developed specifically for the senior managers, but were 
modifications of existing systems and designed for internal use 
or as products for marketing outside the organization. 
Features of discontinuance 
The four discontinued users had all passed through an adoption 
cycle, and had subsequently discontinued their use. This cycle 
was not apparently a commonly shared event; each respondent's 
circumstances were different and had not arisen from the same 
situation. Nevertheless, there were common factors in each case 
and it is possible to discuss the circumstances in terms of these 
factors. 
Sl2 
Sl3 
Sl4 
SlS 
Respondent 
Group Managing Director 
Director of Finance 
Director of Sales 
Director of Management Support Centre 
Computer use category 
discontinued 
discontinued 
discontinued 
discontinued 
A very interesting analysis of his discontinuance was given by 
the managing director, Sl2: 
"Peo~le who designed the system have a completely different 
idea on easy to use' from my idea. They underestimate the ease 
of getting information from people ... They are at different 
organizational levels, so they don't understand that." (Sl2) 
Here the respondent is describing the man/machine interface 
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difficulty associated with his use, together with the value of 
the system in relation to his present, highly developed 
information networks (formal and informal). 
He then goes on to describe further these key aspects of the 
discontinuation: 
"The basic problem is, it's hard to get through the security 
harness; therefore I don't bother. Anything that takes more than 
a couple of minutes I don't use. Any manual that takes more than 
half an hour - then I won't use it. I never got to grips with the 
security codes. It's not friendly. Anything that takes more than 
a couple of minutes - I don't use it. I spend 60% of my time out 
of the office. It took too much time." (Sl2) 
In other words, the system took time and effort to use - more 
time than he was prepared to spend in view of the rewards he 
could expect to gain from using it. 
"It was set up to give group financial numbers 
just as easy to get these from a printout. Now, we 
using it for the wrong information. My chaps use it 
enquiries. Pulling down standard data is not useful 
Chaps below could get me anything I wanted. Also, 
interpret it and tell you what's what. You 
interpretation." (Sl2) 
~ but it's 
think we're 
for ad hoc 
[for me]. 
a person can 
need the 
The "group financial numbers" here are the mainframe system 
facilities listed earlier under items a and d. Here, the 
respondent is not criticising the information itself so much as 
the relative value of the system in relation to his current 
information resources. As discussed in chapter 3 most senior 
managers make extensive use of highly developed information 
sources based on personal relationships to a far greater extent 
than they do formal information systems. However, he then went on 
to describe a crucial aspect of the way in which formal 
information is created at lower levels and then utilised by 
senior management in strategic decision: 
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"Strategic decisions here are made using presentations - not 
by manipulating data at the time. Decisions are made by 
judgement. [When making strategic decisions] ... my people below 
put together the data, the information. People who are 
experienced in these matters [ie the decision in hand] make 
judgements. Day to day - operational - decisions are made by 
looking at data, but the serious strategic stuff - like do we 
attack the German market- are made judgementally." (Sl2) 
Here he is saying that the information systems are giving him 
data that normally is utilised at a lower level; senior managers 
engage in strategic bargaining and group judgemental decision 
behaviours (see chapter 3) and do not as a rule arrive at 
strategy frameworks as a result simply of formal data 
manipulation. 
To sum up, the respondent has identified three key issues 
relating to his discontinuance: the personal time and effort 
costs involved in utilising the systems, the lack of value of the 
data relative to his present highly effective personalised 
systems and finally the incorrect orientation of the data as 
regards his own decisional activities. 
Elements of these three issues are echoed in the following 
comments from other discontinuers (the systems to which their 
comments refer are noted at the end of each set of comments): 
"I kept on trying to see if it came up with anything useful. 
And I found that I couldn't. I could see how it would be useful 
to people below me. But not me." (Sl3) [summaries of internal 
financial and marketing data] 
"The system was hard to use. Otherwise I might have made 
more use of it. Commands were complex. Things would go wrong. I 
couldn't retain all the commands in my memory - there were too 
many; it was too complex. If one were using it all day, every day 
then OK. But using it spasmodically was hopeless. Also, there was 
always something different that I wanted, so new commands had to 
be devised. After a while, my assistant worked out some short 
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cuts and macros for me. He tailored it. But even then, it was 
relatively complex. I would spend 10 minutes getting what I 
wanted -or maybe not getting it and abandoning the session!'' 
(Sl4) [messaging and summaries of internal data] 
"I had it put in to find out how difficult it was to use; 
and it is very difficult to use! The spreadsheet is difficult 
it has a page full of instructions. The reason there isn't enough 
information on it to be useful is because I have not had time to 
sit down and specify what I want in it. My use is so casual that 
I forget how to use it. I spend maybe half my time out of the 
office." (Sl5) (pc only, spreadsheet files] 
"Not happy with the keyboard; I don't know how to type. This 
is a major frustration. The system can be frustrating - time 
wasting- 3 or 4 passwords, then screens, menus ... It's quicker 
to look up the mail. Nothing is easy." (Sl6) (messaging] 
"I want databases that don't exist. I ask my accountant [for 
financial data]- he's down the corridor. I ... get my planner to 
do planning for me. If I was one level down I would use it. I 
would do more if I had the time. Messaging is not useful. My 
secretary uses the messaging extensively - I tend to use it 
through her. " (Sl7) [extensive facilities, virtually the entire 
range of mainframe-based systems) 
Respondents were able to give a detailed picture of their 
discontinuance circumstances because for most, the discontinuance 
had been fairly recent. 
As with the previous case, it is possible to distinguish common 
elements of the discontinuance among the respondents. The general 
features of the discontinuance part of these respondents' 
adoption cycles can be summarised as follows: 
1 Difficulties at the man/machine interface 
There seemed to be two separate issues here, one concerned with 
learning difficulties experienced prior to using the system, or 
in exploring different aspects, and the other concerned with on-
going inconvenience associated with non-productive effort and 
time expenditure. 
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2 High relative cost of the information 
The difficulties of use, resulting in time-wasting and 
frustration, were particularly significant when considered in 
conjunction with the relative ease of gaining high quality 
from the managerjs subordinates or from his personal 
network of contacts. As discussed in chapter 3 senior managers 
usually have extremely well developed information sources. 
3 Inappropriate orientation of the information 
The information available from internal databases, irrespective 
of the form which the data took, was of a kind more suitable for 
direct consumers at a lower level than the managers who were 
accessing it. In general, the systems were intended to suppport 
various managerial roles, but in fact failed to address 
specifically the actual roles of these senior managers. In this 
respect, this case directly parallels the ABC case and much of 
the comment already made about the mismatch between the systems 
and the behaviour which they are intended to serve applies here 
with equal force. 
A final word here is left to the Group Managing Director, who was 
asked if his view of the systems had changed after his 
experience: 
"I have a better idea now. There is a tremendous amount of 
bullshit around, about DSS. Only after using one yourself do you 
understand - it certainly depends on the organizational level. 
[ie as to whether it is relevant]. There is no doubt that some 
men are personally fascinated by the idea of computing. This 
leads to overoptimistic statements about potential uses and 
benefits - [here he named SlS and Sl9] In some cases there is a 
need to believe in or create propaganda for their division's 
use." (Sl2) 
This comment neatly characterises the leadership role enactment 
210 
which predominated in certain managers' adoption patterns, and 
also the problem of achieving systems relevance. But primarily it 
reveals that that this manager had crucial insights into the 
efficacy of own-use DSS computer systems. 
Systems in use 
Five respondents were making some regular direct use of their 
systems at the time of the interviews, as shown in table 6.5 
below: 
Table 6.5 Continuing users in case 2 
Respondent Computer use category 
S16 Director of Information Services user (slight) 
S17 Director of Technical Services user (slight) 
S18 Director of Personnel user (medium) 
S19 Managing Director (UK board) user (medium) 
S20 Director Mainframe Division user (heavy) 
The respondent S16 had been issued with the DSS systems described 
earlier, which included mainframe facilities a to d inclusive. In 
addition, he. had the messaging system. These facilities were 
delivered via a pc, but the pc facilities (spreadsheet, 
wordprocessing and so on) were not used at present, so 
effectively it was being used simply as a mainframe terminal. The 
respondent said that he used the system for perhaps 15 minutes 
per day on average, and his use of the system was almost entirely 
confined to the messaging facility. 
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"The financial DSS is no use at all. The financial data 
doesn't directly apply to me. The financial modelling might be 
useful, but I don't use it at the moment." (Sl6) 
"I use the messaging extensively. I am a prolific 
corresponder; 10 - 20 memos per day. Mainly to direct reports 
[subordinates]. Not outside IS [Information Services] so much 
because we haven't got a lot of [messaging system] users." (Sl6) 
The respondent explained that much of his "use" was through his 
secretary: 
"I do use it extensively through my secretary - say 2-3 
hours per day. [It] has the facility to amend, so for incoming 
input I will amend the message and then pass it on." (Sl6) 
Thus most of his use of the messaging system might best be 
described as "chauffeured", in that his secretary entered the 
bulk of the data. In terms of the computer use matrix developed 
in chapter 2 the secretary was a category Bl user in these 
circumstances and the manager an A2 user. The manager's category 
Al (direct) use was confined to reviewing messages (an important 
application in these circumstances) and the occasional message 
amendment. 
"If I want to see the incoming mail ... if my secretary's not 
around ... I can do it more quickly. [The difficulties of access 
are] ... offset by being able to look at two-minute-old messages 
rather than two-day-old messages." (Sl6) 
Of course, a number of other managers in this and other cases 
have specifically decried the value of such "instant" information 
at senior management level. 
The purpose of this respondent's use of the messaging system 
included considerations other than straightforward efficiency of 
communication with his staff. As has already been pointed out, 
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the messaging system was his division's major product which he 
was anxious to promote internally. The respondent implied that he 
used the system extensively at least partly to enforce its use 
within his own division, so that the system would receive 
increased exposure, and encourage others to use it by example; he 
would send his subordinates memos, notes and instructions on the 
system so that they had to use it to find out what he wanted; 
(" ... I have influenced its use."). 
The respondent Sl7 had been issued with a similar range of 
systems as the previous respondent Sl6, ie a full set of 
mainframe-based facilities (items a through h) delivered via a 
pc. The pc facilities were not used at all. The respondent said 
that his use of the system was slight: 
" minimal. One or two hours per week at most. I know I 
should use it, but ... if the right systems were there ... I don't 
spend much time in the office." (Sl7) 
In complete contrast to the previous respondent, this manager 
said that he used only certain financial data: 
"Messaging is not useful. My secretary uses the messaging 
extensively - I tend to use it through her. The financial system 
is the most useful. The others aren't used." (Sl7) 
It proved very difficult to get the respondent to relate any 
aspect of his use of the financial DSS to specific work tasks or 
roles. He did not agree that the system was irrelevant to him, 
but acceded that it was of "marginal use generally" and that it 
did not relate at all to strategic decision making. 
The personnel director Sl8 had been issued with the full set of 
mainframe facilities (items a through g) delivered via a 
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terminal; he also had access to a personnel database (item b) 
through a separate terminal, and in addition he had a spreadsheet 
package on a separate pc (ie there were three separate hardware 
items in his office). The respondent said that he used the system 
for up to an hour each day. In contrast to both the previous 
respondents, his usage was largely confined to the pc 
spreadsheet facility, and access to the internal personnel 
database: 
"I don't use the DSS. It's too limited. The DSS is all 
financial. I want skills and headcount. When I refer to financial 
data, I don't need the interactive stuff - the monthly report 
will do. [The messaging facility] is very cumbersome; it's labour 
intensive getting data in. It's easier to tell my secretary [who 
uses it]. Personnel data I use a lot." (Sl8) 
The respondent described his use of the spreadsheet package in 
terms of the evaluation of "manpower planning, and trends" and 
for departmental budgeting, using his own spreadsheets (ie he has 
developed the spreadsheet format himself using the software 
package facilities). He said specifically that the direct 
computer use was relevant to his job and gave brief instances. 
Firstly he used "what if" capabilities of the spreadsheet in 
order to revise aspects of the organizational manpower plan. 
Secondly, he used the outputs from the spreadsheet as 
communication documents, both with his own staff and with board 
colleagues. He specifically said that these uses were "supportive 
of decisions", and that the use was most effective for small, 
simple applications. In relation to strategic decision processes, 
the respondent said that the information from these sources had 
specifically influenced manpower decisions. Certainly, such 
decisions can be described as significant, in that they affect 
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the organization as a whole, are concerned with the future, and 
therefore meet our constraints as regards their "strategic" 
nature. The fact that this strategic influence has been achieved 
using the humble spreadsheet in preference to a hiahlv 
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sophisticated and broad-ranging decision support system is surely 
indicative of the extent of the mismatch between the intentions 
of these systems and the practicalities of managerial decision 
processes. 
This respondent's circumstance is particularly significant as it 
appears to be the first reasonably clear-cut case of senior 
managerial computer use where the traditional informational and 
decisional roles appear to be directly addressed by the 
facilities in use, and where the use is not influenced by 
enactment of other role requirements resulting in "symbolic" 
usage of the computer facilities primarily as a means of 
influencing others. It might be argued that this director is 
operating at a lower level than some of his colleagues, in that 
he is directly manipulating data himself whereas his colleagues 
would use staff assistance for this particular purpose (see for 
examples the comments of Sl2, and also those of Sl9 later in this 
chapter). Nevertheless, the use is there and it seems necessary 
to enquire as to what the special circumstances are surrounding 
this case which have contributed to the special instance. 
Although a number of variables have been examined pertaining to 
previous computer use, training and education and so on, none of 
these shows any outstanding features which clearly explain his 
present behaviour. 
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However, reviewing the respondent's career background shows that 
he had occupied his present position for only four months at the 
time of the interview. Prior to this he was personnel manager (UK 
grouping only), and therefore operated at a lower managerial 
level and without the staff support to which he now presumably 
has access. It can therefore be conjectured that he has retained 
his working habits and direct information sources from his 
previous working environment, and perhaps will do so until he can 
establish the informational networks and staff support which his 
senior colleagues utilise. Further, it can perhaps be surmised 
that the nature of senior managerial work will force him 
eventually to adopt similar work patterns to his colleagues and 
his current levels of direct computer use may drop or cease 
altogether. 
The UK board managing director Sl9 was presently transferring 
between two systems. He had been using a terminal linked to a 
mainframe which provided the full range of DSS facilities (a 
through g), but was currently using (or learning to use) a 
separate pc (also linked to a mainframe) which provided the 
common pc packages (spreadsheet, wordprocessor and database) 
together with the special telephony features. He estimated that 
his computer use was up to one hour per day and that this 
included time when he was doing other things; he also mentioned 
that he experimented with the facilities outside normal working 
hours. 
It was not easy to directly elicit this respondent's computer 
usage in a concrete and specific way. He seemed determined to 
present a very optimistic picture of the value of the systems and 
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of computers generally (which is not altogether surprising 
considering his position, and see the comments by Sl2 about him 
in this respect) and it became difficult to establish concrete 
relations between his computer use and his work roles or tasks, 
However, he said that he accessed operational data from the 
databases and examined (but did not enter) messages on the 
messaging system. 
systems as follows: 
He ranked the usefulness to him of these 
1 telephony facilities 
2 operational information (daily/weekly cash receipts, order 
and inventory data, accounts ledgers) 
3 messaging 
He seemed to make no use of the general financial information 
included in the mainframe facilities a,c or d. He mentioned that 
he made no use of the wordprocessor or graphics facilities, and 
he had not yet used the spreadsheet (although he said he had 
tried to, but found a "learning problem" with respect to its use) 
nor had he written any Basic programs. The telephony features of 
the pc may have helped this manager to some extent in the 
mechanics of communicating with his internal and external 
contacts. The use of operational data is an interesting contrast 
to most other subjects who so far have not been at all interested 
in directly accessing raw operational data; certainly it is the 
first mention of anybody interested in stock and ledger data. 
This type of information is clearly oriented towards localised, 
short-term aspects of the organization's activities and it is 
perhaps unusual for a manager of this seniority to regularly 
access it directly. It is possible that his role as managing 
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director within a complex managerial hierarchy was as much 
operations-oriented as strategic, and so accessing this level of 
information was useful to him. On the other hand, as the comments 
about him by Sl2 indicate, there is a strong element of role 
enactment in his circumstances such that he was concerned 
particularly with transmitting strongly positive values and 
attitudes about computing (and also perhaps about himself as a 
computer user) both internally and externally. 
As regards the use of his directly acquired information in 
strategic decision processes, the respondent said that his use of 
the systems did not relate at all to strategy: 
"I would expect others to provide generic strategic 
information for me. I could envisage a strategy meeting when data 
is pulled off a screen; but I doubt it ... It involves preparing 
and circulating stuff in advance ... a meeting of minds. When I 
talk about strategy a group of us get together to discuss it. 
It's a question of management style perhaps. But that [computer-
based interactive data] wouldn't be the key for me. DSS has no 
bearing or interest to the chairman of BCD!" (Sl9) 
The last remark seemed to be a comment on the chairman's dictum 
regarding the use of the DSS for the top management of BCD. 
The respondent S20 was the major direct computer user among the 
BCD respondents. He had the complete range of mainframe software 
(a through h) and pc (item a) facilities with the exception of 
telephony facilities, all delivered via a pc linked to a 
mainframe; there was a separate Prestel terminal. In addition to 
the systems listed earlier, he had access to division-specific 
information relating to computer mainframe engineering status. He 
said he used his systems (as a whole) for about an hour to an 
hour and a half each day, although he spent half his time out of 
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the office with customers and other contacts in the UK and 
abroad. 
The respondent was asked in detail about his computer use, and it 
is worth examining his responses and comments in some detail with 
regard to each type of use. His use of the computer systems 
appears to address various aspects of his managerial roles, and 
it was not always clear as to which elements of his work roles 
were touched upon. In order to simplify the responses without 
imposing a possibly misleading framework, it is perhaps best to 
consider the respondent's computer use in terms of three general 
aspects: 
1 communicating through the messaging system 
2 monitoring of affairs 
3 personal resource management 
1 communicating through the messaging system 
"The system is on all the time. It's mainly used for 
messaging; I tend to pull off the mail in the morning. Myself, I 
use the messaging daily - it's up all the time [displayed on the 
screen]. Mainly my own division staff. I use the [messaging 
system] most. Mail comes in all the time. Most of my system use 
is messaging." 
[Why do you use it yourself rather than through your 
secretary?] "There's not always somebody there .... because I've 
read the mail; and I can send a message there and then. I use my 
secretary for big updates." (S20) 
2 monitoring of affairs 
"I monitor the project data daily." (S20) 
This refers to extensive manufacturing projects which are 
project-managed using computer-based PERT networks by his 
219 
subordinates; the respondent monitors the progress of the 
projects, as shown by the PERT data. 
"I can see if any machine is down - how it's running and so 
on." (820) 
This last comment refers to the company's principal computer 
mainframes, which support all the internal systems and are used 
extensively in software and hardware product development and for 
other purposes. The respondent is ultimately responsible for 
their operation and accesses a special system which indicates 
their status. The respondent mentioned that he was was able to 
monitor his subordinates through this and other systems. (For 
example, he described how one of his people was claiming some 
kind of problem with a mainframe system; but with the aid of his 
monitoring of the subordinate's system activities, he was able to 
show that this was wrong). His monitoring activities seemed 
oriented primarily toward his subordinates and concrete aspects 
of job, as the following comments show: 
"I only look at the internal stuff [ie the corporate 
databases on sales, personnel etc] when preparing corporate 
reviews - say weekly. I only look at the financial data monthly, 
prior to financial reviews. Then I tend to prefer paper reports. 
I look at these figures with somebody. It's no good looking at 
them in isolation without the explanation. There are bits of the 
personnel file which I use a lot - an extract [for his divisional 
subordinates] is on the pc." (820) 
3 personal resource management 
"I keep 'do lists' on the pc [using a dBase II software 
package], and a copy of who I've met [names and other details, so 
that he can refer to this when next he meets them]. I use the 
spreadsheet for personal expenses - I have a specific sheet for 
that. My secretary runs the diary management -for good reason." 
[ie so as to prevent multiple booking and misunderstandings] 
(820) 
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The respondent made these comments about the most and least 
useful facilities: 
"Messaging is of most use. Anything else somebody else could 
get. No, I don't use any financial modelling. I don't use the 
wordprocessor." (320) 
The corporate DSS (and its associated facilities) was generally 
discounted during his discussion of the facilities. Finally, he 
was asked what aspects of his work were directly facilitated by 
his use of the systems: 
"None. If I'm honest .... if you took the system away I would 
probably be more efficient! ... Because I wouldn't be playing with 
it. I could always ring somebody and find out." (S20) 
He also offered other, role related reasons for his systems use: 
"Of course I am hooked up to my own product ... to see what 
my customers will make of it." (S20) 
This reflects the "experimental" mode of use mentioned by other 
respondents. And: 
"The best way of making my reports (subordinates] use it 
[the messaging system] is for me to use it." (S20) 
As with some of his colleagues, (particularly Sl6) there was an 
evangelical approach to encouraging his subordinates to use 
direct systems. In this case, it appeared to be the promotion of 
company systems in an organizational rather than divisional 
context, because the messaging system appeared to be "owned" by 
Sl6's division. 
However, in general he seemed to have successfully woven the 
computer systems into the fabric of his work roles, although his 
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comments would suggest that having done so does not yield any 
significant advantage - on the contrary, he specifically states 
that he would be "more efficient" without it! In other words he 
is paying a price, in terms of effort and time costs, which his 
colleagues are not prepared to pay. Nevertheless, he appears to 
be regularly and effectively utilising the systems to a far 
greater extent than other respondents, with the exception of Sl8. 
In the latter case, it was surmised that the respondent was 
carrying over information-gathering behaviours from a previous 
function. But no such considerations apply here, neither are 
there any obviously compelling reasons in his job content. Why 
then, does this respondent continue to make extensive use of 
direct computer systems, when there is no obvious advantage (and 
perhaps some disadvantage) in doing so? 
This question cannot be dismissed lightly. In the context of the 
discontinuing respondents there were usually concrete factors 
which clearly mitigated strongly against their continuance, but 
it is difficult to ascribe equally concrete reasons why this 
respondent should behave in a completely antithetical manner. 
It simply may not be possible to state with any certainty why 
this respondent should pay a high personal price in order to 
utilise direct computer systems whereas his senior managerial 
colleagues in similar circumstances do not. What can be said is 
that he made use of a computer at home as well as at work (linked 
to the organizational mainframe), and had been involved with 
computers in one way or another throughout most of his career. He 
therefore had developed extensive knowledge and experience, 
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particularly in the skills involved in microcomputer use, and 
that he maintained these skill levels by constant use and 
experimentation. It could be argued therefore, that the learning 
effort required in each adoption cycle was somewhat less than for 
his colleagues because of his well~developed skills, and 
therefore the effort and time disincentives were correspondingly 
less. 
It would be wrong to discuss extensive direct computer usage 
without mentioning the personal satisfactions which can be gained 
from using computers. The allure which computers hold for some 
people has been discussed by several authors (see for example 
Smith 1980), and this fascination has been explained in terms of 
the considerable gratification obtained from intellectually 
wrestling with software structures, and the satisfaction of 
applying well-developed skills in a new context. Smith mentions 
the effects of positive reinforcement on the shaping of behaviour 
which can arise from intensive computer interaction, and the 
semi-compulsive activities which result in "hacking" 
(purposeless intellectual solution of software problems) or other 
inappropriate behaviours. Both S20 and S2 (from ABC) were 
described by systems-providing staff and colleagues as "computer 
freaks" (ie unusually intensive users) and their may be something 
of the "hacker" in their behaviour. An inkling of this was 
discernible in discussion with S20 ( ... if you took the system 
away I would probably be more efficient! ... Because I wouldn't be 
playing with it.[S20]). On the other hand it must be stressed 
that whatever predilections they may have had towards computers, 
both these managers were clearly highly successful men who had 
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risen to the top of their respective organizations and therefore 
any negative impact of their computer use (if any) must have been 
very slight. 
Features of continuance 
It is difficult to ascribe simple features to the circumstances 
of these five instances of continued senior-level computer use. 
Each respondent appeared to be unique in his circumstances and 
behaviours and especially in the choice of systems which he used, 
making it no simple task to generalise or draw conclusions 
regarding salient factors in their continuation. 
As regards the latter point, the respondents' systems preferences 
in terms of commonly available features were as follows: 
Table 6.6 System preferences in case 2 
Preferred system Least preferred system Amount of use 
Sl6 messaging financial DSS slight 
Sl7 financial DSS messaging slight 
Sl8 spreadsheet messaging, financial DSS medium 
Sl9 operational data messaging, financial DSS medium 
S20 messaging financial DSS heavy 
This table highlights the polarised preferences exhibited by the 
managers in respect of systems which were (in technical terms) 
the same. As has already been pointed out, usage patterns for 
each respondent showed a distinctive preference for the 
employment of one system in much greater proportion to all else. 
What is so curious is that two managers made considerable use of 
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messaging, whereas the other three derided this system and 
conversely, one manager (albeit a slight user) thought the 
financial DSS most relevant whereas none of the others made use 
of it. It is difficult (if not impossible) to explain these 
polarised and entirely contrary preferences, which co-existed in 
managers within the same organization, in terms of work tasks or 
managerial informational requirements. 
These differences, together with the lack of clear informational 
advantage imply most strongly that the system preferences, and 
indeed the continued computer usage in general, were due to 
factors other than simple informational or decisional needs in 
the sense implied in the implicit objectives of the systems. In 
other words, the same mismatch between system intentions and 
efficient managerial behaviour which has been stressed in 
discontinuance action is still probably present in continuation, 
but these managers have found ways of at least partially 
overcoming the disadvantages (for example by utilising mainly one 
feature only), or have found other compensating rewards (perhaps 
from leadership or informational role enactment, or personal 
rewards from the intellectual challenge) from the continued use. 
Key salient (but not always general) features of continued system 
usage can be summarised as follows: 
1 polarised 
facilities, 
system usage patterns; given a broad choice of 
users will settle on one system which is used to the 
exclusion (or virtual exclusion ) of all else, perhaps as a means 
of reducing learning and skill maintenance requirements (all 
respondents exhibited this pattern) 
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2 diversified system usage patterns; given a broad choice of 
facilities, users settled on systems preferences (and disliked 
systems) diametrically opposite to colleagues for no clear 
informational reason (Sl6 and S20 versus Sl7, Sl8, Sl9) 
3 the successful interweaving of system use within the manager's 
present role set; eg messaging as a monitoring or communication 
medium (Sl6, S20), or the manipulation of personnel data on a 
spreadsheet for the communication of ideas (Sl8), or the 
monitoring of subordinate performance (S20) 
4 lack of effective advantage; there was no clear evidence that 
system use conferred a distinct personal informational or 
decisional advantage to the user (all respondents; and 
specifically denied by heaviest user, S20) 
5 enactment of the leadership role; the encouragement, direct or 
indirect, of others in the use of computers or specific computer 
systems (particularly Sl6 and S20) 
6 expression of values; the dissemination of information, 
attitudes and values relating to the manager, his division or 
organization (perhaps all respondents, but particularly Sl9) 
7 technology fascination; the gaining of purely intellectual 
rewards from exercising computer skills (S20) 
8 atypical senior-managerial behaviour; a carry-over of direct 
information sourcing from lower management levels (Sl8) 
9 Rejection of the organizational financial DSS as a strategic 
decision support resource (all respondents) 
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Summary of case 2 
Examination of the materials in this case study has covered a 
considerable amount of ground and has provided insights into 
several areas of the adoption cycle. Firstly, an instance of non-
adoption has been examined which appears to lack the features 
either of overt advocacy or leadership behaviour which mark 
adoption behaviour. Secondly, the adoption circumstances of nine 
respondents have been examined in detail and key features 
identified; these features confirm and extend the features found 
in case 1. Next, the discontinuance behaviour of four respondents 
has been discussed in some detail; again, features of this 
category both confirm and extend in an important way the results 
from the previous case. 
Lastly, the circumstances of five continuing users have been 
analysed and several key features of their use in a managerial 
context discussed. Throughout the analysis, reference has been 
made to earlier discussions on the nature of senior managerial 
thought and behaviour, and attention has been drawn to 
characteristics of information use, decision behaviour and role 
requirements which throw light on the phenomena described. In 
order to clarify the separate stages of the findings which have 
been considered here, the diagrammatical form of the theoretical 
model introduced earlier has been extended to show the 
disposition of the findings within the adoption cycle. 
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Chapter 7 
Senior Managers in the Public Sector: Case Analysis of Three 
Organizations 
Abstract 
This chapter examines evidence from three organizations in the 
public sector. As with the previous case studies, interview 
materials are used to develop and extend the picture of 
behavioural features of computer adoption and use. In particular, 
instances of initial rejection are compared with instances of 
adoption occurring in the same organization in order to identify 
salient features of rejection behaviours. The importance of 
organizational context is discussed with reference to the 
effect of organizational resource considerations on the nature of 
managers' roles. 
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Introduction 
As with the previous chapter, information from the study of 
organizations is presented in the form of separate case studies. 
Here, three organizations from the private sector are analysed 
and used independently to develop ideas about features of the 
adoption process. 
Case study 3 : The PHA Corporation 
Background 
The PHA authority is a largely autonomous public corporation 
which is responsible for running one of the country's ports. This 
organization employs over one thousand personnel and collects 
operating revenues amounting to #28m (from published accounts in 
1984). The organization has been in existence for a number of 
years and has seen a long term decline in traditional trading 
volumes; however, recently there has been an upturn in business 
occasioned by oil exports and, in addition, the authority is 
attempting to establish revenues from new areas. The present 
position therefore is one in which healthy profits are being made 
and there is every hope for a steady growth in the future. 
The port authority is managed by two boards. First there is the 
non-executive board which comprises representatives from local 
industry and government, and from the executive board, and which 
meets monthly. Secondly, there is the executive board which 
comprises the senior executive officers who are responsible for 
running the organization on a day-to-day basis and which 
constitutes the senior management team of the organization. 
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Respondents were drawn from the latter group. Out of the seven 
board members, five respondents were interviewed; of the two who 
were not seen, one had very recently joined the organization and 
was excluded from the survey for that reason and the other could 
not be contacted within a reasonable time. The respondents did 
not have an equable share of responsibilities; the chief 
executive seemed to have a large responsibility area (including 
multiple directorships of associated organizations) and, at the 
other extreme, the harbour master acted more like a middle 
manager and seemed more concerned with the day-to-day operational 
matters of his specific department. The other respondents seemed 
more equal in their responsibilities, ranking somewhere between 
the first two. 
The authority had recently undertaken to computerize some of its 
administrative systems, and in addition, some of its top 
management team had adopted computers themselves. The systems 
which were available in the organization can be described as 
follows: 
Computer systems in the organization 
The organizational systems comprised three hardware elements. 
There was a central mainframe on which most of the principal 
management systems resided, separate micros which ran the harbour 
master's records and a private Prestel facility which was used 
for messaging and also for the display of ship arrival data. In 
detail, the systems were as follows: 
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Mainframe-based 
Financial systems: 
Accounts, wages, fixed assets. Budgetting. Management data. 
Financial planning system: PROSPER (financial modelling package) 
Budgetting and 5 year forecasting. 
Tenant/lease and property inspection systems. 
Messaging 
Micro-based 
Ship records (used mainly by harbourmaster) 
Engineering stocks 
Plant maintenance records, breakdowns, availability, planning 
roster of dock labour 
Wordprocessing 
Prestel system 
Closed system for port authorities - messaging related to IR 
problems and issues 
Closed system for ship movement data - ships at anchor, ships 
coming in and leaving etc - (shown on screens around the 
building; this represented a subset of a more detailed 
operational system carried on the harbour office micros) 
Senior managerial computer use 
At the time of the interviews three senior managers were 
utilising computers directly and two were not, as shown in table 
7.1 below. 
Table 7.1 Senior managers and computer use categories - case 3 
S31 
S32 
S33 
S34 
S35 
Respondent 
Chief Executive 
Personnel Director 
Harbourmaster 
Finance Director 
Company secretary 
Use category 
User (heavy) 
User (slight) 
User (medium) 
Non-user (non-adopted) 
Non-user (non-adopted) 
What is particularly interesting here is firstly that the chief 
executive himself was the major direct senior managerial computer 
user in the organization, and secondly that two of the management 
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team had not adopted computing, The latter circumstance is 
unusual because in the last two cases, for example, managers had 
usually at least experimented with a system before discontinuing 
their use; whereas here we have two instances where senior 
managers have not adopted at all, despite the fact that their 
board-level colleagues have done so. The question which naturally 
arises as to what are the special circumstances which mitigate in 
favour of adoption by three of the board, and non-adoption by the 
others. 
In terms of our model of computer adoption and in line with the 
two previous cases it would make sense to analyse materials in 
terms of non-adoption, factors in adoption, and so on. However, 
it is thought that in view of the special part which the Chief 
Executive (S31) played in the adoption processes that it would 
make more sense to begin with him and discuss the others, as 
individuals, in the light of that analysis. 
Features in adoption 
It became clear after talking to the chief executive S31 (and 
this was confirmed by his colleagues) that he was the principal 
driving force behind the introduction of computing into the 
organization, both in terms of the organizational systems and the 
senior managerial computer use. Something of the flavour of the 
organization's computing image can be had from the fact that 
within the main offices reception area was a computer monitor 
mounted so that it could be seen by (and only by) visitors 
passing in and out or waiting for attention; the monitor showed, 
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in colour, information on ship movements and was updated after 
every few minutes in a way reminiscent of an aircraft departure 
monitor at an airport. 
Inside the chief executive's office there were three separate 
computer terminals surrounding the desk; the impression of "high-
tech" was heightened by the presence on the walls of large photo-
pictures of aircraft cockpits (showing the multitude of dials and 
switches) . There were a number of elements of the chief 
executive's computer adoption: 
"I find it fascinating; I like technology! ... It's great 
fun!" ( S31) 
Clearly he revelled in the technological aspects of computing, 
and this showed in the delight with which he discussed and 
displayed the various systems during the interview. Another 
element of his personal involvement was described by one of his 
colleagues: 
"He (S31) was a [large company] sales director and this has 
made him aware that he needs to be different; to stand out from 
the crowd. So the technology is a way of being different." (S35) 
A similar comment was made by another colleague. But the image-
building element was not confined to the man himself; on the 
contrary, important messages are conveyed both internally and 
externally about the organization: 
" ... he (S31) perceives the need to make sure the company is 
seen to be in the forefront, by customers and other ports and 
outside organizations generally. Also, the need to motivate 
staff, so they can see they are in a technologically aware 
company.·" ( S35) 
Here the respondent has described an important aspect of the 
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chief executive's leadership role; the requirement to promulgate 
desirable values and attitudes about the organization (and also 
about himself) inside and outside the organization. This was 
echoed by the chief executive's own comments relating to his 
"crusading" activities which he was now taking outside the 
organization: 
"Now, I want to persuade other ports 
communications system ... I'm on the national 
advocating these things ... " (S31) 
to come into a 
committee - I'm 
In general, therefore, there are two or three different aspects 
of the adoption behaviour. Firstly, there is the leadership 
requirement which is a clear element of the adoption. This 
manifests itself in the way the respondent seeks to influence 
others, inside and outside the organization. This element has of 
course been noted in previous cases; what is different here is 
that the respondent has personally initiated, and driven through, 
the computerisation within the organization ~ in previous cases 
senior level respondents had approved of, and acquiesced in 
computerisation at lower levels but did not seem to have driven 
it personally. 
Secondly, there is the personal fascination with technology; this 
was seen as something rather different from the "hacking" 
behaviour of respondents S2 and S20 from previous cases; here, 
the respondent did not display the detailed knowledge and 
expertise of these latter users and seemed perhaps more 
interested in what the technology represented rather than in 
exercising technical skills. For example, in demonstrating some 
of the systems to the researcher the respondent could not make 
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many of them work and had to call for assistance; also in 
discussing the systems he did not display anything like the depth 
of detailed, specific technical knowledge shown by S2 or S20. 
Finally, it can be mentioned that the respondent had a powerful, 
ebullient and dominating personality (indeed, the researcher's 
control over the interview situation was somewhat limited in this 
instance). 
Turning now to the personnel director (S32), we have a somewhat 
different picture. The respondent had two screens at his desk 
side, and was asked about the circumstances of his adoption: 
"I decided the personnel dept should be computerised. I 
forced it upon my deputy< .. my number two was not enamoured at 
first. It was a joint decision; three [directors] ... Personnel 
would have their own programs and 5 terminals." (S32) 
Here, the respondent is referring directly to his leadership role 
in ensuring the implementation of computing in his own 
department. When asked why he himself personally had terminals at 
his desk, he replied as follows: 
"To appreciate the difficulties - to see what's going on. And to 
get the data myself. The people who I could ask might be out. 
Everybody should be able to use one ... In five years time, there 
will be one on every desk." (S32) 
There are three elements here: the leadership requirement, the 
need for a specific data resource (one of the few times this has 
been mentioned) and a very interesting comment about the need to 
"keep up" with technology. 
This latter point represents a thread which may well be present 
in many senior managers' adoption patterns - ie a fear of being 
left behind in the technological race, of being without the 
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necessary skills or knowledge essential for success or even 
survival in a competitive management arena. There is no doubt 
that some members of the computing world deliberately play on 
such fears, and this can be seen especially in press 
advertisements which emphasise both youthful imagery and also 
imply the dangers of failing to keep up: "You can't win 
tomorrows' business battles with yesterday's office technology" 
is an example from a management journal (Management Today, March 
1986 pii). Government pronouncements at various times also seem 
to emphasise this aspect; for example, a recent television 
programme on computing highlighted a government minister's 
statements to the effect that all children must be "computer 
literate" or, (so it was strongly implied) they would be unable 
to get jobs. 
Bearing in mind the strong advocacy (and powerful personality) of 
the chief executive (S31), the personnel director was asked if he 
had been influenced at all by him. He said that he had not (and 
his comments above indicate his own decision to implement 
computing). However, another respondent (S35) described how he 
had been present when the chief executive had specifically 
ordered the personnel director to use the computer. Whatever the 
strength and importance of the various influences and factors 
affecting the personnel director's computer adoption, there seems 
little doubt that the direct and powerful advocacy of the chief 
executive will have played an important part. 
Unlike virtually all other respondents in this and other cases, 
the respondent did not display overtly positive attitudes about 
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computers; indeed, he did not seem to enjoy the discussion about 
computers, or his own use of them: 
"I have no personal knowledge of computers; no time for one 
thing. It's too late in life- I'm retiring in 18 months time! 
Maybe I don't have the capacity - my brain is not as sharp as it 
was for something new. I have too many other things of more 
importance! My priority is to make [PHA] pay!! Other people have 
greater facility and are paid less." (S32) 
Yet despite this, he had the two screens by his desk and used 
them daily. There seemed to be something of a contradiction among 
some of the respondent's statements, and also between his 
stated attitudes and actual behaviour. In fact, this latter 
phenomenon has been discussed by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), and 
somebody in this position has been referred to by them as a 
"dissonant adopter"; ie there is a discrepancy between the 
person's attitudes and the overt behaviour required by the 
organization. In this instance it may be conjectured that S32 
could not directly escape the dilemma occasioned by the 
requirement to comply with S31 against his wishes, either by 
repudiating S31 or by changing his attitudes and therefore he had 
decided to live with the discomfort occasioned by the dissonance 
until his retirement. Interestingly, many of the respondents in 
previous cases were "dissonant rejectors" in the sense that they 
had discontinued their use while still maintaining strongly 
positive attitudes towards computing. 
The last respondent to have adopted computing was the 
harbourmaster (S33). In a manner similar to the last respondent, 
S33 was primarily concerned about implementing computer systems 
in his own department. He saw this as a means to replace 
inefficient card systems and to improve efficiency generally; in 
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particular, he was aware of specific limitations of the card 
records and could think of ways in which the computer would give 
better detailed information and enable better control over the 
day to day affairs of his office. (Although he said that these 
benefits had not been entirely realised in practice). 
However, when asked why he himself was using a computer (he had 
two screens by his desk), the answers were not entirely clear or 
straightforward: 
"Because my staff have their own terminals ... I'd have to 
interrupt them. With cards, I could go and look, but now ... I'd 
have to stop him and look at his screen. We originally planned 
for me not to have one; but I wanted one ... because it took 
three times as long .. , because of my interference of others." 
(833) 
In fact the specific occurrences which he described related to 
ship movements which happened perhaps three or four times per 
week; so the rationale for his own personal systems adoption and 
use in the first instance is by no means clear. Of course, it is 
possible to speculate on the effect of the powerful advocacy of 
831 which may have been a factor, or the leadership requirement 
which is common in many other cases. According to 835, the chief 
executive had influenced 833 as well as 832: 
"[The chief executive] told [832 and 833] to have one!" 
(835) 
Also, 835 perceived that the harbour master was making a 
statement about himself in his personal computer use: 
"[833]'s system is useful, but to have it on his desk is a 
status symbol - a switched-on harbour-master! [833] was not 
influenced so much by [the chief executive]" (S35) 
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A generalised list of the characteristics of the adoption 
patterns in this case can be summarised as follows: 
1 High level advocacy; the chief executive was clearly a powerful 
advocate and had directly influenced other adopters, particularly 
S32. 
2 Leadership role enactment; all the adopting respondents were 
initiating and encouraging computer use within their spheres of 
influence, and this was seen as a primary adoption consideration 
3 Information role; the chief executive particularly was 
concerned to make certain statements about the organization's 
technological position, and about himself, both inside and 
outside the organization 
4 Technological fascination; the chief executive's fascination 
for new technology (almost for its own sake) was quite apparent 
and acknowledged both by himself and his colleagues 
5 Need for technological involvement; a requirement for the 
individual manager to feel that he is up to date with current 
technology, and will not be left behind with the wrong skills 
(expressed perhaps by S32) 
Features of non-adoption 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this case study, the fact 
that there were two senior managers who had not adopted the 
computer technology is particularly interesting in this instance, 
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because it is possible to directly compare the circumstances 
under which the non-adoption decisions were taken with those of 
respondents who had adopted the technology. 
The finance director S34 had theoretically available to him the 
complete range of organizational systems described earlier, 
amongst which were a significant number of financial systems. His 
departmental finance staff were significant users of the computer 
systems; in addition, the computer department was his 
responsibility and the data processing manager reported directly 
to him. In other words there were strong leadership role 
requirement reasons for him to adopt computing himself; many 
other senior managers in similar circumstances have done so, as 
we have seen in previous cases. In addition there was the 
powerful advocacy of S31 which had undoubtedly influenced S32. In 
general, therefore, it seemed that there was as much if not more 
reason for the financial director to adopt direct computing than 
there was for anybody else. Yet this senior manager had not 
attempted direct computer use. Neither, interestingly, did he 
receive computer printouts himself. Nor did he intend to explore 
the possibilities of direct use at some future time. When asked 
why he did not have a computer terminal, he replied as follows: 
"I made sure I didn't get one! I have seen them working 
[ie computer terminals]; I can get the same data a lot quicker by 
picking up the phone and speaking to the right person. Also I can 
get at the information behind the figures - my management 
accountant will know or will find out why a figure is big or 
whatever. It's a luxury I can manage without ... " (S34) 
When asked about specific systems which seemed "obviously" 
relevant to him, he said: 
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[About the formal financial modelling system] 
"In fact the Prosper summary that [S31] sees [on his screen] 
is a waste of time because he has to ring somebody (like me) to 
get behind the figures anyway!" (S34) 
[About what-if financial spreadsheet modelling] 
"Yes. But it;s quicker to to ask my management accountant, 
who is familiar with the system ... I think you need to be doing 
it regularly. He is familiar; he has done the programming ... " 
[About the other financial management information] 
"I may be missing out on the interesting parts of 
accounting ... but I'm not failing to provide proper information 
or service, because the management accountant does it. I question 
the value I would get out of a system." (S34) 
The respondent was asked if he felt that the personal learning 
costs involved in his use outweighed the rewards he might get: 
"It's very simple these days isn't it? No problem ... I know 
I'm very slow on the keyboard .... " (S34) 
This is undoubtedly unrealistic, and it perhaps contradicts his 
earlier remark about the accountant being familiar with the 
system; but the point here is that this factor is not necessarily 
what has put him off. The respondent was then asked directly why 
it was that S31 and S32 used their computers whereas he did not. 
Although he was loath to say anything which was directly critical 
of S31, it had become clear from earlier remarks that he felt 
that some of the systems used by the chief executive were not 
strictly necessary (for example his comment on the Prosper 
modelling system, and his reference to the "luxury" of direct 
systems employed at PHA generally). His explanation of the 
personnel director's use was that the latter has a specific 
operational requirement for his system: 
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"[S32] gets straight data that is not published elsewhere 
so he has to use it." (534) 
This comment is partially correct, in that after the personnel 
records had been computerized, perhaps the quickest (but by no 
means the only) way for the personnel director to examine 
individual records was for him to access the file from a 
terminal; however, the financial computer systems also contained 
much data which was not published elsewhere, too, but this had 
not forced the financial director turn to use these systems in 
the same way. 
In general, the view can be taken that the financial director had 
formed an opinion about direct computing to the effect that it 
would not improve his personal efficiency or effectiveness in any 
way and that he would continue to satisfy his information needs 
from his present sources. It would seem that he did not feel the 
need to "lead from the front" as regards his departmental staff; 
neither presumably did he feel that it was necessary for him to 
use a computer in order to make a statement about the 
organization's technological stand. He had decided, therefore, 
not to adopt any direct computer systems; unlike the personal 
director, however, he seems to have been able to resist any 
pressures applied by the chief executive. That such pressures 
were applied directly can only be conjectured (the respondent 
sidestepped questions put to him on this issue); but a comment by 
S32 indicates that such pressures were probably present: 
"The finance man should have one, but doesn't!" (S32) 
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And a similar point was made by S35. The comment seems only 
reasonable; as has been already pointed out, the financial 
director had more reason than anybody to adopt computing himself. 
It might be mentioned here that during interview the respondent 
showed himself to possess both considerable interpersonal skills 
and force of character, such that it was quite easy to imagine 
that he had sidestepped any pressure applied personally by the 
chief executive. 
The second instance of non-adoption concerned the company 
secretary, S35. As with the previous respondent he had 
theoretically available to him all the company systems, and 
again, some of these systems - although a small part - were 
specifically relevant to his own function, (tenant/lease and 
property inspection systems). His staff of four secretaries made 
extensive use of wordprocessors for leases and other legal 
documentation. However, he explained that direct systems (however 
useful they might be in his department) were not relevant to him 
personally: 
"It wouldn't be cost effective; I can't imagine it in the 
present state of the art. I use law reports; if they were on 
computer, great, but at present it wouldn't be cost effective. 
Maybe legal document storage [currently held on microfiche] on 
computer; that would be very attractive. Maybe in 5-10 years time 
it will be done." (S35) 
The respondent was asked about specific systems which might be of 
use to him: 
"Messaging? Might be nice - but not very exciting or 
important... I would want to be sure that my messages were 
properly retained ... [Spreadsheets?] Might be nice in some 
circumstances ... At the moment I ring my management accountant ... 
If I was an accountant and numerate... But why have an 
accountant? [ie why have a dog and bark yourself?]" (S35) 
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In· other words he perceives the available systems to be not 
relevant to him personally in the specific context of his own 
real work tasks and roles, He already possesses adequate and 
convenient information sources and sees no reason to do detailed 
work himself, 
He made the following point about the "negotiator" aspect of his 
role (Mintzberg 1973) which had particular application to 
relations with people and organizations both inside and outside 
the port authority: 
"Most of my work involves negotiation and bluff ... " (535) 
In other words the essence of his work tasks are largely 
unrelated to most of the information contained within the 
organization's present systems. Similar points have been made by 
a number of discontinuing managers in previous cases. The 
respondent went on to say: 
"I've avoided hands on use ... not because I'm reluctant, but 
because I don't want to waste time with things that others could 
do with less cost. I could spend a lot of time keying in data ... 
I don't want to twiddle knobs myself ... I want the information. 
Computing is good when it makes for efficiency - like word 
processing - but I'm sceptical about the Prestel ship data - this 
is gimmickry!" ( S35) 
The respondent perceives that using a computer himself would be 
an inappropriate use of his time and effort. Also, he does not 
seem to have the leadership requirement in the shape of sizeable 
staff responsibilities which might influence his adoption. 
Whether he came under pressure to adopt from the chief executive 
and resisted it, or whether no such pressure was applied could 
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not be ascertained. 
A summary of the non-adoption characteristics of these last two 
respondents is by no means easy. On the one hand there is the 
financial director, 834, who had as much reason as anybody to 
adopt computing personally as any of his colleagues, including 
his own departmental leadership requirements as well as the top-
level advocacy of the chief executive, but appeared to have 
successfully resisted taking part in what appeared to him to be a 
time wasting exercise. The latter respondent, 835, on the other 
hand, had less reason for adoption because he had less 
departmental requirement for the main organizational systems and 
seems also to have resisted adoption because he perceived that 
the systems available would not help in making him more 
"efficient". 
Salient features of the non-adoption patterns can be described as 
follows: 
1 Successful resistance to high-level advocacy pressures (S34) 
2 Perception of the available systems as failing to offer a 
better alternative information source than present (human expert) 
sources (S34 and S35) 
3 Perception of available systems as not directly relevant to 
respondent's real tasks or roles (S34 and S35) 
4 Perception that using the systems would be time and effort 
wasting (S34 and S35) 
It is interesting to compare these features with those of 
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discontinuing users; the perceptions of the non-adopters (who in 
this case had had no prior experience of direct computer use) 
seemed remarkably similar to those of the discontinuers who had 
of course gained practical experience. 
Systems implementation 
In the two previous cases, systems had been issued to the senior 
managers which were intended specifically for their own personal 
use (albeit, in the ABC case some of these were originally 
designed for other purposes and in the BCD case were intended for 
external marketing). In this case however, things were rather 
different. Here, systems had been developed largely on a 
departmental basis to serve operational and management needs, and 
the senior managerial use was an extension of this departmental 
activity. For example, the personnel records had been 
computerised in order to improve departmental efficiency, and the 
personnel director accessed these same records. Similarly, the 
harbourmaster accessed systems which had been devised to serve 
the functional requirements of his office. The chief executive 
accessed all of the organization's systems, none of which seemed 
to have any special features applicable to his own role. 
Given this important proviso about the nature of the systems, all 
three computer senior managerial users appeared to have made some 
inputs into system choice processes. These inputs seemed mainly 
confined however, to initiating, monitoring and approving 
activities at various points in the systems development process. 
The chief executive for example had been especially involved in 
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initiating computer developments in the organization, and had 
involved himself in matters such as equipment choice: 
"We discussed, but I chose; I know the ropes. I chose [an 
equipment manufacturer] primarily because... (S31) 
In general, though, it appeared that he knew little about the 
systems in detail and although he had initiated development he 
had stood back from detailed design decisions. 
The personnel director's specific involvement in choice and 
design considerations was not altogether clear; his departmental 
systems had been designed by the computer department in 
conjunction with his own staff, but his personal role seemed to 
have been one of approving these choices: 
"It was a joint decision; three senior officers ... The 
computer department is under finance; I gave them a list of 
priorities 2 years ago ... We designed it. We planned it. I went 
through it and approved it." (S32) 
The harbour master said he had little involvement in detailed 
design considerations, although he initiated, monitored and 
approved system choices. There had been in the organization a 
"management trainee", who had been undertaken the detailed 
systems and technical work. He was spoken of with great respect 
by the respondent; it seemed that the management trainee had 
advocated various systems and had achieved their design and 
implementation with great skill. 
"Not me; it was [the management trainee] who chose, because 
he knew the system. He [the management trainee] did the details 
[designed the system]; I specified which systems to be tackled." 
(S33) 
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Systems in use 
Three of .the respondents were making direct use of computers at 
the time of the interviews. The nature of the chief executive's 
crusading computer adoption has already been discussed; what is 
of interest now is the manner in which the systems were utilised. 
He had three terminals close to his desk, two giving him access 
theoretically to all of the organization's systems and the third 
being a specialised device with telephony features and a diary 
system. Despite his obvious delight in the technology, he seemed 
curiously inexpert in the detailed use of some of the systems 
(compared to respondents from other cases, like S20 for example). 
He had an assistant who was called in at various times during the 
interview to clear up some technical point, or to help make a 
system work. It appeared that this assistant helped the 
respondent considerably with his own computer use, performing 
tasks such as reading the manuals ("I found them difficult") for 
him and showing him how to use the systems. 
Although he enthusiastically described the attributes of various 
systems, and attempted (often unsuccessfully) to put some of them 
through their paces, it often proved rather difficult to elicit 
precisely the way in which these systems related to his real work 
tasks or roles. Three concrete examples only were given: where he 
used the financial budgetry system when personally authorising 
capital expenditure over a fixed amount, use of the personnel 
record system for accessing an individual's records and the 
messaging system for messages from horne (ie to his wife) and with 
the harbour master. 
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This is not to say that the respondent did not have other uses of 
the systems, but rather that it was difficult to elicit these 
uses in conversation with him. In general however, it is hard to 
resist the impression that the important aspects of his computer 
use related primarily to his leadership role and the transmission 
of certain values and attitudes regarding the organization and 
himself, and hardly at all to significant informational or 
decisional aspects of his work. His personal fascination for 
"technology" has already been discussed and needs little further 
elaboration; of his work. His personal fascination for 
"technology" has already been discussed and needs little further 
elaboration; a comment from S32 seems to sum it up: 
"He likes it! It's new ... it's different ... He is the chief 
executive so he can do the things he likes doing!" (S32) 
The personnel director himself was a slight user (up to 15 
minutes per day); he had two screens which gave him access to all 
the organizational systems and to the Prestel shipping and 
messaging systems. As regards the Prestel system, the respondent 
showed how he received messages from other port organizations 
regarding meetings and other information; it was understood that 
in its present form this system represented little more than an 
electronic newsletter to port authorities and other interested 
parties. Of the organizational systems he made most use by far of 
the personnel information (indeed he seemed to have forgotten how 
to use the financial systems so it can be assumed that this 
aspect was rarely used). 
He seemed to use the terminal in exactly the same way as he would 
use a personnel record card file: when he wanted data on an 
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individual he would display it on the screen. The personnel 
record data had details of 1100 employees, with very full details 
including absences, pay, strikes and so on. He mentioned that the 
personnel record system had only three years of back data on it 
(as opposed to seventeen years on the previous cardex system) and 
that this was a drawback. 
He described his direct personnel system use particularly in the 
context of absenteeism a subject that was apparently of prime 
importance to him, and in which he took a great interest. The use 
seemed most often to arise when he had been triggered into action 
by some internal report about personnel absence; he would then 
look up an individual's personnel details to get background 
information. He described this activity mainly in terms of 
keeping middle managers on their toes (ie a monitoring function). 
He also described the system use in terms of his personal 
handling of difficult (exceptional) cases, ie he used the 
terminal to display information to people as he was talking to 
them, 
middle 
and gave examples of this occurring in a discussion with a 
manager and also in a discussion with an employee whose 
own absence record he was examining. 
In general, 
system as 
(which had 
therefore, he seems to be using the personnel record 
a direct replacement of the previous record cards 
been replaced by the computer system). In fact the 
system did not appear to have any functions which would not be 
found in a paper filing system. The respondent was asked whether 
he thought the system facilitated his job in any way (in 
comparison with the old card system): 
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"I can get information quicker. We have now equalised the 
card system; it's now equivalent to the card system. The girls 
say it's quicker than cards. [For you?] Well, we operated for 15 
years without it!! But in due course we will be more efficient, 
possibly." (S33) 
However, later on in the interview, the respondent gave a 
different view about the computerised personnel records, whereby 
he felt he was worse off - particularly as regards the fact that 
the computerised records only went back three years. Some of 
these contradiction may well reflect the respondent's rather 
ambivalent attitude towards the computer systems, as described 
earlier. 
In general, therefore we have a continuing computer user who has 
successfully incorporated a direct computer system into his 
present work tasks; his direct computer use as described forms a 
part in his activities in monitoring, communicating and 
negotiating with others. This successful use seems to be 
undertaken at a cost, however, because the respondent feels that 
to some extent he would be better off with a manual card system. 
Reference has already been made to the idea that the respondent 
was a "dissonant adopter", and it is possible to describe him as 
a "dissonant continuer" as well, because it seems only too likely 
that he would discontinue his use if it were not for the fact 
that there was no ready alternative to the computerised personnel 
system and if it were not for other implicit pressures arising 
from the chief executive. 
The harbour master used his systems for up to an hour each day, 
making him a moderate user. He had two termin~ls close to his 
desk, one of which was the Prestel system with shipping data and 
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messaging described earlier. The other was a specialised 
microcomputer system which carried shipping systems specific to 
the harbour office. Unlike the other respondents, the harbour 
master had no access to the main organizational systems which 
were held on the mainframe. The respondent made no use of the 
Prestel ship data which he described as "just a bloody gimmick". 
As regards the direct access systems on the specialised micro, 
these included operational data on ships in much greater detail 
than that carried on the Prestel system; this data was purpose-
designed for the harbour office and represented a development 
(and replacement of) earlier card records and systems. As has 
already been mentioned, the respondent had played a significant 
part in initiating and implementing computer systems within his 
own department; the data contained within the systems was largely 
operations oriented, and was utilised extensively by his staff. 
Although the precise relation between his systems use and work 
roles was not entirely clear, he did describe specific monitoring 
activities which he carried out using the systems. A specific use 
of the on-line system was acceptance of a ship into harbour; and 
he would access the on-line system at this time: 
"I use it to find out what ships are in - what ships are 
coming in. I look to see if there are conflicts of interest. I 
look to see if there are delays caused by some reason - which 
would cause heavy costs for the ship owner. These things have to 
be continually monitored." (S33) 
In discussing his direct system use, the respondent made some 
very interesting comments about the nature of interactive 
computing. Firstly, he mentioned drawbacks associated with the 
lost benefits of a visual colour-coded card system - with the old 
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system he could see the "shape" of the situation at a glance, 
whereas he now has to assemble information mentally before 
arriving at this same conceptual picture of affairs. 
Secondly, he described a particular dysfunctional effect on 
social relationships which he believed was occasioned by computer 
use. For example, he said that he spent less time talking through 
things with his staff; they too are sitting in front of their 
terminals and he has to make a conscious effort to communicate. 
In general he described the social isolation which was caused by 
not having the requirement to go and communicate personally with 
other people for information; now, he had to make a special 
effort in order to avoid isolation and non-communication. He 
described a loss of effective communication through the verbal 
medium, occasioned by both himself and his subordinates being 
tied to their screens. He saw the dysfunctional effect in terms 
both of himself and his staff. The isolating effect described 
here must be a very real hazard for medium or heavy users, but 
rather surprisingly no one else has mentioned this problem. 
The general characteristics of continued computer use in this 
case can be summarised as: 
1 Leadership role behaviour; the chief executive's computer use 
was closely connected with his initiation and advocacy of 
organizational computer systems, and both S32 and S33 showed 
similar role enactment in respect of their own departments. All 
~hree respondents seemed to being making statements about 
themselves through their computer use, although this seemed to be 
especially true of S31. 
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2 Successful incorporation of direct computer systems into 
present work tasks and roles; both S32 and S33 had interwoven the 
computer use into some specific"aspect of their work tasks. S31 
could point to only very minor aspects of his work. All three 
respondents described specific system use which was effectively a 
direct replacement of identical functions hitherto performed on 
manual systems. 
3 Polarised system use; both S32 and S33 referred mainly to one 
specific system (although S32 particularly had a range of systems 
at his disposal). S31 showed no particular polarisation, but then 
his overall system use seemed much less expert, None of the 
respondents appeared to make any direct personal use of the 
financial planning or modelling facilities. 
4 Atypical senior managerial behaviour; both S32 and S33 (but 
especially the latter) referred to operational (and local 
use which 
None of the 
departmental) work tasks in the context of computer 
were more characteristic of middle management roles. 
systems used in this case appeared to have been created 
specially for management information per se, but rather they were 
operational systems which the manager used in their daily 
departmental work. 
5 Lack of distinct effective advantage; there was a lack of clear 
evidence that system use conferred any distinct personal 
advantage in informational or decisional terms on the user (S31, 
S32 and S33). 
6 Disadvantages of system use; S32 viewed the computer system as 
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less effective (for him) than the previous manual system; S33 
pointed out distinct and specific dysfunctional consequences 
attendant upon his computer use. 
7 Technology fascination; this was displayed by S31 to an almost 
exaggerated degree, but not by the other respondents. 
Summary for case 3 
As in previous cases the salient features of each stage in the 
adoption cycle have been identified and discussed. The case 
materials largely confirm and extend the picture of senior 
managerial computer adoption developed in previous cases; in 
particular, instances of rejection occurring alongside adoption 
have been examined in detail and our understanding of these 
processes extended. Although the structure of the emerging 
adoption model has not been altered, the materials reviewed here 
have added to and confirmed the nature of the overall adoption 
cycle. 
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Case 4 : ACC County Council 
Background 
ACC county council is a large organization by any standards, with 
over 20,000 direct employees and handling revenue expenditures in 
excess of #300m per year. Unlike previous organizations, the 
county council is linked directly to political affairs at local, 
regional and national levels and the reconciliation of various 
facets of multiple and conflicting objectives and requirements 
was a significant part of the strategic decision process as 
described by its senior managers. This aspect of local authority 
management, and the new pressures which changing circumstances 
have brought for senior officers, are discussed at length by 
Laffin and Young (1985). 
At the top of the council organization is a group of senior 
officers who control major segments of council affairs and who 
discuss and agree policy matters. Apart from the overtly 
political character of their environment, respondents described 
their key tasks and role requirements in terms which largely 
matched the top managerial tasks described by respondents in 
commercial environments. One senior officer had been designated 
chief executive, but owing to some internal wrangle this title 
had been abandoned in favour of a less emotive term; 
nevertheless, he was the acknowledged leader, and this more 
descriptive title will be used here. Out of the six senior 
officers who headed the various council functions, it was only 
possible to see four respondents, the other two being 
unobtainable within a reasonable timescale. 
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Computing had been long established within the organization, and 
in fact the head of the computing services division was of chief 
officer status and was one of the respondents interviewed. Of 
particular interest here was the fact that some of the senior 
officers had commenced, or were about to commence a trial of 
direct use facilities. In previous cases, respondents had already 
passed through various stages of the adoption cycle. Here, it was 
found that the trial had just commenced and three of the 
respondents were currently at interesting points in the cycle. 
The trial was a co-ordinated affair for the four senior managers 
who were taking part (only three of these were interviewed); 
however, the objectives of the trial were stated differently by 
each respondent. The positions of the respondents at the time of 
the interviews are shown in table 7.2 as follows: 
Table 7.2 Senior managers and computer use categories -case 4 
S41 
S42 
S43 
S44 
Respondent 
Chief executive 
Director of social services 
Dep. Director of education 
Director of Mgt. Services 
Computer use category 
adopted; mid-trial 
adopted; pre-trial 
adopted; pre-trial 
non-adopted 
In fact S41 and S43 had computer terminals at their desks, and 
S42 expected to receive his within a few days. 
Non-adoption 
The director of management services was directly responsible for 
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the extensive computing organization (which served other regions 
and districts as well as the council's requirements). He was not 
taking part in the present trial of direct computing facilities, 
neither did he have any direct facilities from any other source. 
"I couldn't see the need to have one personally ... but it's 
indispensable for my secretary." (S44) 
His personal non-adoption may seem curious in the light of 
adoption patterns described earlier, particularly with regard to 
his leadership requirements. However, it became apparent that 
there may have been other reasons for his disinclination. It was 
established from the other respondents that in fact this senior 
officer trial was being organised by a separate department 
(planning and research) and the main computer department had been 
sidestepped. That neither he nor his department was involved in 
what was clearly a high-profile and prestigious project may have 
been something of a disappointment to the computer director. The 
respondent's distaste for the project showed in some of his 
comments about the facilities in the trial: 
" there are degrees of user-friendliness, degrees of 
hype ... also the bullshit about how easy they are to use. We 
don't really have anything they will find useful ... they aren't 
prepared to spend the money." (S44) 
(Where "they" are his senior officer colleagues). The respondent 
indicated that he felt that the present trial, or pilot study 
was "not significant", except that it might make the senior 
managers involved more likely to listen to him because it would 
improve their understanding: 
" take for example sub-second response; none of them will 
believe how important this is ... " (S44) 
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Here, he explained that the other senior officers would not let 
him upgrade his computer equipment to achieve this performance 
level, because they did not understand the importance of it and 
therefore would not listen to him. He hoped that the trial would 
show them that he was right about this and other matters. 
Finally, he asserted that the reason for the trial was to promote 
the interests of the present organizational computerisation 
programme (executed by his department), which he felt 
spearheaded, or at least facilitated, organizational change and 
progress. 
"We are doing this pilot scheme in order to promote the 
interests of the scheme... [whereby it is possible to 
achieve] ... changes in structure and working habits." (844) 
In fact, his non-involvement in the senior officer trial either 
as participant or as protagonist may turn out to be fortunate. 
Insights developed in this thesis so far enable us to predict 
with some confidence that the trial will be a failure, in the 
sense that it is most unlikely that the senior officers will find 
sufficient benefit from the system to continue their personal 
computer use. Thus this respondent will avoid not only some 
wasted personal effort but also the opprobrium attendant upon 
project failure. Whether he was aware of this or not was not 
clear. 
Features of adoption 
The initiator of the trial appears to have been a middle- to 
senior- ranking manager of a staff function, referred to here as 
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Pll. Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview him 
directly. Interesting comments on the nature of the 
implementation are provided by the chief executive under the 
"discontinuance~ heading. 
The chief executive, who had a computer terminal beside his desk, 
gave the following reasons for his own personal involvement in 
the trial: 
"It's being tried on the senior officers 
computer literate. That we'd got it and needed 
worked ... To see what the package is worth. I'm a 
will encourage others." (S41) 
who are least 
to see if it 
guinea pig. It 
[to help you personally?) "That's not really an objective in 
a very strong form." (S41) 
These comments show the leadership requirement and the 
"experimental" aspects already observed in previous cases. 
Another purpose of the trial was described by the director of 
social services, who had not yet received his terminal: 
"The middle manager computer man (Pll] 
officers to understand as much as possible ... 
to bring computers into my consciousness - to 
the potential was." (S42) 
wanted us senior 
That person wanted 
let me know what 
He also described his own wish to find out about computing in 
respect of his leadership role: 
"The knowledge that we were installing a system into the 
department - and my naive desire to be master of the whole 
thing. I want to see if it works or not. It may be useful." (S42) 
Finally, he was asked if there was any pressure on him to adopt: 
"Yes, there is subtle pressure - people who are involved do 
try and involve people ... " (S42) 
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However, there appeared to be more than a little ambivalence in 
his attitude towards the forthcoming trial. In particular he 
seemed to resent the chief executive's influence, and finally he 
expressed some distaste towards the project: 
"My stance is that it's vital ... [that the organization 
takes full benefit of computing] ... But I have a very difficult 
organization to manage - and I have staff to look at the 
computer stuff." (S42) 
[So why are you taking part?] 
"I will get one imposed upon me!! The [chief executive] has 
asked if we can benefit from ... He's been got at by [the computer 
director] who is trying to convert us!" (S42) 
In other words, the respondent appeared to be acquiescing in the 
trial in order to avoid any direct confrontation with the chief 
executive who had been advocating adoption. In this respect he 
appeared to be a "dissonant adopter", rather like S32 from PHA. 
(The respondent was wrong in assuming that the computer director 
(S44) had initiated the trial; the main protagonist was Pll). 
The last respondent, S43, had a terminal on his desk but had not 
yet started to use it. HLs reasons for adoption were as follows: 
"I'm in on it because my boss is not interested and you 
can't have education not involved ... [S44] and [Pll] know about 
computing but we don't so we agreed that we should have personal 
experience of it. So that we will appreciate what to do with 
it ... So it's got an educational purpose to begin with. But I 
will use it operationally when I get familiar with it." (S43) 
Because they had not yet started to use their equipment, both the 
latter respondents were asked what they thought the direct 
computer system would do for them, and the ways in which it would 
help them in their jobs. Neither respondent was entirely clear 
about this and required some prompting about the nature of the 
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systems; but both seemed enthusiastic about certain benefits: 
"It may be useful ... it has great potential. I've not given 
it a lot of thought, but say finance data that I can monitor .. , 
[messaging?] ... I'd be happy to do it if it's possible. I'd like 
to see trends ... For the speed and convenience of it." (842) 
"It's convenience - it will be as easy for me to punch in a 
request as ring up a clerk. It will really eliminate paper. I 
will use it for accessing individual personal data files. I want 
to be able to aggregate data myself for analysis purposes... for 
operational planning. I'd want to know, for example, how many 
middle managers are retiring next year ... For the one off ad hoc 
enquiries. In order to answer ad hoc questions from others ... 
from members of council ... from people who are important enough 
not to be put off to underlings! Central government - MPs and so 
on ... [messaging?] I don't know, quite honestly." (S43) 
In the light of what senior managerial respondents in previous 
cases have had to say about the real value of their systems in 
terms of their real work roles and tasks, these views seem 
unrealistic to say the least. Additionally, both respondents were 
asked about the nature of the learning effort which they thought 
they might have to make: 
"It will be a problem of finding the time and the will to 
master it. As long as I can take time out of the working day ... 
[ie the respondent expressed resentment at his involvement, and 
did not wish to work on it in his own time] These things 
evolve ... maybe ten hours- maybe four afternoons at the most 
required. Of course, I will have a personal teacher who will 
plug me right in quickly ... So I expect to be plugged in very 
quickly." (S42) 
"I'm waiting to be shown how to use it; I've no idea ... 
maybe an afternoon of being shown. I doubt I'll use it half an 
hour per day." (S43) 
Both respondents, but particularly the latter, had unrealistic 
views about the amount of learning required and about the amount 
of effort needed to access and utilise direct computer 
information. The disenchantment effect which this is likely to 
induce was expressed strongly by the chief executive (see below). 
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It is understandable that the respondents should not be very 
clear about the facilities which they were to receive; but both 
expressed enthusiasm for the potential of the systems. What is 
particularly interesting is the contrast between these views and 
the much more critical opinions of managers from previous cases 
who had gained experience of direct systems. In particular, these 
respondents expectations appear most unrealistic in terms both of 
the benefits which they expected and in the personal effort costs 
involved. 
A generalised list of adoption features would include the 
following: 
1 Middle-level advocacy; the current senior officer trial had 
been specifically initiated by a middle manager who was 
personally directly associated with the implementation 
2 Senior-level advocacy; the chief executive had strongly 
supported the trial both verbally and by virtue of his own 
adoption (without this advocacy it is doubtful if S42 would have 
adopted) 
3 Pre-trial adopters had unrealistic views about the personal 
benefits and the personal learning, time and effort costs of 
utilising the computer facilities; (the post-trial adopter 
expressed significant disenchantment); both pre-trial respondents 
seemed to believe that it would confer significant informational 
or decisional advantage 
4 Personal evaluation of computer potential; this was described 
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in two forms: experimental evaluation of the trial system 
specifically with the senior officers acting as guinea-pigs, and 
the gaining of personal understanding of computers in general in 
order to improve contribution to general discussion on computers 
in the organization 
Features of discontinuance 
Although apparently in mid-trial, the chief executive seemed to 
be on the point of abandoning his system; in fact he appeared to 
be making his mind up about this as he spoke to me. (A telephone 
call made some months later confirmed that he had discontinued 
his use of this system). That he seemed to be on the boundary 
position was illustrated by the apparent conflict of his views as 
he thought about aspects of his use from different angles; he was 
disappointed with the system features he had tried but was still 
hopeful about some aspects which he had not been able to test 
yet. 
"I am getting on very slowly - still learning. It needs 
massive commitment for training - it needs constant exposure. It 
is very difficult to retain the skills." (S41) 
The respondent made the following comments about the systems he 
had tried: 
"Messaging - completely useless. After the fifth or sixth 
attempt ... it was very frustrating. Anyway, who should I send 
stuff to? To make the trial work we'd need everybody on it. It's 
inferior to telephone or letter. [Of the diary system] ... the 
effort cost would be phenomenal - I'm looking at my secretary 
doing it." (S41) 
However, he seemed to perceive that certain information and 
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analysis features which he did not yet have available would be 
useful: 
"The data side is potentially very good. File storage would 
be most useful," {S4l) 
There was thus a curious mixture of disenchantment with those 
facilities which he had actually tried out, together with 
continuing enthusiasm for those aspects which he had not yet 
experienced. This phenomenon was very similar to that found in 
other respondents from previous cases, for example S3 from ABC. 
In general, he seemed to be very disappointed, even angry with 
some aspects of the system - and some of this bad feeling was 
aimed at the principal advocate and initiator, Pll, 
"I am becoming progressively more disenchanted. 
aspects of security are not too good. A management disaster 
The system was bought without proper authorisation ... 
bought the system. He bought the system in circumstances 
don't bear close examination. He oversold us on it. He 
oversold by IBM!" (S41) 
Also, 
area! 
[Pll] 
that 
was 
In these and other comments, it became clear that the respondent 
perceived that this project, and his own involvement in it, might 
turn out to be not only a managerial mistake, but more 
importantly a serious political error in that he would be seen as 
having associated himself with something which was not only 
unsuccessful but which might be seen as a "folly". Certainly, he 
cannot have been unaware of the hostility of the computer 
director and also the social services director towards the 
project and, by implication, his own role in it. This 
respondent's awareness that he may have "backed the wrong horse" 
on this occasion may be contrasted with the senior manager in the 
next case, who, while in a very similar position, sensibly 
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declined to adopt in order to avoid exactly this outcome. 
Although there was only one respondent in the 11 discontinuingn 
phase, the immediacy of his experience threw crucial elements "of 
the situation into sharp relief; this particular respondent was 
especially conscious of the man/machine difficulties which 
entailed substantial time and effort investments on his part, and 
also of the importance of the expression of his own leadership 
role in the adoption. A summary of key elements is as follows: 
1 Realisation of considerable initial personal learning effort 
required; 
2 Realisation of the need for ongoing practice in order to 
develop and retain necessary skills 
3 Appreciation of ongoing effort required to service the systems 
4 Substantial disenchantment with systems under test; 
5 Continuing apparent enthusiasm for systems not yet tested 
6 Awareness of the impact of leadership role in the advocacy and 
adoption of an unsuccessful system 
7 Continuing positive views about organizational computing in 
general 
Summary of case 4 
The details from this case confirm the features of adoption and 
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discontinuance which have been built up in the computer adoption 
model so far. In particular, the respondents who were at boundary 
positions in the adoption cycle (ie adopted, but at a pre-trial 
stage and at mid-trial prior to discontinuance) provided 
important confirmatory insights into behaviours at these points 
in the cycle. 
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Case study 5: NHL institute of higher education 
Background 
An institute of higher education has of course a different 
purpose from that of the commercial organizations discussed 
earlier; nevertheless, in terms of its ability to survive in a 
currently somewhat hostile external environment, and in terms of 
its need for resolution of internal management and strategic 
problems it faces similar issues and problems to those of any 
large organization. The formal structure of the organization 
recognized two distinct functions: academic and administrative. 
The administrative function was headed by three senior officers, 
each having specific hierarchical responsibility for certain 
aspects of the organizations affairs. Two respondents were 
available for interview. The academic function was managed by a 
number of regular and irregular committees and working parties, 
with membership drawn from members of the academic staff. 
Additionally, academic departments were headed ("first among 
equals") by departmental chairmen; these departments were in turn 
combined into faculties, each headed by a dean of faculty. 
It was by no means certain that the deans, for example, 
represented the top "management" of the organization in terms of 
the criteria developed earlier, because decisional power and 
resource allocation responsibilities (particularly with regard to 
financial matters) were in many instances dispersed among the 
various committees, or enacted by departmental chairmen; however, 
the interviewees may be said to represent a sample of senior 
members of the academic community. Finally, administrative and 
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academic functions came together under the leadership, 
effectively, of the vice-chancellor. The latter, and four deans 
of major academic faculties were interviewed. 
The organization possessed a large academic computing resource, 
which was dedicated to the interests of teaching and research; on 
the administrative side there was a smaller, more recently formed 
and separate function used for administrative data processing in 
the treasurer's department. Additionally, some faculties and some 
departments possessed their own separate facilities for teaching 
and research or for administrative purposes. There appeared to be 
no links of any kind between the two major facilities, and this 
distance perhaps reflected the organizationally separate nature 
of the academic and administrative functions. There had been no 
formal trial of direct computing facilities for the senior 
academic personnel of the organization as a whole, although the 
treasurer was currently involved in such a trial and the vice-
chancellor had recently declined to take part in one. 
Two respondents were making some use of computing themselves at 
the time of the interviews, although the circumstances were 
different in both instances. 
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Table 7.3 Senior managers and computer use categories ~case 5 
Respondent 
S51 Vice-chancellor 
S52 Dean of faculty (a) 
S53 Dean of faculty (b) 
S54 Dean of faculty (c) 
S55 Dean of faculty (d) 
S56 Treasurer 
S57 Director of estates 
Pre adoption-decision phase 
Computer use category 
Non-adopted 
Non-adopted 
Non-adopted 
User (slight) 
Non-adopted 
User (slight) 
Non-adopted 
The roles of the academic deans were described somewhat 
differently by each respondent, but in generally they seemed to 
occupy a liaising and representational role between their faculty 
departments and the organization's main committees. In practice 
each individual exercised many roles, including for example 
lecturer, researcher, author and academic and financial 
administrator, and in addition exercised academic authority 
through chairing or sitting on various committees and working 
parties. 
Three deans had had no experience of direct computing in their 
work roles: 
"I simply don't wish to expend the time and effort in 
learning how to use one just now. My perception of what is 
needed may be displaced, I may think it's harder than it is. So I 
keep putting it off. But I regret not doing it; I feel that I 
should. My customers [ie students] expect me to know what's going 
on. I don't know what the possibilities are. I'm frightened I'm 
missing something. But what I want to do, I want to do right, not 
pissing about like an enthusiast ... " (S52) 
"No. There are no plans in the immediate future. I could 
have one on my desk and look stuff up ... it would be nice to be 
able look up a student when a query comes up. But I don't think 
it would be worth the expense ... maybe an extravagance that the 
[organization] could not afford. As a way of keeping records. If 
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I had one available on my desk I would keep records on articles, 
books, cross-referenced in some way. As a word processor - I type 
10% of my stuff myself at the moment. Maybe ... if it was directly 
available, I would do some data analysis that I wouldn't bother 
with now -some cross coefficients... Useful for revising 
handouts ... things you revise slightly ... I might use it a lot" 
(S53) 
Neither respondent had any immediate plans to use a computer, 
although both could imagine certain aspects of their roles which 
might be enhanced by using one. 
The third dean (SSS) appeared to have decided on adopting a 
computer in order to address specific aspects of her teaching and 
research roles: 
"Yes. I will use one. I intend to get a word processor and 
use it at home ... drafting conference papers, student handouts ... 
my next book. My secretary would do the bibliographies on the 
main computer ... I haven't got round to it. A combination of 
money, time and space. But it is a project for this year." (S55) 
Although all three respondents could see potential uses for 
direct computing in the context of one or more of their academic 
work roles, only the latter seemed so far to have made a specific 
adoption decision. None of them had begun the adoption cycle as 
portrayed in the behavioural model developed so far. 
The director of estates (S57) had sizeable direct 
responsibilities in terms of resource allocation and staffing; in 
these respects he more closely resembled managers from earlier 
cases. Although he had had no experience of direct computing so 
far, it appeared that his department would shortly be involved in 
computerising aspects of its administration: 
" my deputy will coordinate this project. I won't punch 
information in, but I intend to get a terminal to look at the 
data. Presumably I will be able to do this? ... you just push a 
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button and get it ... these things are OK now, but will be much 
easier when you can just push a button.<. the name of the game is 
accountability ... it's the climate of opinion that these things 
will be computerized." (S57) 
In general, this project had not developed far enough for 
concrete applications to have emerged or for the respondent to 
have clearly identified specific applications which he might use. 
As with many other pre-trial respondents, he had unrealistic 
ideas about the learning costs involved in his personal use in 
terms of the time and effort required: 
"I would think about a day. If it arrived one morning I 
would be fairly confident that I would use it at the end of the 
day ... if I am instructed properly." (S57) 
The project was being undertaken using the internal 
administrative computer department as the main resource for 
computer expertise, and the systems would be physically linked to 
and based upon the computer systems already in place in the 
treasurer's department. 
Features of non-adoption 
The vice-chancellor described himself as the "head of the 
(organization]"; he exercised a key role in controlling, 
directing and influencing affairs both internally and externally. 
"Head of the [organization] ... student welfare, social 
education and so on; I see myself as the [organization's] eyes 
and ears; a chief executive role; chairman of senate; - leader of 
the house and prime minister - I can seize authority by virtue of 
my office - if I'm foolish I could lose that power. It's 50-50 
inside to outside at the moment ... Sir Keith will ring me or 
write ... for advice. Senior civil servants ... ministers ... will 
talk to me." (SSl) 
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Additionally, the respondent held chairmanships/directorships of 
a number of commercial and other bodies: "Public roles; it lets 
me see the other world." (SSl) As regards computing, the 
respondent appeared to have experimented extensively with a home 
computer and in many respects this private "trial" paralleled the 
lear-ning experience of other respondents who had adopted a system 
within the direct context of their work roles and environment. In 
fact, because of the close intertwining of the respondent's 
private and public lives it might be said that he had to all 
intents and purposes experienced an adoption and discontinuance 
cycle. (However, he had specifically rejected a trial of a direct 
facility at work and so he is categorised as non-adopted here.) 
"I got it for the children; then I felt I ought to know what 
these toys were. I enjoyed playing silly games on the 
computer ... Tremendous. Felt ashamed of only playing games, so we 
decided to put it to use ... we have a wine cellar, so I put on a 
program to catalogue wines ... and as a talking point for 
guests ... but a notebook would be better. Then we did mortgage 
re-payments ... ". (SSl) 
As in other instances of specifically work-related adoption, 
there were a number of factors which seemed to have influenced 
the adoption choice: 
"It was important that I knew what my colleagues were 
talking about when discussing computers. I could see what the 
students were doing ... what they were saying about other places 
having better facilities. I enjoyed playing chess ... It was also 
curiosity driven ... " (SSl) 
Here the respondent refers to aspects of his leadership roles as 
well as simple curiosity. However, it appeared that after a 
while he had discontinued his use, and he made the following 
comments relating to this which match comments made by other 
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respondents about this point in the adoption cycle: 
"But once you've done it, you've done it! I can see now that 
it has very limited use in the house; it's main function is 
games. I thought it might have been more useful than it turned 
out. I had visions of it telling me how many standing orders ... " 
(S51) 
Here he describes a familiar response to the lack of directly 
relevant system features. He also mentions the man/machine 
interface difficulties and the learning efforts required: 
"If it had been quicker ... and better ... if I had better 
training ... then I might have tried to simplify my financial life 
(which is very complicated). But I didn't have the time or 
patience to put all this on. I don't have the time to do it. I 
would need training, and I don't have the time for this." (SSl) 
As regards a formal trial of direct computing in his working 
environment, this had apparently been suggested recently but 
specifically rejected by him: 
"We did look at something. It was put to me that the v-c•s 
office should have an electronic mail facility to encourage the 
others ... We did look at this very carefully, but ... It may have 
been seen as a gimmick ... so not have been a good thing." (S51) 
In other words the respondent says he has rejected the adoption 
trial (advocated by others on the grounds of leadership role 
requirement in order to encourage more extensive computer use) 
specifically because he felt that his involvement was 
inappropriate at this time(" ... at some stage it may be useful, 
but not for me just yet."). It is clear that he has formed his 
own opinion about the value of direct computing based at least in 
part on his direct personal experience of the home computer, and 
as such seems better informed than many other pre-trial 
respondents have been. Most importantly, it is the consciousness 
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of his role and the importance which would be attached to his 
adoption which has caused him to reject the trial ("It may have 
been seen as a gimmick."). A direct comparison may be drawn here 
to the chief executive in the ACC case who did accept the 
adoption in very similar circumstances and later seemed to have 
regretted the decision. It is also interesting to note the 
reactions to the chief executive's adoption in the PHA case, 
where some of his peers regarded aspects of his systems use as 
"gimmickry". 
Adoption and use 
854, the dean of faculty (c) was a lecturer in electronic 
engineering and used a computer in teaching aspects (for example 
digital electronics) of his subject, as well as in pursuing his 
research interests. It was therefore arguably something of a 
requirement of his post that he be familiar with aspects of the 
computer as a technological manifestation of his taught subject. 
However, he had roles other than in teaching and it is his use of 
computing in these that is of special interest here. In 
particular, the respondent held several senior posts in the 
organization; as well as a professorship, he held the rank of 
pro-vice-chancellor - ie second in line to the vice-chancellor 
and in addition, was head of a residential college. This latter 
role entailed the leadership of what was in some respects almost 
a separate "business", in that the college generated revenues and 
was responsible largely for its own administration and policies. 
This small organization employed over thirty staff and served the 
non-academic requirements of several hundred students. 
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The respondent explained that there was no relationship between 
his computer use and his professorial or p-v-c activities and 
this is particularly interesting because it reflects the distance 
between these senior organizational roles and his computing 
behaviours. This distance appeared to be despite the fact that 
he clearly had quite extensive computing skills. In other words, 
the respondent could see no relationship between the demands of 
these roles and the facilities of computing of which he was 
aware. 
However, he was presently engaged in introducing administrative 
computer systems into his college organization, and in this 
respect he enacted the role of both initiator and expert: 
"Everybody has talked about it for years ... Nobody else in 
the colleges apart from myself has done anything... There will 
be an Apricot for word processing and for student records. I am 
developing and implementing a student record system based on 
dBase II ... I felt it was about time we did something." (S54) 
The respondent had given this project much thought and had 
planned in detail for several specific record systems, and also 
had ideas for some elementary financial systems, although these 
latter were not at an advanced stage. It was quite clear that the 
respondent was himself the main protagonist and that he was 
involving himself at a detailed level, including designing 
systems and programming them in the dBase II language. It was 
also clear that these systems were not intended for his own 
personal use; rather they were intended for the improvement of 
efficiency in his organization: 
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" increased efficiency. Economic advantage? It remains to 
be seen! Could possibly lose one staff - but no. It's the 
efficiency; staff will be able to do things that aren't being 
done ... it may save his [ie the college finance officer's] time; 
may improve his ability to make good decisions about marketing 
the college to schools ... " (S54) 
The respondent intended to design, program and implement the 
systems, train key personnel in the use of them, and then cease 
his own direct computing activities. Here the respondent is 
acting in an important initiating capacity and in a way which has 
not been found in earlier case studies. In the earlier studies 
the respondents, with one or two specific exceptions, were 
adopting systems which had been issued to them, as it were, by 
a specialist department. The purpose and objective of the 
managers' own direct system use was to have been the support of 
various aspects of their own decisional and informational roles, 
although the adoption of these systems was usually undertaken 
with a view to the encouragement of others in some way. 
Here, however, this senior manager (and there is no doubting his 
senior and important position within the academic hierarchy) is 
undertaking a personal technical role in the initiation of 
systems which are intended for the specific direct use of others. 
Clearly he is acting in a leadership capacity, but the use of his 
own personal skills, effort and time are being exercised in an 
entrepreneurial manner in his "own" part of the larger 
organization (ie the college) in order to achieve an 
organizational end which he sees as desirable, rather than his 
own personal efficiency. This relationship to the computing 
activity of the organization may seem a little unusual in such a 
senior man; but, the respondent seemed to have undertaken the 
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task primarily because there was no effective organizational 
resource to which he felt he could delegate it. 
In general therefore, the pattern of "adoption" and ''continued 
use" described here is completely different from the patterns 
described in earlier cases, and appears to be an aspect of the 
respondent's relationship to computing which seems to have 
arisen at least in part because of the lack of an appropriate 
alternative organizational resource. (He made it clear that he 
did not intend to use either the academic or the administrative 
computer departments, but his reasons for this were not clearly 
established). In fact, this instance of computer use approaches 
the situation most frequently found and described in the next 
cohort of respondents - the small business group. In addition, 
the circumstances are particularly interesting because it is a 
good example of the transference of skills and knowledge from one 
role (teaching) into another (management). 
The second respondent currently making use of a computer was the 
treasurer, S56. His role more nearly equated to that of a 
financial director in a large commercial organization, and he 
exercised similar powers and responsibilities to the holder of 
such a position. One of his responsibilities was the 
administrative computer department. He was currently undergoing a 
trial of a pc with spreadsheet and wordprocessing facilities: 
"I've had it for two months. I'm using spreadsheets, 
developing them myself. I've not made very much progress. It's a 
trial; an experiment to see if it's of any use to me." (S56) 
The respondent described how he experimented with it mainly out 
of office hours. He said that no specific aspects of his work 
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were facilitated at this time, but he felt that they would be as 
he became more proficient. He had specifically declined a link to 
the departmental mainframe with its access to organizational 
data: 
"I didn't want a [mainframe] terminal. I need ·data that 
isn't on the [mainframe]!" (S56) 
As regards the circumstances of his adoption he mentioned one or 
two factors which seemed to have influenced him, including 
especially, perhaps, the advocacy of the computer department 
manager: 
"I've been aware 
saw a demonstration. 
thought that there 
efficient." (S56) 
for some time that it might be useful ... I 
[The DP manager] drew my attention to it. I 
might be some way of making me more 
In many ways this instance parallels examples of adoption seen in 
previous organizational cases, where a senior manager adopts 
computing advocated and supplied by the organizational specialist 
computing resource, and does so at least partly on an 
experimental basis. Here, the respondent seemed concerned 
especially with his own efficiency and unlike many previous 
instances, the overt leadership role enactment appears to be 
missing. 
Summary for case 5 
This case displays a mixture of circumstances and contexts within 
which the issues of senior managerial computing occurred. The 
situation of some of the academic deans was one where, although 
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the respondents could visualize instances in which some aspects 
of their roles might be supported by direct computing, the 
necessary environmental forces (such as strong internal advocacy, 
for example) seemed to be missing, so that they had not yet 
com.TTienced .,.~ uu adoption cycle. On the other hand, the vice-
chancellor had specifically rejected a direct use system on the 
grounds that it may not have represented a satisfactory 
organizational statement in terms of his leadership role; a view 
based, ultimately, on his extensive personal experience, 
unusually, of a home computer. (This rejection was contrasted 
with the adoption, in similar circumstances, of the chief 
executive in the last case where the adoption may well have 
represented something of an error of judgement). 
The two instances of adoption and continued use represented very 
different circumstances. The adoption pattern of the treasurer 
paralleled closely the situation in previous large-company cases, 
whereby the respondent had accepted a system which was intended 
for his own efficiency on an experimental basis from a specialist 
providing department. On the other hand, the fourth academic dean 
(854), although not using computing in respect of his larger 
organizational role, was engaged in personally implementing 
elementary business systems in the smaller organization of which 
he was the head. This last instance anticipates the position 
often found in smaller firms, the circumstances of which will be 
discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
The Effect of Organizational Size: Analysis of Sixteen Small 
Firms 
Abstract 
Small firms may be considered to possess certain attributes which 
set them apart from larger organizations and in this chapter the 
different context in which direct computing occurs is identified 
and described. The chapter investigates computing with particular 
reference to the chief executive, and it is established, for 
example, that he often adopts a more proactive approach than his 
large organization counterpart. A typology of behaviour patterns 
is proposed which identifies the relationship of the small firm 
chief executive to his organizational computing resource. 
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Introduction 
The field studies discussed previously were undertaken in large 
organizations and endeavoured to establish the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding senior managerial use of computing in 
decision processes. One of these circumstances was the presence 
within the organizations studied of internal specialist computing 
departments who provided a fund of expertise and acted as 
providers of a computing service to senior managers. In fact it 
was normally the case that providing departments "issued" 
standard systems to senior managers who attempted to make use of 
them on the assumption that the system would enhance their 
personal efficiency in some way. 
In order to provide a contrast to these large organizational 
cases studies, a group of small companies was contacted and the 
owner/manager or managing director interviewed (in order to 
simplify the terminology, he will be referred to as the chief 
executive or CE from now on). In fact considerably more research 
materials were generated from this small-firm group than are 
covered here (see Martin 198Sd for other aspects), but space 
precludes further inclusion of issues not directly associated 
with the focus of the thesis. 
The literature on DSS and decision-behaviour generally does not 
mention the small firm milieu, or take account of the very real 
differences in context which arise. Similarly, the small firm 
computer literature makes little mention of the issues and ideas 
contained in the DSS tradition with respect to the potential of 
these in the small firm context. The inclusion of this piece of 
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research in a thesis about senior managerial decision is an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the two separate streams. 
There is a sizeable literature associated with the special 
problems and concerns of small business. In particular, it has 
been shown (Gibb 1983, and Gibb and Scott 1985) that there are 
particular factors associated firstly with the special influence 
of the owner/manager himself (for example his personalised task 
structure and leadership style), and secondly with the sheer size 
of the organization (for example the lack of specialists and the 
resulting adoption of multi-functional roles by senior 
management). In view of the special influence of the CE in small 
business management, (he would be likely to carry responsibility 
for much of the resource allocation decision making within his 
organization) and in order to achieve a wider spread of companies 
in the sample it was decided to interview the CE only. 
Out of twenty firms visited, sixteen provided useable interview 
materials. Firm sizes in the sample ranged from 5 employees up 
to 210 (see item 4 in appendix 3 for business activity 
distribution). 
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Table 8.1 Firm Size Distribution in the Small Business Sample 
Firm size Number 
-~-----~~ ------
Up to 10 employees 2 
10 to 50 " 7 
50 to 100 ii 4 
100 to 150 " 2 
150 to 200 " 0 
200 to 250 " 1 ~ 
16 
(Average size of sample: 69) 
Control of two of the largest firms had been passed to 
professional managing directors, and in this and in other 
respects these more closely resembled the characteristics of big 
companies. In two cases the CE had a partner who shared the 
responsibilities (but only one respondent was seen by the 
researcher). 
Characteristics of computing in the smaller firm 
All the firms in the sample except two had some form of computing 
resource available on site. The two firms which had no computer 
facilities were both of fairly recent origin (two and four years 
since start-up respectively); one was of very modest size (9 
employees) and the other (50 employees) had expanded to its 
present size only very recently. The relative ages of firms in 
the sample differed widely, and this was associated not only with 
the recency of computer adoption but with the experience of 
multiple system changes: 
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Table 8.2 Age of Firm and Number of System Changes 
Systems Status 
Age of Firm '!"\ 1 2 v 3 Totals 
~=-===-·-=o-=-..-----
Up to 5 years 2 2 4 
5 to 10 years 2 
> 10 years 3 3 4 10 
Totals 2 5 5 4 16 
"System status" represents the category of the presently owned 
system, ie 0 means no system has been acquired and 3 means that 
the firm now has its third system. Over half the sample were on 
their second or third system. In these small businesses, the 
initiation and choice of computer facilities may best be regarded 
as a progression from one stage to another in a general 
escalation of investment, associated with an organizational 
learning process. System selection and implementation decisions 
were embedded in a complex, incremental process consisting of 
choice, learning and correction cycles which took place over an 
extended timescale as the organization developed. Particularly in 
the smaller firms, the chief executive played a key part in 
these processes. 
With the exception of a mainframe in the largest firm, the 
computer resource in most businesses consisted of one or more 
microcomputers; only two firms had teleprocessing connections to 
a bureau or other office. The nature of the operational 
information systems which each firm used varied enormously - most 
had been developed on the small firm's behalf by a software 
house, or from standard packaged software offered by the computer 
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manufacturer or other supplier. Only three firms had a regularly 
used internal programming capability (a distinction is made here 
because several CEs had themselves undertaken or attempted 
detailed system development work at the time the system was first 
introduced into the organization, but had since ceased this 
activity). 
Although the details of individual application systems differed 
enormously, they can usefully be grouped together into broad 
categories as shown in table 8.3 below. 
Table 8.3 Categories of Application System and Percentage of 
Firms in the Sample Who Used Each Type 
% 
(N=14) n 
l. Accounts (sales, purchases or nominal) 86 12 
2. Order processing I invoices I sales analysis 50 7 
3. Production control I stock control 36 5 
4' Word processing 36 5 
5. Spreadsheet analysis 29 4 
6. CAD I design or product calculations 29 4 
7. Payroll 21 3 
Note: These systems were currently operational; many 
organizations had extensive plans to implement further systems. 
Most firms used computerised accounting facilities of some kind, 
but only three had payroll (predictably, these were the larger 
firms). Other systems related to production or stock control, 
word processing and technical calculations; four firms had a 
spreadsheet capability. The systems developed seemed to have been 
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chosen largely for their relevance to operational aspects of the 
organization rather than to higher-level management decision 
making areas of direct concern to the CE himself. 
A is that the emphasis of the systems was almost 
entirely on either transaction processing or operational systems; 
only two managers mentioned computer information directed 
specifically to forward planning, strategy or policy issues. In 
general, these findings are not incompatible with other studies 
of small business computing, see for example Delane (1981), 
Easton et al (1983) and Malone (1985). The operational emphasis 
implied by the orientation of the applications systems was 
confirmed in discussion with the respondents; many of them 
identified the role of the computer as one which affected their 
organization per se - it was not intended for their own personal 
decisional efficiency, but for that of the organization. 
The Relationship of the Small Firm CE to the Organizational 
Computing Resource: Development of a Behavioural Typology 
In the larger organizations of earlier studies, senior managers 
who were involved in computing did so using systems developed for 
them (as personal management aids) by specialist providing 
departments; senior managers themselves were not involved in any 
way in the low-level data processing activities of the 
organization. In many of the smaller firms in this sample 
however, the reverse was true: where the CEs were involved in 
computing, this was primarily in respect of the organization's 
operational systems. 
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In general, then, the nature of the relationship between the CE 
and the computing resources in his organization was in many cases 
completely different from that of senior managers in the larger 
organizations. However, respondents in the sample 
disclose one uniform characteristic relationship; rather, a range 
of different involvement patterns was discernible (this was 
first proposed in Martin 1985d). The observed range has been 
developed into a typology which is intended to classify the 
behaviours according to the closeness of the CE's personal 
involvement: 
Table 8.4 The Relationship of the Chief Executive to the 
Computing Resource: A Typology of Behaviour Patterns 
Behaviour Pattern 
1 CE remote from management of the computer resource 
2 CE involved in a managerial, overseeing capacity 
3 CE closely involved in implementation of the facility 
(ie: detailed choice and/or design decisions) 
4 CE directly involved technically in computer implementation 
(ie: programming and/or spreadsheet development) 
5 CE routinely interacts directly with computer 
This set of behaviour patterns has been arranged in order of 
increasing personal involvement; this generally implies 
increasingly large investments of time and effort on the part of 
the CE and also requires him to possess increasing technical 
expertise. The categories are not intended to be mutually 
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exclusive - managers involved at a lower level, say category 4 
may well also be involved in higher categories as well, ie 
involvement in technical aspects does not preclude involvement in 
detailed choice and design considerations. However, placing a 
respondent in one category implies that this is his closest level 
of involvement - if he is placed in category three, it is because 
he does not engage in any activities of categories four or five. 
1 The first pattern, where the CE was remote from and had little 
influence on the computing resource was found mainly in the 
larger businesses in the sample. In three instances, the CE was 
the managing director rather than an owner-manager, had been 
employed from outside the business and had considerable prior 
managerial experience at senior levels. Generally, managerial 
involvement with the computing resource was undertaken by a 
financial director or other manager. (However, in one case the CE 
had a partner of equal standing who handled all aspects of 
computer implementation). For example: 
"The financial director controls the day to day running. The 
accounts have gone on without me knowing anything about it. But 
when it comes to the sales side I will get more involved ... " 
(S69) 
The CEs in the remainder of the sample were more closely involved 
in initial computer acquisition and implementation processes and 
acted in a managerial capacity in overseeing the introduction 
into their organizations of the computer resource. 
2 The second pattern .involved the CE in a more direct 
relationship with computing, whereby he acted in some measure as 
an overseer of the computer implementation process, but without 
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being specifically involved in technical choices or system design 
considerations at a detailed level. 
"The [financial controller] ... 
man - he puts in the systems. I was 
checking criteria and asking them [ie 
could do what they said." (S74) 
is a very competerit systems 
playinq devil's advocate 
his staff] to prove that it 
3 The third pattern shows the CE directly participating in 
technical choices and design considerations, but without 
involvement in programming, spreadsheet development or other 
technical activities. 
"I 
package 
it. I 
(S62} 
set it up and decided what to do ... we chose a standard 
and bent it a bit. [Now] ... the accountant looks after 
did a systems analysis for the stock control system ... " 
4 The fourth pattern shows direct technical involvement in 
programming, spreadsheet development or database creation (all 
these make roughly equivalent demands on the user in terms of 
expertise required, learning effort and application effort}. Most 
CEs in this section of the sample emphasised that only they 
personally had (or had acquired} the necessary skills - skills 
which were just not available elsewhere in the organization at 
the time the activity was undertaken. 
"I set up the spreadsheets in the first instance ... the 
secretary does the (spreadsheets operations) now. Any queries on 
spreadsheets come to me. I haven't taught anyone else to set one 
up yet." (S66) 
"I did the design calculations [programmed in Basic] because 
I'm the only one who can." (S72) 
"I was involved initially with the set up... wrote programs 
in dBase ... " (S76) 
These activities contrast sharply with the those of senior 
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managers in larger organizations, who were seldom involved in 
detailed technical work and never in respect of organizational 
systems which were intended for delegation to others, 
5 The fifth pattern involved the CE regularly using a computer 
himself directly (in the sense of operating equipment and 
controlling inputs and outputs). In this pattern of involvement, 
the CEs in this section of the sample estimated that they spent 
a substantial proportion of each working day working on the 
computer (over two hours on average each day). 
As this may seem unusual for a chief executive, the circumstances 
will be described in a little detail. One firm had only four 
employees and the CE used the computer in two senses. Firstly, he 
had himself set-up systems (customer records, billing and stock 
recording) which at the time of start-up he had operated himself, 
although he had now delegated some of the data entry to his 
employees. He was currently devising and testing new systems. 
This pattern of system set-up and delegation is consistent with 
pattern four. However, in addition the CE continued to operate 
certain systems himself: notably cash controls, expenses and cash 
flow forecasting. This latter use is a little unusual and 
presumably if the firm expands these activities will also be 
delegated at some stage. 
The second firm had twenty eight employees and the CE was not 
presently involved in setting up operational systems. Instead, 
his direct computer use consisted of the manipulation of 
spreadsheet formats associated with forward planning (sales 
forecasting and budgetting). 
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"At this time of year it's the budget I use most; I'm 
putting in actuals -developing next years budget. It's the cash 
flow which we use most frequently." (S65) 
This is the only instance in the sample where the CE was using 
the computer directly himself in a planning related capacity; 
when asked what were the circumstances of his use he said: 
"Only recently have I tried using one myself ... I've just 
done a course at the ... Business School- they forced us to use 
a spreadsheet there ... " (S65) 
In the other four behaviour patterns, the computer was regularly 
used by staff other than the CE himself. He may have received 
information in the form of printouts or less directly, but the 
system and its inputs and outputs was controlled by others. Thus 
the other CEs in the sample made use of computer information 
indirectly, either by way of printouts received or via verbal or 
written reports from subordinates or colleagues. These patterns 
of indirect information use again varied widely between 
individuals, from respondents who received no computer direct 
computer outputs at all through to the CE who made extensive use 
of own-designed printouts in order to control operational aspects 
of the organization. 
Contributory factors associated with the behavioural typology 
The primary factor associated with the range of behavioural 
patterns described above seems to be associated with requirements 
dictated largely by organizational resource constraints. The 
necessity for the CE to adopt the role of computer implementer is 
part of a pattern of "multi-role" behaviour in small businesses 
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which has been described elsewhere (see Gibb 1983 for example). 
Although the availability of organizational resources seems to be 
the key variable, firm size (as measured by number of employees) 
is clearly an associated variable and this was tested directly 
using an appropriate non-parametric statistical method. (See 
appendix 8 for details of the statistical method employed.) 
As might be expected, firm size was correlated negatively with 
the CE's position in the behavioural typology; Kendall's tau 
(Siegal 1956) yielded a value of -55% correlation which was 
significant at the 1% level. This statistic illustrates the 
intuitively reasonable hypothesis that the smaller the firm (and 
hence, generally, correspondingly fewer organizational resources) 
the more likely it is that the CE himself will be more closely 
involved personally in detailed aspects of computer 
implementation and use. 
But of course there will undoubtedly have been other factors 
involved: personal characteristics, experiences and predilections 
will all have played a part in defining the nature and scope of 
the role which the CE adopted. This was particularly apparent 
for example where the CE seemed to be following personal goals, 
such as fulfilling his perceived education needs, or establishing 
a measure of exclusivity (and hence perhaps personal 
irreplaceability) 
systems. 
by personalising the operational control 
The incidence of formal computer training, prior interactive 
experience, and earlier managerial involvement in computing were 
examined (see Table A.l in appendix 7 for details) as potential 
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predisposing factors. Most of the managers had had very little 
formal training, and generally less than that experienced by 
their large company counterparts (although it must be pointed out 
that with one exception little of the training received bv r~nu -..~. -··..I 
respondents was directly relevant to the roles adopted). Few of 
the sample had had direct computer experience (in the sense of 
hands-on use); but, interestingly, several- about one third-
had had prior management involvement with computer systems in 
previous large-company experience. There was little evidence, 
however, that these factors played a significant part in 
predisposing the CE to adopt any particular pattern. 
Discussion 
Clearly, the typology of behaviours should not be regarded as a 
set of static positions which, once adopted by the CE, remain 
immutable. On the contrary, as organizations change and as 
individuals' experiences and predilections alter it would be 
expected that role patterns will change. In general, it would be 
predicted that as organizations develop and expand their resource 
base over time so the CE's behaviour patterns would shift up the 
hierarchy from the more direct to the less direct modes of 
involvement. However, personal needs, interests and predilections 
also change over time and increasing technical involvement (if 
only temporary) is also possible. In fact, movements in both 
directions were discernible in the sample although a longitudinal 
study over a reasonable timescale would be required to illustrate 
and clarify the position. 
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There was little evidence to suggest that any one set of 
behaviours might be more successful than another in terms of 
overall operational success as regards the computer resource. 
Certainly, some of the behaviours (particularly at the extremes 
of daily use of remoteness) seemed a little inappropriate in 
the context of the generally accepted nature of the CE's role on 
the one hand, and the importance of the computing resource on the 
other; however, there were no obvious deleterious effects in 
either position. 
The one significant pattern which was missing from these small 
businesses is the one where the senior manager interactively uses 
a computer system which has been developed for him by a providing 
department. The key features of this pattern which have been 
identified from the study of the previous cases are firstly that 
the manager himself typically has little involvement in the 
choice or design of the facilities which he is to use, and 
secondly that the facilities are ostensibly designed to support 
his own personal decision activities. The provision of these 
systems (usually incorporating extensive and sophisticated data 
retrieval and analysis facilities) requires considerable 
development effort by the providing team together with other 
expenditures, and few small businesses will have sufficient 
organizational resources to even contemplate such activity. 
Evidence for a cycle of involvement/disengagement activities 
Although only two of the respondents were routinely engaged in 
direct interaction with the computer, half this small business 
sample had had a detailed technical involvement at the time of 
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initial system implementation. This technical involvement ranged 
from writing programs for design calculations through to devising 
spreadsheets and specifying file transactions in a database 
package. In most cases, the CE delegated routine operation of the 
system to other staff after a period of time, as part of a cycle 
of development, implementation and delegation. For example: 
"I got really involved ... at that time we only had thirty 
five employees, so I used it myself." (S61) 
"I set it up and decided what to do ... " (S62) 
"I don't do it now; the sec. does the spreadsheets ... I set 
up the spreadsheets in the first instance." (S66) 
"I've derived all the spreadsheets. The accountant now has 
improved on some of these ... " (S71) 
"I was involved initially with the set up; involved in 
program writing ... I never touch it now." (S76) 
Additionally, the majority of the sample of CEs were involved in 
the implementation of computer systems in a managerial, project 
leader sense, and would have had to accomplish the integration of 
a great number of disparate elements in order to accomplish a 
successful implementation. In view of the inadequacy of the 
training they had experienced it is hardly surprising that many 
of the first attempts were not successful. In larger 
organizations, there would be a fund of professional skills 
including the necessary technical, data processing and man-
management experience. In the smaller firm, the CE has to provide 
his own expertise and this seemingly is gained only after some 
hard-won experience. 
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Summary 
In contrast with the larger organizations covered in the previous 
case studies, it was found that where the chief executive of the 
organizations interacted directly with the computer, it was 
usually in a rather different context from that of the senior 
manager in the large organization. None of the managers in this 
sample had been issued with DSS or related systems by a 
specialist providing department. In general, the top management 
computer involvement was linked to the implementation of 
organizational systems intended for organizational efficiency at 
an operational level, and not for the personal efficiency of the 
senior manager himself. This different context is in large part a 
reflection of the lack of internal resources which, in a large 
organization would be available to handle the implementation of 
operational systems. 
However, the depth of personal involvement of the chief 
executives in the sample varied dramatically, and this has led to 
the proposal of a typology of behavioural patterns which has been 
formulated to reflect the range of involvement levels found. Some 
managers were remote from the organizational computing activities 
(in the way that nearly all the large organization senior 
managers were) whereas at the other extreme, some interacted 
daily in the operation of data processing systems. Between these 
extremes, managers were involved to a greater or lesser extent in 
the details of the computer implementation processes (as no doubt 
they were closely involved in the implementation of any important 
activity in their organization). 
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In particular, about half of the sample had been involved in 
detailed technical work at the time of system implementation; in 
most instances, routine operation of the system was delegated to 
other staff after a period of time, as part of a pattern of 
development, implementation and delegation. (This pattern was 
itself part of a larger pattern of whole-system development 
cycles, which seemed to follow incremental processes of 
organizational learning over a period of time). The chief 
executives' personal involvement/disengagement cycles were, of 
course, dissimilar to the adoption/discontinuance patterns found 
in senior managers in earlier cases because of the different 
context in which they occurred. 
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the Behavioural 
Chapter 9 
Quantitative Analysis of Selected Hypotheses 
Abstract 
Much of the analysis of field research results so far has been 
qualitative; this chapter examines data from the interviews 
quantitatively. The main purpose of the analysis is to explore 
relationships between computer adoption decisions, and certain 
measured background and personal variables using appropriate 
statistical techniques. Hypotheses about relationships between 
variables are tested using non-parametric statistics. With one or 
two key exceptions, the sample does not show characteristics of 
clear relationships among the measured variables and management 
predispositions in the adoption cycle. These findings, which are 
regarded as being primarily of exploratory and advisory value, 
are taken as generally supportive of the qualitative evidence 
regarding the managerial behaviour which is presented in earlier 
chapters. 
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Introduction 
The research materials presented so far have been represented 
largely by the qualitative analyses of case and associated-group 
materials, These materials have been utilised orimarilv 
- ~ in 
providing a rich and insightful picture of the complex social 
issues relating to the circumstances of senior managerial direct 
computer use. However, as well as the insights gained from 
content analysis of open-ended questions, the research effort 
gathered data from a number of specific short-answer questions 
put to each of the respondents. In considering the meaning of 
these interview responses, a number of tables of data were 
generated for each organizational case or group of respondents 
and initially these were helpful in guiding analysis, clarifying 
thought and correcting some initial wrong impressions. These 
tables have not be reproduced here, because although they provide 
interesting background material they do not add materially to the 
lines of argument discussed in the text (see Martin 1985 for some 
examples of case by case comparisons). 
Our purpose in performing quantitative analysis, apart from 
complementing the qualitative analysis already discussed, is 
that it is possible that there are trends in the sample arising 
from the personal or situational characteristics of the 
respondents which of themselves shed light on the respondents' 
positions or choices in the adoption cycle. For example, a 
respondent's age may be a prime factor in disposing him to use a 
computer or not, or the amount of computer-specific training he 
has received may be the main factor in disposing him to continue 
with use. In fact, of course, it is believed that the factors 
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involved include complex situational issues arising from various 
contingencies operating in the respondents' environment, as has 
already been discussed in the qualitative analyses of the cases 
in chapters 7,8 and 9. Nevertheless, in the interests of 
theoretical parsimony it is necessary to test the sample 
rigorously in order to establish the presence or absence of more 
simple relationships. 
Describing the sample 
In addition to the respondents already described qualitatively in 
the case materials, other respondents were interviewed. As has 
been previously described, these respondents were individuals 
(eight in all) from organizations where further investigation was 
not possible for one reason or another. Although it would add 
little to the qualitative arguments expressed in the thesis to 
discuss these respondents in detail, the personal and situational 
data gathered can be used en masse with that of the other 
respondents in the quantitative testing of hypotheses. 
The source organizations for this new group of respondents are as 
follows: 
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Table 9.1 Organizational background for the miscellaneous group 
Respondent 
S91 General Manager 
S92 Managing Director 
S93 Financial Controller 
S94 Director of Personnel 
S95 Director of Purchasing 
S96 Head of Planning 
S97 Director of IT 
S98 Councillor 
The complete dataset, 
Organization 
Medium sized private company 
Medium sized private company 
Medium sized private company 
Multinational 
Multinational 
Building society 
Public utility 
County council 
tabulated to show the numbers of 
respondents at various points in the adoption cycle, can now be 
shown in table 9.2 below. 
Table 9.2 Frequencies of all respondents by group and usage 
------------------------------------------------------------
category 
------~- Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Private Public Small Misc. 
sector sector firms group Totals 
Adoption cycle category 
------~-----~-~~-------
0 Pre-adoption decision 4 10 1 15 
1 Adopted: pre-trial 2 1 3 
2 Rejected: pre-trial 1 4 1 6 
3 Discontinued users 9 1 4 14 
4 Slight users 2 2 1 5 
5 Moderate users 2 2 1 5 
6 Heavy users 2 1 2 3 8 
Totals: 16 16 16 8 56 
305 
The intention is to test hypotheses concerning the relationships 
among certain background and personal variables such as age, 
previous career and education and so on with respect to the 
decisions made by the respondents regarding computer use. From 
the adoption model developed in the qualitative analysis (see 
figure 10.1) there are two distinct decision points during the 
adoption cycle. These are: 
Decision A: Adoption or rejection of direct computing prior to 
trial (or attempted use) of the system, and 
Decision B: Continuance or discontinuance of direct use following 
trial (or attempted use) 
Of course in practice, these categories were not always quite so 
clear cut. For example, the "continuing" group included 
respondents whose slight use bordered on discontinuance; under 
certain circumstances it may appear better to regard these 
categories as being distributed on a continuum which can be 
represented by an ordinal scale. (Some of the hypothesis testing 
was repeated on this basis using Kendal's tau, but in practice 
there was no difference ·in the acceptance or rejection of the 
hypothesis proposed from the position arrived at from the 
dichotomised data). In most instances it was possible to 
dichotomise the respondents into these groups without much 
difficulty. 
The small firm group has been excluded from the following 
discussions because either the context of their adoption and use 
was different from that of the large firm respondents, or because 
they had not commenced an adoption cycle. Also excluded are 
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respondents in categories 0 and 1 (ie the pre-adoption decision 
category and the adopted/pre~trial category), the former because 
they also have not yet entered an adoption cycle, and the latter 
because although they have expressed an intention, they have not 
yet acted in respect of their adoption decision. 
The data from the remaining respondents in table 9. 2 have been 
combined into the four adoption decision categories as follows: 
Table 9.3 Respondent frequencies by adoption cycle categories 
Category No. 
--~--~~~ 
Adopted 26 
Rejected (no trial) 6 
Use continued 16 
Use discontinued 10 
In other words out of the 32 senior managerial respondents 
considered here, 26 have adopted direct computing to the extent 
of giving it a personal trial in a work context and 6 have 
specifically rejected computing (although their colleagues have 
adopted). Then, out of 26 respondents who adopted computing 16 
have continued their use to some extent or another and 10 have 
discontinued their use altogether. 
Statistical background 
As discussed, the intention is to examine the possibility that 
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certain personal or situational characteristics of the 
respondents in the sample are associated with choices at the two 
decision points in the adoption cycle. In order to do this, 
statements about variables will be cast in the hypothesis I null~ 
hypothesis form and tested rigorously using appropriate 
statistical techniques. 
The statistical tests used here have been chosen to suit the 
modest amount of respondent data and in the absence of knowledge 
about underlying distributions. Non-parametric tests are used 
because the data is on an ordinal or nominal rather than interval 
scale and no assumptions can be made about normality. The choice 
of non-parametric test with nominal data is dependent upon the 
type of data available. Where it is desirable to establish a 
significant difference between one distribution and another, the 
chi-square test is suitable where expected values in all cells of 
the contingency table are greater than o.s (Lewontin and 
Felsenstein, 1965 referred to in Everitt 1977). Values shown 
include the Yates's correction where appropriate. One example of 
the calculations for the chi-square test is given, but from then 
on only the final value and its significance have been shown. 
With some of the variables, information in the contingency table 
is at an ordinal level on one dimension and forms a nominal 
dichotomy on the other. However the dichotomy itself is a special 
case and may be treated as at least nominal (Nie, Hull et al 
1981), allowing a more sensitive test which makes use of the 
greater 
test for 
information available in the ordered data. In order to 
association between two sets of independent ordinal 
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data, several bivariate correlation tests are available; the 
choice of non-parametric tests with ordinal data is between 
Spearman's rho and Kendall's tau. Spearman's rho is suitable 
where there are few tied ranks in the data and Kendall's tau is 
suitable where there are many tied ranks (Siegel 1956); our data 
shows many tied ranks and so Kendall's tau has been employed. 
(The choice between tau b and tau c is governed by the presence 
of square or rectangular tables). The calculations for Kendall's 
tau have been performed using the SPSS-X computer package (Nie, 
Hull 1981) and detailed workings are not shown. 
Where the chi-square test shows a significant relationship it is 
possible to indicate the strength of the association using either 
Phi (for the 2X2 contingency table) or Cramer's v (for the larger 
tables) (Nie, Hull et al 1981), and these statistics have been 
shown where appropriate. Although inspection of the table usually 
makes it clear as to the direction of the association, a value of 
Kendall's tau b (2X2 tables) or tau c (for larger tables) is 
given where appropriate to indicate the direction of association 
for the tables with ordinal data. 
In deciding on a value for significance, the 5% level has been 
adopted here as the criterion for rejection of the null 
hypothesis. This rather broad interpretation is justifiable 
considering that the intention here is to consider whether there 
are underlying trends in the data which would provide simpler 
explanations of behaviour than the qualitative arguments 
discussed in earlier chapters. 
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The generation and testing of statistical hypotheses 
Background data was gathered from the respondents in 
predetermined, short-answer questions in the following 
categories: 
Personal factors 
1 Career history 
2 Education 
3 Respondent's age 
General computer exposure 
4 Formal computer training 
5 Past experience 
6 Home computer ownership and use 
System introduction and development processes 
7 Respondent's relationship to design I choice processes 
8 Respondent's technical involvement 
Personal factors 
1. Career history 
It is possible that a respondent's previous career orientation 
may act to predispose him towards or against direct computing. 
For example, it can be seen from earlier evidence eg Grinyer 
(1983), and Grinyer and Wooller (1975), that accountants are the 
most frequent initiators and users of certain model based DSS 
systems. According to Super and Bohn (1970) career choices are 
associated with a developmental process concerned with relating 
the individual's self-concept to the realities of work 
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experience, According to Schein (1980) people can be classified 
into 5 career anchor groups according to their self-perception of 
needs, values and talents. 
1 Technical I functional competence 
2 Managerial competence 
3 Creativity 
4 Security or stability 
5 Autonomy 
Membership of these groupings might be taken as a predictor of an 
individual's predisposition towards computer-based decision aid 
adoption where, for example, he wishes to enhance his technical 
competence and perceives the computer-based decision aid as a 
useful medium for him to do so. However, a computer-based 
decision aid may well satisfy the needs of individuals from 
other groups, for example for somebody wishing to enhance their 
managerial competence. The main thrust of the theoretical work in 
career development has been in the motivational issues, and 
although this these may well be relevant in a general way it may 
be difficult to separate them from the more direct effects 
associated with the organizational milieu. In general therefore 
it does not appear that a clear cut direct theoretical link can 
be forged between career choices and computer use on this basis. 
However, there are other aspects to career progression. It may 
be, for instance, that continual exposure over many years to 
cultural norms shared by an occupational group would predispose 
an individual for or against the perceived values associated 
with technological tool adoption (and perhaps accountants come 
into this category). More specifically, the history and 
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development of computing has taken place in an engineering and 
mathematical environment and still retains the signs of these 
roots. Although computers are not especially suited for 
mathematical use more than any other field, nevertheless 
culture of computer use shows a distinctly mathematical or 
technical image. In practice, much of the literature which a 
would-be user will read has been prepared by people with 
engineering, mathematical or scientific backgrounds and has 
traditionally been prepared in a style and format usually 
associated with technical descriptions of engineering products. 
Thus, unless the reader has a suitable background he will find an 
additional barrier to comprehension owing to the cultural norms 
of the experts. 
It makes sense, therefore, to examine the possibility both of 
career and educational backgrounds as predisposers to direct 
computer use, on the grounds that certain experiential 
orientations will have a direct impact on both predisposition and 
on the learning effort required. 
In order to test career background as a potential predisposing 
variable, the last 20 years of each respondent's career 
experience were inspected and a main career emphasis selected. 
Each respondent was placed into one of 6 nominal career 
categories forming a contingency table with his adoption 
categories as follows: 
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Table 9o4 Career background and adoption decisions 
Decision A Decision B 
Adopt Reject Continue Discontinue 
Career ------ ---~-~ --=------- ----------=-=...___ 
Marketing/Sales 5 3 2 
Finance/Accounting 5 1 2 3 
Personnel 4 3 1 
Production/Engineering 5 2 4 1 
General mgt/Admin 4 1 1 3 
Other 3 2 3 
26 6 16 10 
Hypothesis 1A. There is an association between career background 
and adoption decision A. 
The null hypothesis (HO) states that there is no association 
between career background and adoption decision A in the sample. 
Taking the contingency table for adoption decision A and 
calculating expected values gives the following: 
Expected value E(ij) = n(i).n.(j) 
Table 9.5 Career background observed and expected values 
Decision A 
Adopt Reject 
Career 
0 E 0 E 
Marketing/Sales 5 4.063 0.938 
Finance/Accounting 5 4.875 1 1.125 
Personnel 4 3.250 0.750 
Production/Engineering 5 5.688 2 1.313 
General mgt/Admin 4 4.063 1 0.938 
Other 3 4.063 2 0.938 
----- ------
26 26.002 6 6.002 
0 - observed values 
E - expected values 
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Inspection of the expected values shows that the smallest value 
.is Q,75; this is within the guidelines described by Everitt 
(1977), and so the test is technically valid. 
2 
A value of X can now be calculated using the following formula 
(Siegal 1956): 
r k 
2 2 
X = \ \ ( 0 ( ij ) - E ( ij ) ) I E ( ij) 
I I 
i=l j=l 
2 
X = 4.02 
The degrees of freedom are given by: 
Df = (r-l)(c-1) = 5 (Everitt 1977) 
r - no. of rows in contingency table 
c - no. of columns in contingency table 
Inspection of tables for critical values of the chi-square 
distribution (Siegal 1956) shows that this result is not 
significant below the 5% level and therefore the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis lB. There is an association between career background 
and adoption decision B. 
HO There is no association between career background and adoption 
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decision B. 
Calculations were performed in a similar manner on the decision B 
data in table 9.5 and a chi-square value of , ., ........ o • .L.).L obtained. 
Reference to the appropriate tables showed that this value is 
not significant below the 5% level, and therefore the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
A summary of the hypotheses, statistical tests and results is 
shown in table 9.13 at the end of this chapter. 
2. Education 
As has been argued above, it is possible that orientations 
acquired as a result of career or educational experiences act to 
predispose individuals to direct computer use. In order to test 
for a relationship in the sample relating to education, 
respondents' main tertiary educational subjects were coded into 
groups and formed into a contingency table. (Some combining of 
the original education categories was necessary to eliminate 
cells where the expected values where less than the prescribed 
minimum). 
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Table 9.6 Tertiary education and adoption decisions 
Decision A Decision B 
Adopt Reject Continue Discontinue 
Subject ----~ ------ -~------ --------=--
~=~-~--
Science 6 2 3 3 
Engineering 9 2 6 3 
Finance/economics 4 1 2 2 
Arts ~ 1 l 2 j 
Other 4 4 
26 6 16 10 
Hypothesis 2A. That there is a relationship between principle 
tertiary education category and adoption decision A. 
HO. That there is no relationship between principle tertiary 
education category and adoption decision A. 
Evaluating the tables using the SPSSX computer package (Nie, Hull 
et al 1981) gave a chi-square value of 1.24 with 4 degrees of 
freedom, which was not significant at the 5% level. HO cannot 
therefore be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2B. That there is a relationship between principle 
tertiary education category and adoption decision B. 
HO. That there is no relationship between principle tertiary 
education category and adoption decision B. 
Evaluation showed a chi-square value of 4.17, which was not 
significant below the 5% level. HO cannot therefore be rejected. 
These findings indicate that there is no clear relationship in 
the sample between tertiary education and adoption behaviours 
either as regards initial adoption or continuing use. 
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3. Respondent age 
It might be considered that age has a bearing on the adoption of 
new technology - ie the older the respondent the less likely will 
he be to consider favourably the new challenge of computing, or 
to be able to adapt to the learning demands of present-day 
systems. It must be emphasised that no such impression was gained 
from discussion with the respondents, nevertheless in line with 
the philosophy of this chapter the possibility of such a 
relationship existing in the sample data has been explored 
rigorously. 
Table 9.7 Respondent age and adoption decisions 
Decision A Decision B 
Adopt Reject Continue Discontinue 
Age group ----- ------ -------~ 
-----------
1 (31-40) 5 1 3 2 
2 (41~50) 10 4 6 4 
3 (51 +)* 11 1 7 4 
26 6 16 10 
*(Includes 1 respondent in group 61+) 
Hypothesis 3A. That there is a relationship between age of 
respondent and adoption decision A. 
HO. That there is no relationship between age of respondent and 
adoption decision A. 
The value of chi was 1.76 which was not significant below the 5% 
level, so HO cannot be rejected. 
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Hypothesis 3B. That there is a relationship between age of 
respondent and adoption decision B. 
HO. That there is no relationship between age of respondent and 
adoption decision B. 
The value of chi was 0.98 which was not significant below the 5% 
level, so HO cannot be rejected. 
These results indicate that there is no relationship in the 
sample between age and decisions in the adoption cycle. 
Interestingly, a test on one set of case data considered in 
isolation indicated a significant positive association between 
age and computer use (ie the older the respondent, the more 
likely he is to use computing!) but this is not of course based 
on any justifiable theoretical position and the relationship is 
not pursued here. 
General computer exposure 
It would be predicted from the qualitative results discussed 
earlier that the amount of a manager's general experience of 
direct computing would be a significant factor influencing 
adoption choices. This could act in two distinct ways. 
Qualitative evidence suggests that some managers adopted on the 
assumption that their systems would provide certain personal 
benefits, and without knowledge of the time and effort costs 
involved, and were substantially disappointed (ie they might not 
have adopted in the first place if they had known more about the 
subject). Conversely, the more experienced managers would be more 
likely to continue with computing once adopted, because their 
learning requirements would be less and because their 
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expectations were more realistic. These ideas were tested by 
considering three aspects of computer experience and exploring 
their relationship to the adoption decisions. 
Table 9,8 Formal training and adoption decisions 
Decision A Decision B 
Adopt Reject Continue Discontinue 
Formal training 
* 
....,...,-=_..,. 
_,_,_... ___ 
-------- ~~~--~---.--
0. None 9 3 7 2 
1. Slight (<20 days) 9 1 6 3 
2. More than 20 days 8 2 3 5 
26 6 16 10 
* As measured by days training or full time equivalent. 
Hypothesis 4A. That there is a relationship between the amount of 
formal computer training and adoption decision A. 
HO. That there is no relationship between the amount of formal 
computer training and adoption decision A. 
The chi-square value was found to be 0.82 which was not 
significant below the 5% level, therefore the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 4B. That there is a relationship between the amount of 
formal computer training and adoption decision B. 
HO. That there is no relationship between the amount of formal 
computer training and adoption decision B. 
The chi-square value was found to be 3.1 which was not 
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significant below the 5% level, therefore the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
Intriguingly, the more sensitive test using Kendall's tau c shows 
a significant positive correlation of 0.35 between formal 
training and discontinuance. This seems to indicate that 
respondents with more training are more likely to discontinue 
use! However, there is no theoretical position behind a positive 
correlation and it is treated here as affirmation of a lack of 
negative correlation - ie there are no grounds for assuming that 
increased formal training improves the chances of continuing use. 
These results seem to indicate that formal computer training has 
not positively affected the adoption and continuance behaviours 
of the managers; in particular, the fact that formal training 
seems to have had no positive effect on continuance behaviours 
supports the view that there is a substantial lack of suitable 
training for senior managers generally. This finding makes an 
interesting contrast with the next result relating to 
specifically practical experience of computers. 
5. Previous practical experience 
As discussed, the amount of previous direct computer experience a 
manager has had is expected to influence significantly his 
choices in the adoption cycle. To test this idea, respondents 
were asked about relevant direct experience which they may have 
had prior to their present adoption circumstances. 
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Table 9.9 Prior experience and adoption decisions 
Decision A 
Adopt Reject 
Prior experience _, ____ ---~----__, 
0 . No experience 14 3 
1 0 Slight (<SO occasions) 6 l 
2. Considerable (>SO occ's. 6 2 
26 6 
Decision B 
Continue Discontinue 
8 6 
2 4 
6 0 
16 10 
Hypothesis SA. That there is a relationship between the amount 
of past experience of direct computer use and choices in adoption 
decision A. 
HO. That there is no relationship between the amount of past 
experience of direct computer use and choices in adoption 
decision A. 
The value of chi-square was found to be 0.31 which was not 
significant below the 5% level and therefore HO cannot be 
rejected. 
Hypothesis 5B. That there is a relationship between the amount 
of past experience of direct computer use and choices in adoption 
decision B. 
HO. That there is no relationship between the amount of past 
experience of direct computer use and choices in adoption 
decision B. 
The value of chi-square was found to be 5.88 which was 
significant at the 5% level, and therefore HO can be rejected. 
In other words, there is some form of association between prior 
experience and continuance behaviours. The value for Kendall's 
tau is not significant however, which implies that the 
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relationship is not a straightforward linear one based on a 
correlation between increasing experience on the one axis and 
continuing usage on the other. Inspection of table 9.9 shows 
that the significant chi~square value is probably influenced by 
the values of the most experienced respondents, who all 
continued; but there is no clear linear relationship between 
continuance and experience. In other words, the amount of 
experience has to be large for the effect to be realised. If the 
categories 0 and 1 are combined, then the form of the 
relationship can be seen more clearly. 
Prior experience 
0.+ 1. No I slight experience 
2. Considerable (>SO ace's) 
Decision B 
Continue Discontinue 
10 10 
6 0 
16 10 
These results are most interesting; apparently there is no 
relationship among the data relating to the initial adoption 
decision but there is a clear relationship relating to 
continuance behaviours, albeit not a straightforward one in the 
present sample. This finding is supportive of the view expressed 
earlier about the heavy learning costs encountered by 
inexperienced adopters. Of course, these results could be 
explained in a number of ways, but there is a clear case for 
further exploratory work. It is not an unreasonable assumption 
that the lack of relationship to initial adoption is due to the 
strength of overriding factors such as role requirements and 
322 
advocacy pressures; however, it is always possible that analysis 
of a more extensive sample would indicate the presence of a weak 
underlying relationship. 
6. Home computer ownership 
The third element of computer exposure investigated related to 
home computer ownership and use. It was suspected that many 
managers would have home computers (bought for their children if 
not for themselves) and that this might influence subsequent 
adoption behaviours at work. (Of course it could also be argued 
that the reverse were true, and that use at work encouraged use 
at home; the statistic measures either association). 
Table 9.10 Home computers and adoption decisions 
Decision A Decision B 
Adopt Reject Continue Discontinue 
Home computer use ---~- ------ --------
------------
0. Not owned 8 4 5 3 
l. Not used by resp. 5 1 2 3 
2 . Slight use 7 0 3 4 
3 . Extensive use 6 1 6 0 
26 6 16 10 
Hypothesis 6A. That there is a relationship between home computer 
use and adoption decision A. 
HO. That there is no relationship between home computer use and 
adoption decision A. 
The value of chi was 3.34 which was not significant below the 5% 
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level, so HO cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 6B. That there is a relationship between home computer 
use and adoption decision B. 
HO. That +hQro ~t"'l ---_,. ... _.._ "- ..!..~ J.J.U relationship between home computer use and 
adoption decision B. 
The value of chi was 5.76 which was not significant below the 5% 
level, so HO cannot be rejected. 
It is possible to combine categories 0 and 1, and 2 and 3 (ie 
making new categories no use/ownership and slight/heavy use) and 
to form a square contingency table; this was also tested using 
the same hypotheses but again the chi-square values were not 
significant. 
System introduction and development processes 
There are a number of reasons for supposing that certain aspects 
of the way that systems are developed and introduced following 
adoption will affect the chances that the manager will 
subsequently continue or discontinue his use. In particular, it 
might be supposed that where the manager has himself been 
involved in the choice or design of his own facilities it is far 
more likely that these will be satisfactory than if he has merely 
accepted a standard offering which was intended for other 
purposes. 
In order to test these ideas respondents were categorised in 
terms of their perceptions as regards their involvement i.n the 
design or choice of the facilities which they were offered, and 
in terms of their personal technical involvement (for instance in 
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programming, designing spreadsheets or developing database 
language parameters), 
Table 9.11 Involvement in design or choice of facilities 
Design I choice 
1. Involved 
2. Not involved 
Decision B 
Continue Discontinue 
6 0 
10 10 
16 10 
As the table shows, the majority of respondents were not involved 
either in the design or the choice of the their facilities. 
Interestingly, those that were involved were all continuers. 
Hypothesis 7B. There is an association between involvement in the 
design or choice of computer facilities and adoption decision B. 
HO. There is no relationship between involvement in the design or 
choice of computer facilities and adoption decision B. 
The chi-square value was 3.0 with a significance of 8% (after the 
Yates correction); however, the more sensitive test using 
Kendall's tau indicated a value of 0.43 which was significant at 
the 2% level and therefore HO was rejected 
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Table 9.12 Technical involvement and continuing use 
Technical involvement 
l, Tecb~~ically involved 
2. Not technically involved 
Decision B 
Continue Discontinue 
7 0 
9 10 
16 10 
Hypothesis 8B. There is an association between technical 
involvement in the development of spreadsheets or programs, and 
adoption decision B, 
HO. There is no relationship between technical involvement and 
adoption decision B. 
The chi-square value was 3.0 with a significance of 8% (after the 
Yates correction); however, Kendall's tau was significant at the 
1% level and therefore the null hypothesis was rejected. 
In both these last tests a relationship has been shown between 
the system development processes and the respondents• continuance 
behaviour; the Phi statistic showing a marginally greater 
association with respect to technical involvement. Of course, the 
direction of causality is not clear from the statistic; (ie it 
could be argued that continuing use encourages increased 
technical involvement, for instance) and in fact it is entirely 
possible that both variables are related to a third variable not 
considered here. For example, it is possible that a 
predisposition for computer programming is associated with 
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another variable, which in its turn is also associated with 
computer usee Thus it would be quite unwarranted to assume that 
encouraging managers to write their own programs would improve 
the likelihood of continuance. Similarly, earlier experience 
and/or knowledge from training may predispose managers to 
involvement in choice of their computer facilities as well as to 
continued use, so system choice is not causally linked with 
continued use on the data examined here. Nevertheless, 
relationships have been shown and this may warrant further work 
on larger samples to investigate the phenomena. 
Within the limits of the data sample to hand it is possible to 
examine the possibility of a relationship between the two 
developmental variables and other variables in order to ascertain 
the presence of other links; it is possible, for example that 
there is a certain mix of variables which amounts to a 
"continuance profile". In order to explore this idea, the last 
two variables were cross-tabulated against variable 5, prior 
experience (which was itself correlated with continuance}, in 
order to assess the extent of any relationship. 
H9. There is an association between prior experience and 
involvement in the design or choice of systems. 
HO. There is no association between prior experience and 
involvement in the design or choice of systems. 
The chi-square value was 8.8 with a significance of 1%, and 
therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. Kendall's tau was 
also significant at the 3% level and showed the direction of 
correlation as indicating the expected positive relationship 
between experience and choice involvement. 
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HlO. There is a relationship between prior experience and 
technical involvement in systems development. 
HO. There is no relationship between prior experience and 
technical involvement in systems development. 
The chi-square value was 2.2, not significant at the 5% level and 
so HO cannot be rejected. The result from Kendall's tau was also 
not significant. 
This result is somewhat surprising as it might have been 
predicted that technical involvement was certainly related to 
past experience; nevertheless, the relationship has not been 
shown and this weakens the case for a "continuance profile" based 
on a group of experiential and implementation 
features. 
Discussion 
involvement 
Of course, there are many other ways of exploring these data 
statistically. For instance the respondents who have adopted have 
been categorised in terms of the extent of their usage (slight, 
medium and heavy use) and this variable may be considered as 
ordinal; such an extension of the data has been explored in terms 
of some the other variables already discussed using Kendall's 
tau, but without substantially affecting the impressions gained 
from the chi-square tests already discussed. Additionally, it is 
possible to explore relationships between variables other than 
those examined here. The main criterion for such exploration is 
of course the presence of theoretical underpinnings which produce 
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relevant 
results 
hypotheses. In general terms, it is felt that 
presented here represent the simplest and perhaps 
clearest treatment of the sparse quantitative data available. 
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the 
the 
Summary and conclusions 
Table 9.13 Summary of hypotheses and statistical tests 
Cramer's 
Hypothesis I 
Decision 
Data Table Chi-square v Kendall's tau c 
Type Size Value Sig- Out- I Value Sig~ Out-
Personal variables 
H1A Career A 
HlB B 
H2A Education A 
H2B B 
H3A Age 
H3B 
A 
B 
Nom 6x2 
Nom 6x2 
Nom 5x2 
Nom 5x2 
Ord 3x2 
Ord 3x2 
Experiential variables 
H4A Training A Ord 3x2 
H4B B Ord 3x2 
H5A Experience A Ord 3x2 
HSB B Ord 3x2 
HGA Home c. use A Ord 4x2 
H6B B Ord 4x2 
Developmental process 
H7B Des'n/choice B Nom 2x2 
H8B Tech. inv. B Nom 2x2 
Profile variables 
H9 Prior exp. I Ord 3x2 
design-choice involvement 
HlO Prior exp. I Ord 3x2 
technical involvement 
'nce come Phi 'nee come 
% 
4.0 50 Rej 
6. 1 20 Rej 
1.2 87 Rej 
4. 2 38 Rej 
% 
1.8 41 Rej 
1. 0 98 Rej 
0.11 22 Rej 
-0.04 43 Rej 
0.8 66 Rej -0.05 
3.1 21 Rej 0.35 
0.3 85 Rej o.os 
5.9 5 Ace 0.48 -0.24 
3.3 33 Rej -0.22 
5.8 12 Rej -0.24 
3.0 8 Rej 0.43 
4.0 5 Ace 0.48 0.48 
36 Rej 
5 Ace 
37 Rej 
12 Rej 
8 Rej 
13 Rej 
2 Ace 
1 Ace 
8.8 1 Ace 0.58 -0.33 3 Ace 
2.2 33 Rej -0.19 15 Rej 
Key: Rej. -reject hypothesis; Ace. -accept hypothesis. 
Note: The direction of association indicated by the positive or 
negative values of Kendall's tau are based on discontinuance as a 
"higher" value than continuance; thus the relationship in HSB 
indicates a positive association between experience and 
continuance. 
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By and large, (and with the specific exception of the prior 
experience 
background 
variable) it seems that the personal and situational 
variables discussed here are not statistically 
associated with the sample individuals' trajectories in the 
adoption cycle. This is not altogether surprising after the 
extensive qualitative analysis described earlier has shown 
considerable evidence for the importance of social and role-
related variables in initial adoption and for the importance of 
interface difficulties and role mismatch in discontinuance 
behaviours. 
In general, the point has been made that the sample 
exhibit characteristics of clear relationships between 
does not 
adoption 
and continuance with respect to the measured background variables 
and this serves to reinforce the arguments presented from the 
qualitative analysis undertaken for each case. The exception is 
of course the presence of prior experience which, when present in 
sufficient amount, appears to be associated with continued use. 
This result is supportive of the qualitative findings which 
suggested that interface difficulties associated with high 
learning costs were significant in discontinuance; prior 
experience acts generally to reduce the learning costs. 
The two variables 
showed a clear 
associated with the developmental process 
association with continuance behaviours. 
Involvement in the choice or design of the managers' systems 
facilities, and technical involvement in the development of the 
systems were both associated with continued use. However, some 
caution is required in interpreting these finding - there is no 
evidence to suggest, for example, that increasing a manager's 
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developmental 
of continued 
would suggest 
involvement will necessarily increase his chances 
use (although conventional implementation wisdom 
that this would be true). Qualitative evidence 
would suggest that managers who are involved developmentally have 
other characteristics (such as strong personal interests in 
computing for its own sake, and extensive prior experience) which 
are just as likely to be determinants of any predisposition to 
continuance; and in fact there is indeed an association in the 
data which relates prior experience to design involvement (see 
hypothesis H9). In general then, there were no simple background 
factors which showed clear relationships to predispositions in 
the initial adoption cycle and this finding adds support to the 
discussion 
earlier. 
of complex organizational and role factors related 
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Chapter 10 
Results and Conclusions 
Abstract 
This final chapter reviews the key results from the field 
research chapters and develops a new theoretical framework. A 
behavioural model for the computer adoption process is proposed 
which is grounded in evidence from the study. Finally, there 
follows an appraisal of the model, and a discussion of the work 
in a wider context. 
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Introduction 
The primary purpose of this research has been to explore the 
nature of the computer adoption process and to examine the 
circumstance and nature of the adoption behaviours. This part of 
the thesis attempts to create a new theoretical structure which 
incorporates the main results. The qualitative evidence from the 
field research sheds a detailed light on the circumstances of the 
managers' behaviour, considered both as the action of individuals 
and also (primarily) as part of the complex fabric of 
organizational life. 
"Rules, motives... situations, social relationships, 
behaviour are all regarded as analytically separate elements only 
contingently related to each other. The job of empirical research 
is to discover ... the pattern of these contingent relationships 
and formulate them as regularities." (Hughes 1980) 
It is now possible to synthesize a generalised model of the 
adoption process which illustrates these patterns, and which 
combines results from all phases of the research into a single 
expression of the results. The derivation and presentation of 
this model involves a number of elements: 
1 Summarising and combining the results from the case studies in 
the light of the behavioural perspectives explored in chapters 3 
and 4 
2 Elaborating the resulting salient behavioural features within 
the proposed model framework, and deducing the key variables 
3 Reviewing the conclusions from the hypothesis testing on 
background variables in chapter 9, and from the small firm study 
of chapter 8 
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Naturally not every detail of the earlier chapters can be 
reviewed here; rather the key elements will be highlighted. 
Following the presentation of the new theoretical model, its 
relationship to earlier work will be assessed, 
A behavioural model of the adoption process 
A key finding from the case studies described in chapters 6 and 7 
was that many of the large organization managers in the sample 
had been through one (or more) adoption I rejection - continuance 
I discontinuance cycles. All five case studies showed evidence 
for the existence of these cycles, although the trajectories and 
details of the cycles varied from case to case and from 
individual to individual. In a number of instances, the 
trajectory through the cycle took the form of an adoption of 
direct computer systems for reasons associated with leadership 
role enactment and with high level advocacy; in some instances 
the system usage was then discontinued - a phenomenon associated 
by the respondents with man/machine interface difficulties on the 
one hand, and with a lack of significant advantage arising from 
system use on the other. There seems to be a crucial point in the 
adoption cycle of discontinuers where the manager is overwhelmed 
by negative factors such that he considers the effort required to 
continue with the adoption outweighs the perceived rewards. It 
may also be the case at this point that his perceptions of the 
rewards changes as he experiences the situation directly, rather 
than relying on external perceptions. 
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It has been found useful to consider adoption and use behaviours 
generally as exhibiting a cyclic pattern with two principal 
stages. In order to describe this pattern accurately it is 
necessary· to extend the dynamic model of chapter 4 in order to 
incorporate these results. This can be expressed in the form of a 
pictorial model as shown in figure 10.1 below: 
Figure 10.1 Final Model of the Managerial Computer Adoption 
Process in Large Organizations 
group A 
decision 
variables 
group B 
decision 
variables 
I 
continued 
----I adoption 
system trial I 
adoption - phase 
I 
adoption I 
decision I 
processes 
\ 
\ 
\ 
rejection 
A2 features 
of rejection 
Al features 
of adoption 
\ 
\ 
\ 
discontinuance 
B2 features Bl features 
of discont- of contin-
inuance uance 
This model shows an initial decision process which results either 
in adoption of a computer system, or in rejection. If the system 
is adopted, then there is a trial phase followed either by 
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continuing use, or discontinuance. All the managers in the large 
organization research sample could be described in terms of their 
trajectories in these decision paths. The crucial feature of the 
model is that it postulates two different sets of variables, set 
A and set B, which come into play at the two key points in the 
adoption cycle. Hitherto, it has been assumed that there are 
variables which generally influence computer use; here, it is 
specifically hypothesised that the set of variables which 
influences initial adoption is substantially different from the 
set of variables which influences subsequent continuance. The 
nature of these variables will be deduced after considering the 
features of adoption, which will be discussed next. 
In terms of our main theme, the key questions about senior 
managerial computer use revolve around the circumstances under 
which some managers reject direct computing when others adopt it, 
and why some managers continue with their system use when others 
discontinue. Utilising comparative data derived from the case 
studies, certain features of the managers• circumstances can 
associated with their decisions at the two key points in 
adoption cycle. This is a key point; it was found in the 
be 
the 
case 
studies that the intra-organizational comparisons of managers who 
described different behaviours (in terms of the categories in the 
model) were crucial to understanding the nature of those 
behaviours. These comparisons highlighted the situational factors 
which were important in prescribing behaviour. On the other hand, 
inter-organizational comparisons showed remarkable uniformity 
even though the organizations were functionally very different; 
in our view this adds weight to the idea that the internal 
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situational factors identified were in fact the key issues. 
Combining the evidence from the case studies provides sets of 
salient features which were judged to be associated with the 
behaviours in 1-ho 
-"'"''-" 
adoption cycle. These features can be 
summarised in the form of a table which shows the cases and 
numbers of respondents from which evidence of the feature is 
derived (Table 10.1). It is hypothesised here that these features 
are not specific only to the cases reviewed in the research, but 
represent aspects of adoption behaviour which, in the appropriate 
circumstances, will be found generally in all large 
organizations. The explanation of these features derives at 
least in part from the consideration of particular senior 
managerial behaviours (such as spending time outside the 
organization) and attributes (such as possessing well-developed 
personal networks), and also from the requirements of particular 
aspects of their roles (such as the requirements arising from 
their leadership position). 
It is clear from earlier discussions that the behavioural 
circumstances which are being described here are particularly 
complex. In one sense it is less than satisfactory to derive 
specific "features" or "variables" when this tends to reduce a 
complex situation to a simple description. But on the other hand, 
there has to be some way in which the nature of the complexity 
can be understood, otherwise no progress can be made. The 
approach adopted here has been one that attempts to isolate 
important aspects without losing too much of the essential 
"flavour" of the situation; this is why the resulting conclusions 
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are described as a model - it is an attempt to provide a useful 
simplification of a complex reality. A measure of success is the 
extent to which the model does in fact represent a useful and 
informative (if simplified) picture of the complex reality. 
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Table 10.1 Main Features of the Decision Paths in the 
Adoption Cycle 
Respondents and cases 
Case 1 
N 6 
Al, Features of adoption 6 
1. High level advocacy H 
2, Middle-level advocacy M 
3. Leadership role enactment 6 
4. Personal evaluation of systems 2 
5. Unrealistic expectations as 4 
regards rewards and benefits 
A2. Features of non-adoption 
1. Resistance to advocacy pressures 
2. Adverse perceptions about the 
value of computer systems 
B1. Features of continuance 1 
1. Polarised system usage patterns 1 
2. Successful interweaving of system 1 
use into manager's role set 
3. Lack of informational advantage 1 
4. Expression of values 1 
5. Rejection of the financial DSS 
6. Atypical senior managerial behaviour ~ 
7. Technology fascination 1 
B2. Features of discontinuance 
1. Difficulties with m/m interface 
2. High cost (to the individual) of 
information relative to its value 
3. Inappropriate orientation 
4. Mismatch between system intentions 
and real role requirements 
5. Continuing positive views about 
organizational computing 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
5 
2 
10 
9 
H 
M 
9 
5 
3 
1 
1 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
5 
3 
H 
3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
4 
4 
3 
H 
M 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l 
5 
7 
2 
M 
2 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Key: H and M indicates that high- or middle-level advocates 
respectively were present in the cases indicated. The quantities 
shown for feature Al.3 and onwards indicate the number of 
respondents in each case with whom the feature was associated. 
Note: Two respondents from case 4 had indicated their adoption 
decision and are placed in category Al, but neither had yet begun 
their trial phase and therefore do not appear in either of the B 
categories. 
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A description of the main features of the adoption process 
Although the circumstances of individuals have been discussed in 
some detail in the case study reviews, it is necessary here to 
summarise the principal aspects together with the main arguments 
for their inclusion in the final behavioural model. 
Al. Features of adoption 
1. High and middle-level advocacy 
Managers were influenced by others within the organization at 
various levels and rarely was the decision to adopt computing an 
individual's lone choice. Although it might be supposed that top 
level managers have complete discretion over these choices, in 
practice they usually described the ways in which they had been 
influenced by others, and in one or two instances this amounted 
to something closer to compliance rather than whole-hearted 
enthusiasm. All except one case provided evidence for the effects 
of advocacy, and it is concluded that the influence of intra-
organizational pressures is a key variable in the adoption 
process. 
2. Leadership role enactment 
Nearly all the managers referred directly to their leadership 
roles when describing their computer adoption. In some instances 
this occurred in the context of a requirement to lead their 
direct subordinates with respect to computer use; in others 
because they were in charge of a division with responsibility 
for the computing resource, and hence there was a need to show 
appropriate usage leadership to other divisions on behalf of the 
manager's subordinates. Even where there were no direct 
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functional responsibilities of this kind, senior managers 
described a perceived requirement for them to reflect certain 
values (always very positive ones) with regards to computing, to 
others both inside and outside the organization. 
3. Personal systems evaluation 
Some managers described their computer adoption in terms of a 
personal exploration of the capabilities of the system; this 
deliberate learning experience was described as being undertaken 
sometimes on their own behalf and sometimes on the behalf of 
others. In a sense this was part of the leadership role 
requirement, but involving a somewhat different complex of 
demands than the straightforward exposition of desirable values 
to others. 
4. Expectations of particular rewards and benefits 
Managers had certain expectations with regard to the 
systems which they would receive, in terms of 
informational benefits. These expectations 
partly on the manager's prior experience of 
varied, 
direct 
computer 
personal 
depending 
computing; 
where the 
were often 
expression 
manager had no previous experience the 
unrealistically favourable, leading 
of substantial disenchantment and 
expectations 
to subsequent 
disappointment 
following system trial. These expectations were described not 
only in retrospect by discontinuing managers, but also by those 
who had not yet adopted (and who therefore had no experience to 
go on). 
A2. Features of non-adoption 
In most respects the features of non-adoption reflected a 
343 
corollary of the features of adoptiono In a few instances, 
managers had specifically rejected direct computing for 
themselves even though their board colleagues had adopted. Either 
the internal pressures to adopt had been less acute in their 
particular circumstances, or they had specifically resisted the 
pressures. With regard to their leadership requirements, either 
they perceived there to be no requirement for them to display 
pro-computing values, or, as in one instance, the manager 
perceived that computer use would reflect negatively on his 
position. 
Bl. Features of continuance 
1. Polarised and diversified system usage patterns 
Several managers in the study were presently utilising their 
computer systems to one degree or another. It was noted that a 
significant characteristic of their use was the tendency for a 
manager to stick with one particular system or facility, even 
where a wide range of facilities was available to him. This was 
taken to be a response to the need to minimise the personal time 
and effort costs which were associated with learning how to use 
the systems. These costs arise not only from an initial learning 
effort but also from the necessity to continually practice 
specific system-oriented skills in order to maintain effective 
systems use. The managers could not afford the time to maintain 
his skills in more than one system. Given a broad choice of 
facilities, managers settled on one or another facility (in 
contrast to their colleagues) for no clear informational or task-
oriented reason. 
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2. Successful interweaving of system use into the manager's 
present role set 
A significant feature of the continuing use was the direct 
utilisation of a system within the manager's present work 
activities. For example, personnel directors used their terminals 
to access data on individuals from computerised databases; this 
activity would have been carried out before computerisation using 
record cards or other means and the automation represented a 
straightforward replacement of one access mechanism for another. 
Other top managers who used their systems regularly had all found 
some way in which their computer use related to current 
activities. None of the respondents reported any significant use 
of generalised decision support systems, even where these systems 
were very extensive and sophisticated. In general there was 
little evidence that any manager's work roles had changed 
significantly as a result of his computer use. All respondents 
were asked about the way in which direct computer use had altered 
their personal work activities, and most of them reported that 
there had been no significant change. 
3. Lack of effective informational advantage 
What was particularly noticeable was that systems use did not 
appear to confer any particular informational advantage on the 
user (and some systems were compared unfavourably by the 
respondents themselves to alternative access methods). In 
particular, many of the top managers in the study could command 
significant human informational resources in terms of staff 
advisers, financial analysts etc by virtue of their position; 
and, as has been pointed out, it is a significant part of top 
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management's work that they create extensive and effective 
interpersonal information networks. The direct computer 
facilities were considered to be poor alternatives to such 
resources except under special circumstances. In many instances, 
continuing computer use seemed to be related to the achievement 
of other goals, particularly as regards the influence of others 
or the expression of values with respect to the man and his 
organization. 
B2. Features of discontinuance 
1. Difficulties at the man/machine interface 
All the discontinuing managers described difficulties in terms of 
time and effort costs associated with learning to use computer 
systems. However, it must be emphasised that many of the 
respondents had in fact made very determined efforts to utilise 
their systems, and had achieved substantial operating and 
conceptual knowledge about the systems before ceasing to use 
them. This implies that interface difficulties alone were not 
responsible for the discontinuance, but rather that the managers 
perceived that they were paying a high relative cost for the 
system use. For many respondents, the value of the information to 
be had from the system seemed to represent a poor reward for the 
considerable efforts required to access it. 
2. A mismatch between system intentions and managers' real role 
requirements 
This section explores the reasons why the managers found the 
informational rewards from the system to be unsatisfactory. The 
three separate items B2.3-5 of table 10.1 are closely related and 
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will be more clearly and easily interpreted if discussed together 
rather than as separate entities. 
It has been found most useful to consider the computer system as 
being aimed at addressing various aspects of the manager's 
informational and decisional roles; it appeared that the systems 
failed to do this successfully because the systems were 
incorrectly oriented as regards the particular nature of senior 
managerial work in respect of these roles. In particular, where 
the information was aimed, for example, at monitoring or 
resource allocation roles it often reflected issues which would 
be of more interest at lower management levels. 
Apart from the orientation failure, it seemed that this computer 
just could not compete with the information sources information 
which the managers had developed from their existing personal 
This is a key point: it is a characteristic of senior 
that they acquire and develop superior information 
through skilful manipulation of interpersonal networks 
1982). Attempts to create and implement systems which 
networks. 
managers 
sources 
(Kotter 
were to compete directly with these sources (even formally based 
ones) seemed to have been ineffectual. In a similar way, the 
managers' liaison and dissemination roles were usually not 
enhanced by computerised messaging systems, partly because the 
systems did not include important contacts who were part of the 
manager's interpersonal networks, and partly because they lacked 
the immediacy of face to face contacts or the efficiency (for the 
managers) of traditional methods. 
In general terms, therefore, it is concluded that the mismatch 
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between the system outputs and the managers' role requirements -
due at least in part to a failure of orientation - resulted in 
the systems being perceived by the managers to be of poor value 
relative to their well-developed personal resources, and 
particularly with regard to the effort costs involved. Practical 
experience showed the discontinuing managers that their personal 
efficiency was not addressed by the systems, and they duly 
abandoned them. There were of course exceptions to this rule, but 
these have already been adequately discussed in the preceding 
section. 
Derivation of the model variables 
Considering the features of the paths in the adoption process 
leads directly to the deduction of those variables which can be 
hypothesised as contributing to the direction of the adoption 
process. In the case of adoption in the first part of the model, 
it was found that the presence of high and middle level advocacy 
was a salient feature related to initial adoption. It can 
therefore be deduced that the strength of the influence on the 
manager of these intra-organizational pressures (in combination 
with his response to them) is a key variable in determining the 
likelihood of his computer adoption. Similarly, in view of the 
importance of the leadership role it is considered that the 
nature of the manager's role requirements (and his response to 
these) is a key variable in his adoption decision. Finally, it 
was found that the managers' expectations (which were often quite 
unrealistic) about the systems seemed to be an important 
consideration both for those who adopted and for those who did 
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not; therefore 
expectations is 
the strength and nature of the manager's 
hypothesised to be the third main variable 
affecting his adoption decision. 
With respect 
features point 
effort costs 
discontinuance) 
to the second part of the model. several of the 
to the size of the manager's personal learning 
as contributing to his continuance (or 
behaviours. The difficulties described by the 
discontinuers, together with the polarised usage patterns of the 
continuers both support this hypothesis. Similarly, the 
inappropriate orientation of the systems and the low value 
ascribed by discontinuers, together with the expressed lack of 
informational advantage described by the continuers allow the 
derivation of a variable which expresses the perceived relevance 
of the system to the managers work. This can best be expressed in 
terms of the closeness of the system functions to the manager's 
present role requirements. Finally, certain features (including 
the lack of informational advantage, and expression of values by 
the continuers) point to the achievement of non-functional 
rewards (non~functional in the sense that the rewards were not 
designed into the system as an inherent part of the system's 
intended functionality). 
The variables which are hypothesised to be the key variables in 
the adoption process can now be summarised as follows (see table 
10.2) below: 
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Table 10.2 Variables in the Model of the Adoption Process 
Related features 
from Table 10.1 
A. Variables in the adoption/rejection decision 
1. Influence on the adopter of intra~ 
organizational pressures 
2. Role requirements (particularly in 
respect of leadership) 
3. Expectations of future functional 
benefits and rewards 
Al.l,Al.2,Al.4,Al.5 
A2.1 
A1.l,A1.3,Al.4 
A2.2,B2.5 
A1.2,A1.5 
A2.2 
B. Variables in the continuance/discontinuance decision 
1. Personal learning effort costs 
2. Closeness of system functions to present 
role requirements 
3. Achievement of non-functional rewards 
Bl.l 
B2.l,B2.2,B2.5 
Bl.2,B1.6 
B2.2,B2.5 
Bl.3,Bl.4,Bl.7 
These are considered to be the main variables which are relevant 
in the adoption cycle. There are of course others, but it is the 
contention of this thesis that these are the principle ones. As 
significant as the items included are those which have been 
omitted. For example, purely functional system value is not 
considered to be a key variable in continuance and many of the 
behaviours described here are inexplicable when considered in 
these terms. Similarly, attitudinal effects are not considered to 
be a key variable because even managers who had discontinued 
still expressed positive attitudes about computing in their 
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organizations. Neither is the quality of the system interface 
included; only its affect in terms of the manager's personal 
learning costs. 
In general terms, then the variables shown in table 10.2 are 
proposed because they are derived directly from those features of 
the case studies which were judged to be salient. There is no 
doubt that in a situation of this behavioural complexity, not 
only will other variables play a part, but the ones proposed will 
interact in subtle and complex ways. Nevertheless, it is 
considered that the model derived here will serve a purpose in 
illuminating at least some aspects of the adoption problem. 
The evaluation of other variables 
Having presented the model derived from qualitative analysis of 
the research data, it is worthwhile restating the implications of 
the quantitative work on testing predefined hypotheses. As has 
been described in detail in chapter 9, provision had been made in 
the interview format to gather data with which to test specific 
hypotheses relating to background variables which might be 
supposed to have influenced adoption processes. These variables 
related to specific personal factors: age, education and career 
history; the effects of prior computer exposure gained from 
education or previous experience; and the consequences of 
respondents' involvement in developmental processes. Appropriate 
nonparametric statistical tests were performed in order to 
establish the presence or absence of significant relationships 
between these variables and managers' choices at the two key 
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points (initial adoption/rejection and subsequent 
continuance/discontinuance) in the adoption cycle, The intention 
was to verify as far as possible the assumption that there were 
not more straightforward relationships among these variables in 
the sample that would obviate the need for the evolution of more 
complex social explanations of the managers' behaviours 
involving role requirements, advocacy pressures and so on. 
In the event, out of fourteen specific hypotheses only three were 
found to be significant. None of the variables was significantly 
related to initial adoption. The personal variables were not 
associated with either decision outcome. Of the experiential 
variables, prior direct experience (if in sufficient amount) was 
shown to be associated with continuance; this was taken as 
supportive of the qualitative findings which suggest that 
discontinuance behaviours were associated with high learning 
costs and man/machine interface difficulties generally. Both the 
developmental variables (design/choice involvement and technical 
involvement) were shown to be associated with continuance 
behaviour; however, it has been stressed that it would be quite 
unwarranted to assume simple causality (ie that encouraging 
managers to write their own programs, for example, would improve 
the likelihood of continuance) as there were alternative likely 
explanations for this relationship. 
Naturally, having 
considerable caution 
regard 
must 
for the sparse 
be exercised with 
data available 
regard to the 
implications of these statistical findings, which are regarded as 
being primarily of exploratory and advisory value. Nevertheless, 
it is judged that the results are supportive of certain aspects 
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of the proposed adoption model, and can be regarded as obviating 
to some extent any criticism that simple relationships among 
background variables exist in the sample which have not been 
properly explored. 
The small firm - a different context 
The materials from the five case studies (and the statistical 
analysis) represent findings relevant to large organizations 
under certain specific organizational circumstances. These 
circumstances included the presence of established internal 
specialist computing departments which represented a fund of 
technical expertise and which acted as providers of a computing 
service to the senior managers. By way of contrast to these 
studies, interviews were conducted with the chief executives of 
the small firms in order to establish comparisons. A review of 
the established literature encouraged the view that in the small 
firms, the lack of internal specialists (and indeed the lack of 
other resources) would result in a different, proactive approach 
to computing in contrast to the generally rather reactive styles 
found in the large organizations. 
This was indeed found to be the case, although there were several 
different patterns found in the sample, ranging from close 
involvement in direct operations of routine systems through to a 
remote stance similar to that found in the large organizations. 
The presence of these different styles led to a proposal for a 
typology of behaviour patterns which showed the relationship of 
the chief executive to the computer resource. 
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The typology was arranged to show ordinal categories of 
increasing personal involvement, which implies increasingly large 
investments of time and effort. The main factor associated with 
this range of behavioural patterns seemed to be the requirements 
dictated by organizational resource constraints, which require 
that the chief executive take on roles which would be associated 
with lower management levels in larger organizations. This being 
the case, one would expect to find a relationship between firm 
size and the behavioural pattern adopted. This hypothesis was 
tested using a non-parametric test which indeed indicated a 
significant association between the two variables. In addition to 
the behavioural typology, there was evidence in some cases for 
the existence of distinct involvement/disengagement cycles by the 
chief executives; this took the form of close involvement (in a 
technical sense) followed by the delegation of the activity after 
a period of time. This cycle of development, implementation and 
delegation was of course undertaken in a rather different context 
from that of the managers in the large organizations, to whom the 
direct use of computers was intended to be related to their own 
personal efficiency. 
In general terms then, it was found that where the small firm 
chief executive interacted directly with a computer system it was 
undertaken in a different context from that of the senior manager 
in the larger firm. Generally, the involvement was linked to the 
implementation of systems intended specifically for 
organizational (and not personal) efficiency; this different 
context is understood to reflect the difference in the internal 
resources which are required to handle the implementation of 
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operational systems. 
Having identified the different contexts in small and large 
organizations arising primarily from size and resource 
constraints, what can be said about the large body of 
organizations which lie between these size extremes? It might be 
supposed that most organizations can be categorized either as DSS 
possessing entities with sufficient resources and management 
slack to invest in personal managerial efficiency, or as small, 
operationally-oriented entities. However, it can be hypothesised 
that there will be a cross-over point where firms are big enough 
to possess specialist expertise and other resources sufficient to 
enable decision-suppport intended systems to be developed, and at 
the same time small enough so that the chief executive will still 
take a personally active part in the development and 
implementation of these and other systems. Such a possibility 
merely emphasises the point that size is an important factor 
not an absolute dictate of context. 
But the general point still stands - most of the literature 
concerned with this topic makes little reference to the effect of 
organizational size; this research shows that organizational size 
(and. hence organizational resource) is a key variable in 
prescribing the nature of senior managerial computer involvement 
and use. 
The model in a wider context 
The present work has produced a dynamic, process model specific 
to senior managerial computing adoption and use, and has shown 
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how organizational size 
context of that process; 
and resource availability affect the 
the comparative nature of the research 
has shown that the model is relevant in both private and public 
organizations. The question now arises as to the extent to which 
the model can be generalised outside the limitations of the 
research materials studied; particularly, say to other managerial 
strata or to quasi-managerial occupations such as the 
professions. 
In some respects it might now seem appropriate to derive a 
general model of managerial computer adoption and use which 
incorporates the findings from the field work together with the 
literature-derived model from chapter 4, and the organizational 
size/resource relationship from chapter 8. But this is not felt 
to be a suitable point to attempt such a synthesis. Firstly, the 
general model from chapter 4 represents a melange of ideas from a 
review which covered many different perspectives and viewpoints. 
There appears to be little justification for combining this 
"theory" with the empirically derived results from the present 
research. Rather, it is felt to be more appropriate to regard the 
model of chapter 4 as an initial general framework, a convenient 
point of departure for specific research into specific contexts. 
To have illuminated parts of the whole picture is felt to be 
perhaps as much as is warranted by the nature and extent of the 
present research effort. The derivation of a more general theory 
which encompasses a wider approach to computer adoption and 
implementation processes will require a better understanding, 
which will in turn come from future research efforts and from the 
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synthesis of materials at a broader theoretical level. 
An appraisal of the theoretical model 
The derivation of the model has attempted two different things. 
One objective was to create a straightforward conceptual model of 
a complex behavioural process, one which could be used by 
practitioners, for example, to guide system design and 
implementation efforts at top management levels, or in an 
educational context to emphasise key aspects of the special 
implementation problems associated with managerial computing. 
The model is intended to possess predictive and explanatory 
power, as well as alerting practitioners to important (but often 
ignored) elements of the managerial world. It is felt that 
something useful has been achieved here, and some direct 
implications of the model and associated research findings for 
managers and practitioners are discussed in appendix 9. 
The other aim involved the derivation of a scientifically valid 
theory which could be verified empirically or utilised as a 
springboard for further research, either in the context of 
verification studies or as a framework for examining related 
topics. 
" theory in sociology is a strategy for handling data in 
research, providing models of conceptualisation for describing 
and explaining. The theory should provide clear enough categories 
and hypotheses so that crucial ones can be verified in present 
and future research; they must be clear enough to be readily 
operationalised in quantitative studies when these are 
appropriate." (Glaser and Strauss 1968) 
It is felt that the model framework and ideas outlined here do 
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indeed provide such a suitable basis. The model and its elements 
have been clearly evaluated and presented, and the variables and 
linkages made explicit. This leaves the way open for the 
proposals to be tested and refuted. (or confirmed!) by others~ 
In conclusion, it is felt that a new outline of the research 
phenomena has been achieved, one which is grounded in empirical 
evidence, and one which will have some use for researchers and 
practitioners alike. Moreover, the methodology employed involving 
intra-organizational and inter-organizational comparisons among 
computer-exposed managers has been both novel and useful, and the 
study has added materially to our understanding of the issues 
involved. In particular, it has been shown that role concepts are 
very useful indeed for investigating aspects of managerial 
computer use - both in the context of current practice and for 
future potential. In general, it has been shown that social and 
organizational issues are particularly significant in prescribing 
the nature of computer adoption and use processes, an issue that 
has been given insufficient attention by decision support 
practitioners and academics. 
Opportunities for further research 
During the course of this project, a number of opportunities for 
further research have been created. These came from ideas 
generated from the literature review, during the field work and 
during the writing-up phase. They are a reflection of issues 
which were deemed to be tangential to the main focus of the 
project, or arising from ideas or problems which just could not 
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be resolved within the project time constraints, or from the 
implications of the research findings. A few of these ideas are 
discussed in appendix 10 (see page 427). 
A final comment 
It has long been assumed that a manager-computer symbiosis of 
some kind will be an inevitable outcome of improved technology or 
techniques. And in fact most computer development is indeed 
essentially technique or technology driven; the current Japanese 
Fifth Generation initiative and the British Alvey programme are 
prime examples of the technological approach and ethos. Where 
this approach has not been successful in managerial computing 
(and the occurrence of failure may be far greater than is 
indicated by present research activity) it has been assumed, 
tacitly or otherwise, to be due to some "problem"; the problem 
being either on the part of the manager, ie lack of awareness, or 
lack of training, or attitudes and predispositions or perhaps, 
more recently, to be a consequence of inadequate human I computer 
interfaces. 
However, this research has shown that managerial behaviours in 
respect of computing are generally linked to personally rational 
and compelling reasons for the personal decisions which are made; 
these decisions often involving the rejection of the technology 
which so far seems to have comparatively little to offer in terms 
of functionally advantageous personal support for the top level 
general manager. Computer systems intended for managerial support 
seem usually to be based, explicitly or implicitly, on certain 
assumptions about the nature of managerial behaviour. 
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Unfortunately, these assumptions seem often to be wrong. ·rhe idea 
which emerges is that the way forward requires first an improved 
understanding of the real nature of managerial work itself, as a 
prerequisite for the sensible development of the necessary 
technology which is to support it. 
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Appendix 1 
Details of the computer literature search 
An on-line search was performed using the Dialog commercial 
database search system acting on a chosen database. The 
"management contents" database was searched using two sets of 
keywords in a Boolean "AND" relationship. The keywords were 
senior manager (and various synonyms) and computer (and various 
synonyms) as follows: 
senior manager 
OR 
senior managerial 
executive 
CEO 
top manager 
AND computer 
OR 
management information system 
MIS 
Decision Support System 
DSS 
The numbers of references produced by these search arguments were 
as follows: 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
3 
5 
5 
9 
7 
18 
10 
18 
18 
50 
36 
13 
192 
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Appendix 2 
Towards An Operational Definition of Senior Management 
From the review and summary of the characteristics of senior 
management, in chapter 2 it is clear that in an important sense 
the distinction between roles and decision behaviours is a subtle 
one, and wl~~ not be adequately dealt with by a one line 
definition. However, in order to operationalise the matter for 
field research purposes it is necessary to be specific about the 
characteristics which are being examined. In particular, key 
characteristics of senior management can be seen in several of 
the roles which have been discussed at length in chapter 3. One 
key aspect of the senior managerial decisional role is his 
authoritative prerogative in respect of the allocation of 
organizational resources. The emphasis on allocative control 
adopted here has also been noted by Mintzberg (1973) and Pahl and 
Winkler (1974). 
In particular, the essence of one of the senior managerial 
characteristics in which we are interested is that he is 
concerned with significant outcomes for his organization. This 
"significance" is of course relative; it may be represented by 
decisions relating to hundreds of millions of pounds worth of 
resources for large organizations, or tens of thousands for small 
ones; what is important is that the resources represent a large 
part of the organization's total. In principle, such 
considerations should lead on their own to discovery of critical 
members of an organization's decision-making elite. However, in 
order to reduce a potentially enormous number of candidates, 
positional criteria have also been adopted. 
Therefore, in arriving at an operational definition of managerial 
seniority two variables have been employed. Firstly positional 
seniority - only board directors of commercial organizations are 
included in the sample (managing directors or owner/managers for 
the smaller firms). It is recognized, of course, that this 
screening mechanism does not allow for managers who are not on 
the board but who nevertheless wield considerable power and make 
substantial decisions in terms of their organizations resources; 
such respondents have simply been unavoidably excluded from our 
sample. Neither does it allow for board members who in fact have 
a small and perhaps specialised brief, or who, perhaps through 
unsuitability, personal disinclination or political circumstance 
have no place in the internal strategic decision club. Secondly, 
two proxy measures of the manager's resource allocation authority 
have been taken - annual spend budget and the number of employees 
for whom he is responsible. Although these rather crude measures 
do not of course in themselves capture the essence of an 
individual manager's specific decisional roles within his 
organization, they do represent a flexible and justifiable 
screening mechanism for improving the likelihood that the sample 
contains respondents in whom we have an interest. 
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Appendix 3 
Organizations in the survey 
1. Large companies 
ABC Multinational chemical conglomerate 
BCD Multinational computer manufacturer 
2. Public organizations 
PHA Public Corporation 
CCC County Council 
NHL Institute of Higher Education 
3. Miscellaneous group 
S91 Medium sized private company ~ engineering 
892 Medium sized private company ~ engineering 
893 Medium sized private company - engineering 
S94 Multinational - conglomerate, mainly mining investment 
895 Multinational - chemical processing 
896 Building society 
897 Public utility 
S98 County council 
4. Small firms group 
S61 Manufacturing industrial equipment 
S62 Manufacturing industrial equipment 
S63 Food processing 
S64 Manufacturing industrial materials 
S65 Distribution and Marketing of Leisure Products 
S66 Interior Furnishing and Decorating 
S67 Manufacturing metal forgings 
868 Manufacturing industrial service vehicles 
869 Manufacturing furniture 
870 Manufacturing industrial components (gas industry) 
S71 Distribution of Electronic instruments 
S72 Manufacturing of engineering sub-assemblies 
S73 Hardware retailing 
S74 Food processing 
S75 Manufacturing and marketing office equipment 
S76 Manufacturing industrial components 
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Summary of small firms group 
Manufacturing 
Services 
Food processing 
Distribution 
Retailing 
9 
2 
2 
2 
1 
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Appendix 4 
Interview details 
1. Introductory letter * 
* Note: In practice many different versions of this letter were 
sent, each one tailored to the specific circumstances of the 
target manager or organization; but the gist of each letter was 
similar, 
Dear Mr 
Research into Senior Managers and Computers 
I wonder if it would be possible for you to help in a research 
project which we are running here at the Business School? I have 
recently had a talk with Mr * of * who mentioned that you might 
be able to help. 
Briefly, we are examining the use made by top managers of 
computers in their work. Specifically, we are interested in the 
situation where a director uses or has used a desk top computer 
or terminal himself, or where a trial has been made of such a 
facility. 
I would be most grateful for the opportunity to discuss your own 
situation for a short time. I am interested in individuals' own 
personal views and experiences, and any information about 
themselves or the organization will be treated in strict 
confidence. 
Perhaps if I telephoned over the next few days I could make an 
appointment to see you? 
Many thanks for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
C.J.Martin 
Research Fellow 
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3. Interview checklists 
a) Semi-structured interview schedule for senior managers in 
large organizations; covering all adoption categories 
GENERAL 
-------
Gl Date of interview: (Researcher's use) 
G2 Organization: (Researcher's use) 
G3 Division etc: (Researcher's use) 
G4 Name of interviewee: (Researcher's use) 
G5 Title: (Confirm) 
G6 Can you briefly describe your role ? 
GlO Annual budget under your control: 
Gll Staff reporting to you (and/or under your control): 
Gl2 Time in organization: 
Gl2,5 Time and roles in other organizations ? 
Gl3 Time in current function: 
Gl4 Time in (and nature of) previous functions: 
1-
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
function * time 
* Broad description of work discipline, eg personnel, production 
Gl5 Age: 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, 60+ 
G16 Can you tell me about your educational and professional 
qualifications ? 
G17 Highest level of maths or science or quantitative subject 
G19 Main education bias: 
Arts 
science 
maths 
393 
engineering 
languages 
law 
finance 
etc 
Previous computer exposure 
========================== 
G23 Computer education: (time in any category) 
Concepts Techniques 
School 
College/University 
Training Agencies 
Manufacturers 
In-house 
Own reading 
Other 
Products 
Other computer exposure (prior to present system adoption) 
Direct (Own use hands on) 
Slight <10 occasions of hands-on use 
Moderate 10-50 " II 
Extensive > 50 II II 
Indirect (But have defined own inputs and/or outputs) 
Home computer ? 
Do you use it ? 
Extent of Indirect/Own Use (cat 2A) Computer use 
------------------------------------------------
Do you receive computer printouts yourself ? 
(Take this current month as an example) 
How many different ones daily 
weekly 
monthly 
Do you ever ask specifically for a computer printout ? 
(Take this current month as an example) 
CATEGORY OF USER : Current or not current user 
============================================== 
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G24 Do you use a computer personally, yourself now? 
G25 Have you ever 7 
******************* 
GOTO 
CUrrently direct user: goto (l.a) 
CUrrently non-user : goto (l.x) 
See also pre-trial questions (about to undertake trial) 
( 1 . z ) 
l.a START ******* 
CURRENTLY A DIRECT USER 
======================= 
go to 
Dl What kind of system do you use and what is available to you ? 
Personal (PIC) 
Terminal 
Executel I OPD 
Other 
Connected to mlframe 
Other connections 
Internal data: 
File draw 
Data analysis 
Analysis information 
Archiving (assassin) 
Diary management 
Messaging 
Budgetary control 
Other 
External data: 
Viewdata 
External database 
Other 
Messaging: 
Wordprocessing: 
Available Use 
Available Use 
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Modelling: 
Spreadsheet: 
Expert system: 
Other: 
Dl.S What use do you make of these facilities; what do you use 
them for ? 
D2 Personally, which aspect of the system is of most use to you ? 
Why ? 
D3 Which aspect is of least use, and why ? 
D4 How much use do you make of the system 
per day : no. of times - duration 
per week: 
Slight user 
<15 mins per day <1 hour per week <2 occasions per week 
Moderate user 
<1 hour per day <5 hours per week <10 occasions per week 
Heavy user 
<5 hours per day <25 hours per week <SO occasions per week 
D4.5 If messaging is significant, how many people have screens 
and can access the same system as you.? 
DS Please rank the facilities according to preference 
DS.S Based on your experience so far, are there any facilities 
or features you would like to see added ? 
D6 Why do you use the system yourself rather than have somebody 
else do it for you ? (and provide you with printouts, summaries 
or word of mouth results) 
D7 What aspects of your job are facilitated by the system ? 
D8 How does this come about ? 
D9 Has your view of the system changed at all since you started 
using it ? 
D8x How did the system come to be developed for you ? 
D8y Who was involved in the decision/choice as to the nature of 
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the system ? 
DlO How have the facilities been developed, by whom, and to what 
extent were you involved ? 
Dll Whose idea was it to install/develop the system ? 
t·1anagernent services 
Computer dept 
OR/MS 
Other 
*** Dl2 What aspect most influenced you to agree to using it ? 
Dl3 What is your opinion of manuals/written materials 
Dl4 II 
015 Has the 
device ? 
II training course/facilities 
quality of these been a factor in your use of the 
Dl6 How long was spent learning how to use it ? 
Dl7 Was the time spent learning about the system I learning how to 
use the system justified, in your opinion ? 
Dl8 How do you like using a keyboard ? 
Dl9 Which aspects of the system do you like least ? 
Dl9.5 Is the system reliable; are there any problems of this 
sort? 
D20 Are any aspects difficult/ a nuisance? 
D21 Which would you change, given the opportunity ? 
D22 Which aspect of the facilities do you like most ? 
D23 How does your use of the system relate to strategic decisions 
that the organization might implement ? 
D23.5 What kind of decisions does the system help you with ? How 
does it help? Can you give an example ? 
D24 How does the system help you personally ? 
024.5 Are there any other uses for the system ( other than those 
described so far ?) 
D24.7 Is there anything about your use of the system that gives 
you a kick (personal rewards) - why do carry on using it - what 
does it do for you ? 
025 Has the nature of your job changed at all (since your system 
installed) as a result of the system ? 
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D26 Thinking of the potential rather than what is available now, 
what, potentially, do you think computers might be able to do for 
you ? 
D27 Can you roughly describe the way in which strategic decisions 
are made in this organization ? Describe your relation to the 
strategic decision process ? (Strategic decisions affect the org. 
as a whole and usually are looking several years ahead). 
l.x START ******* 
CURRENTLY A NON USER 
----~~----------------- ~
(Rejected with/without trial ?) 
Have you been approached with schemes to provide you with 
computing facilities ? 
By whom ? 
Internal 
External 
What kind of facilities ? 
What was your response to the approach ? 
Did you try the system ? 
GOTO 
-----
Non-adopted (discontinued) after trial goto l.b 
Rejected without trial goto l.c/l.d 
l.b START ********* 
Non-adopted after trial 
======================= 
Dl What kind of system did you use and what is available to you ? 
Personal (PIC) 
Terminal 
Other 
Connected to m/frame 
Other connections 
Internal data: 
File draw 
Data analysis 
Analysis information 
Archiving (assassin) 
Diary management 
Available Use 
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Messaging 
Budgetary control 
Other 
External data: 
Viewdata 
External database 
Other 
Messaging: 
Wordprocessing: 
Modelling: 
Spreadsheet: 
Expert system: 
Other: 
Available Use 
Dl.S What use did you make of these facilities; what did you use 
them for ? 
D2 Personally, which aspect of the system was of most use to you? 
Why ? 
D3 Which aspect was of least use, and why ? 
D4 How much use did you make of the system 
per day : no. of times - duration 
per week: 
DS Please rank the facilities according to preference 
DS.S Based on your experiences so far, were there any facilities 
or features you would like to see added ? 
D6 Why did you use the system yourself rather than have somebody 
else do it for you ? (and provide you with printouts, summaries 
or word of mouth results) 
D7 What aspects of your job were facilitated by the system ? 
D8 How did this come about ? 
D9 Has your view of the system changed at all since you started 
using it ? 
D8x How did the system come to be developed for you ? 
D8y Who was involved in the decision/choice as to the nature of 
the system ? 
DlO How have the facilities been developed, by whom, and to what 
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extent were you involved ? 
Dll Whose idea was it to install/develop the system ? 
Management services 
Computer dept 
OR/MS 
Other 
Dl2 What aspect really most influenced you to agree to using it ? 
Dl3 What was your opinion of manuals/written materials 
Dl4 " " training course/facilities 
DlS Has the 
device ? 
quality of these been a factor in your use of the 
Dl6 How long was spent learning how to use it ? 
Dl7 was the time spent learning about the system I learning how to 
use the system justified, in your opinion ? 
Dl8 How did you like using a keyboard ? 
Dl9 Which aspects of the system did you like least ? 
Dl9.5 Is the system reliable; were there any problems of this 
sort? 
D20 Are any aspects a nuisance? 
D20.5 Was your time wasted at all, do you think ? 
D21 Which would you change, given the opportunity ? 
D22 Which aspect of the facilities did you like most ? 
D23 How did your use of the system relate to strategic decisions 
that the organization might implement ? 
D23.5 What kind of decisions did the system help you with ? How 
did it help? Can you give an example ? 
D24 How did the system help you personally ? 
D24.5 Are there any other uses for the system ( other than those 
described so far ?) 
D24.7 Is there anything about your use of the system that gives 
you a kick (personal rewards) - why carry on using it - what did 
it do for you ? 
D25 Has the nature of your job changed at all (since 
installed) as a result of the system ? 
your system 
D26 Thinking of the potential rather than what is available now, 
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what, potentially, do you think computers might be able to do for 
you ? 
** What caused you to stop using the system ? 
============================================ 
Were any aspects of the system particularly difficult ? 
Was it ~elevant to you - did it help you personally ? 
What aspects were most instrumental in causing you to give up the 
system ? 
What was the system intended to do (achieve) ? 
====~========================================= 
Before you started with the system, did you think that it might 
be a significant management tool ? 
How was the system supposed to help you ? 
========================================= 
In your opinion, what was achieved ? 
Did the system do these things in any way at all ? 
Were your reasons for giving up the system different from the 
"official" (or reported) reasons ? 
Was there any particular thing about the system or about the 
circumstances in which it was introduced that acted as a turn-
off? 
How do you feel now about computers ? How can they can be of use 
to managers such as yourself ? 
l.c l.d START ******** 
Non-adopted ; no trial 
Are there any plans to provide you with facilities ? 
Have you ever thought it might be advantageous to have one 
yourself? 
Do any of your colleagues have one (directors, or chief officers 
etc)? 
(Get names for interview) 
Why do they use one and you not? 
Do you have any plans to use one? 
Can you see any circumstances in which using a computer yourself 
might be advantageous? 
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Do you think it would be useful to use one personally? 
*** Why good for the company but not for you? 
Have you been approached 
computing facilities ? , 
By whom ? 
Internal 
External 
What kind of facilities ? 
with schemes 
What did you do about the approach ? 
Were any schemes attractive to you at all ? 
to provide 
Do any of your colleagues use computers at all ? 
Why do you think that they use them ? 
Why do you not use one ? 
with 
Given a completely free choice, is there any kind of direct 
-------------------------------------------------~-------------~-
- -
computing which you think you might adopt? 
========================================== 
Was any computer adoption intended 
----------------------------------~
Factors in the intended adoption 
================================ 
Why do you intend to take up these systems? 
*** Any computer facilities that might potentially be of use to 
you personally ? 
============ 
Considering the computer information you receive (printouts etc) 
================================================================ 
What is the most useful to you personally 
What are the features that make it useful 
Considering strategic planning computer systems 
-----------------------------------------------
Do you receive info yourself, or are the results reported to you 
Would you say that strategic choices are put up 
your colleagues for decision, or do you find 
approving/disapproving individual propositions 
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to you and 
yourselves 
Does the information affect strategic decisions ? 
Considering computer systems in general in the organization 
=========================================================== 
Are any of relevance to you ? 
Do you receive printouts directly? 
How do you use the information? 
Do you influence the way the computer dept structures these 
systems? 
How are systems chosen? 
Are you involved in design matters at all? 
**** Start 
l.z Pre trial questions 
pl Who has initiated the trial 
p2 Why have you agreed to take part? 
p3 What systems I facilities do you expect to get 
p4 What do you think they will do for you 
p5 Will they help your job in any way 
p6 Will they help with strategic matters 
p7 How will they achieve these things 
p8 Will there be any difficulties in using it 
p9 What kind of learning task do you consider will be involved 
1 full day 
5 full days 
10 full days 
20 full days 
More? 
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2, Interview Checklist - Chief Executives of Small Firms 
Date : 
Name : 
Firm: 
The company (size and activities): 
Title: (NB Owner manager, managing director, shareholder, 
relative of owner(s) 
Responsibilities: (NB partners) 
Time in organization: 
Age range: 
Work experience: (prior to present organization): 
_____ ..,. ________ _ 
---------------
G14 Time in (and nature of) previous functions (reverse order): 
function * time (yrs) 
1 -
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
*** Is there a professional management background (ie a large 
firm background; and does this have an influence on his approach 
to computing ?) 
Education 
---------
---------
Main formal educational bias: 
============================= 
Previous computer exposure 
--------------------------
G23 Computer education: (time in any category) 
College/University 
Training Agencies 
Manufacturers 
In-house 
Own reading 
Other 
Concepts Techniques Products 
Other computer exposure (prior to present system adoption) 
Direct (Own use hands on) 
Slight <10 occasions of hands-on use 
Moderate 10-50 
Extensive > 50 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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Indirect 
Home computer ? Do you use it ? 
Category of user 
---------------
Computer systems in the organization 
==~~~~======;~~===================== 
Who in the company physically operates it? 
------------------------------------------
Factors in adoption of company systems 
----------------~~~-------------------=~ ---
Computer System introduction processes 
--~------------~~=~--------------------~==~ ----
Respondent's Relation to design process 
Respondent's relation to implementation processes 
What role was played by external consultants or suppliers? 
========================================================== 
Manuals/written materials - training facilities 
Time spent on learning (by the respondent) 
Facilities available for the respondent 
------------------------------------~
System use by respondent(or use prior to discontinuance) 
===================== 
(Real use; experimentation, trial - what?) 
Nature of use 
-------------
Precise relationship of respondent to computer use/ relation of his 
================================================================= 
involvement in comparison with his role. 
======================================== 
Reasons given for discontinuance (if any lA use) 
================================ 
Any computer facilities that might potentially be of use to you 
personally ? 
------------
405 
Which aspect of the system is of most use to you ? 
================================================= 
Any facilities or features you would like to see added? 
------------------------------------------------------~
Any aspects of the system particularly difficult ? Or 
==========================================================~~===== 
inconvenient? 
-------------
Any aspects of your job facilitated ? 
=================================== 
Relevance 
---------
Has adopting the technology necessitated a role change? 
======================================================= 
Has your view of the system changed since before you used it ? 
============================================================ 
Comments 
--------
406 
3. Interview checklist - intermediaries and system providers 
Date of interview: 
Name: 
Organization: 
Division: 
Title: 
Responsibilities: 
Topics for discussion: 
1. What facilities have been made available to directors ? 
2, What were the circumstances surrounding the introduction ? 
who initiated the development 
what part did the s-m play in deciding on what would be made 
available? 
3 • What benefits accrue to the s-m? 
4. What were the objectives for the trial? 
5. What training facilities were offered to them? 
6. What are the main difficulties I problems with senior 
managerial computing ? 
7. What has been the result of the trial? 
has it been successful? 
in what way? 
8. Has there been any evaluation of the effect of the 
introduction (formal or informal)? 
9. Are any more trials or introductions planned? 
what purpose will be served? 
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4. Interview checklist - second interviews 
Name: 
Date: 
Organization: 
1st Int. No,: 
1 Any missing data: 
2 Category 1st time: 
3 What technology do you have now? 
4 What systems are available now? 
Dl What kind of system do you use and what is available to you ? 
Personal (P/C) 
Terminal 
Executel I OPD 
Other 
Connected to m/frame 
Other connections 
Internal data: 
File draw 
Data analysis 
Analysis information 
Archiving (assassin) 
Diary management 
Messaging 
Budgetary control 
other 
External data: 
Viewdata 
External database 
Other 
Messaging: 
Wordprocessing: 
Modelling: 
Available Use 
Available Use 
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Spreadsheet: 
Expert system: 
Other: 
Dl.S What use do you make of these facilities; what do you use 
them for ? 
D2 Personally, which aspect of the system is of most use to you ~ 
Why ? 
D3 Which aspect is of least use, and why ? 
D4 How much use do you make of the system 
per day : no. of times ~ duration 
per week: 
Slight user 
<15 mins per day <1 hour per week 
Moderate user 
<1 hour per day <5 hours per week 
Heavy user 
<2 occasions per week 
<10 occasions per week 
<5 hours per day <25 hours per week <SO occasions per week 
D4.5 If messaging is significant, how many people have screens 
and can access the same system as you.? 
DS Please rank the facilities according to preference 
DS.S Based on your experience so far, are there any facilities 
or features you would like to see added ? 
D6 Why do you use the system yourself rather than have somebody 
else do it for you ? (and provide you with printouts, summaries 
or word of mouth results) 
D7 What aspects of your job are facilitated by the system ? 
DB How does this come about ? 
D9 Has your view of the system changed at all since you started 
using it ? 
D8x How did the system come to be developed for you ? 
D8y Who was involved in the decision/choice as to the nature of 
the system ? 
D10 How have the facilities been developed, by whom, and to what 
extent were you involved ? 
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Dll Whose idea was it to install/develop the system ? 
Management services 
Computer dept 
OR/MS 
Other 
*** Dl2 What aspect really most influenced you to agree to using it 
=====================================================================: 
Dl3 What is your opinion of manuals/written materials 
Dl4 " 
Dl5 Has the 
device ? 
" training course/facilities 
quality of these been a factor in your use of the 
Dl6 How long was spent learning how to use it ? 
Dl7 Was the time spent learning about the system I learning how to 
use the system justified, in your opinion ? 
********* 
(Special this respondent) 
You had intended to use the pc for 
access to the personnel databases; 
in order to explore data yourself, 
to explore the age structure. 
messaging 
budgeting 
What are your views now about computing for yourself? 
Have your views changed since last time? 
You did consider that computing was increasingly going up the 
organization - do you think it will now percolate to the rest of 
the board? 
Comments 
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Appendix 5 
List of variables and definitions 
Uf Usage factor 
a 0 Not available (Av 5 or 6) 
n l No use (rejected although available in some sense) 
d 2 Discontinued after adoption 
s 3 Slight use <15 mins/day <1 hr /wk <2 occasions/wk 
m 4 Moderate use < 1 hr/day < 5 hrs /wk < 10 occasions /wk 
h 5 Heavy use > 1 hr/day > 5 hrs /wk > 10 occasions /wk 
1 6 Lapsed leader (small business) 
Rf Responsibility 
(These represent rankings within one organization. 
organizations there is little basis for comparison). 
Between 
1 Slight 
2 Moderate 
3 Heavy 
A Age 
1 <30 
2 31-40 
3 41-50 
4 51-60 
5 61+ 
Pe Prior experience 
1 None 
2 Slight 
3 Moderate 10 
4 Considerable > 
Ft Formal training 
0 None 
< 10 occasions 
- 50 II 
so II 
1 Slight: (< 20 days,seminars etc) 
2 Moderate: 20 - 60 man days 
3 Extensive: 3 mnths - 1 year 
4 Specialist: 1 year + 
He Home computer 
0 not owned 
1 owned, but no use by respondent 
2 slight use 
3 considerable use 
Si system intra processes 
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of hands on use 
II 
II 
a initiated by user 
b initiated by others 
u initiation uncertian 
n not applicable 
Df Design of facilities 
a user involved in design or choice of his facilities 
b user not involved (offered a standard product) 
n not applicable 
Ti Technical involvement 
a user designs own spreadsheets, programs etc 
b no active technical work 
n not applicable 
Eb Formal Education subject bias 
s science 
e engineering 
l law 
f finance 
a arts 
Ca Main Career bias 
Marketing I sales 
Finance I accounting 
Personnel 
Production management 
Data processing 
Education 
Mgt Services 
Administration 
Local govt. 
Av Availability 
1 Openly available 
2 Readily available 
3 Reasonably available 
4 Available with difficulty 
5 Not available 
6 Not available - no system 
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Appendix 6 
Examples of summarised interview accounts 
1. A respondent from ABC 
S03 
Uf Rf Pe A Ft He Si Df Ti Eb Ca 
rr3 
Name: 
Date : 30/8/84 
Title: Director of Personnel and Management Services Dept 
Responsibilities: Staff: 128 in personnel and 116 in MSD 
NB: MSD includes the computer dept, which includes a voluble, 
and articulate advocate - * a man who seems to aspire to head of 
MSD and is personally interested in computing being a powerful 
and important force in the organization. [Was promoted to this 
position 6 months later] 
The broad view of the board of directors' role can be seen as a 
management team that decided policy matters together; in addition 
to this general role, each director had one or more "portfolios". 
Time in organization: 20 
Age: 50-60 
Work experience: 
Gl4 Time in (and nature of) previous functions (reverse order): 
1 -
3 -
Career summary 
--------------
--------------
function * 
Personnel 
Management Services 
Business Area Manager 
(Largely planning role) 
Personnel 
Mainly personnel with a spell in planning. 
Education 
---------
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time (yrs) 
8.5 
1.5 
2 
8 
BA Degree 
maths, not 
months. 
from Cambridge in English and Law. No science or 
even at 'o' level. Harvard Business School for 2 
Previous computer exposure 
--------------------------
G23 Computer education: 
School 
College/University 
Training Agencies 
Manufacturers 
In-house 
Own reading 
Other 
(time in any category) 
Concepts 
(none) 
(none) 
(none) 
3/4 days 
Techniques 
(IBM seminars)** 
(none) 
Products 
3/4 days 
(IBM seminars) 
** "IBM seminars included familiarization with products and 
possibilities. No programming; no technical stuff." 
Other computer exposure (prior to present system adoption) 
Direct (Own use hands on) None 
Indirect None 
Respondent was involved in the computerisation of personnel records, 
responsible for introduction- " ... the first to do so in*·" 
"I believe in leading in computing." 
Home computer ? Yes 
Do you use it? "No. Kids use it. Not me yet. Not games." 
Category of user 
---------------
Discontinued after trial. (At first he claimed that he was a 
direct user , but after some discussion explained that he made 
"very little use of it, now.") 
Factors in adoption 
=================== 
"Because of MSD hat. I took it and did some experimenting and 
found out the potential. I will now chuck it. I know the 
potential. It has served its purpose." 
The respondent described at some length the use the salesmen made 
of computers in their homes (cf *). His reason for trying it was 
to see what it was like for the others to use. 
The respondent was asked to rank his reasons for adopting the 
system: 
1 Curiosity 
2 Because I'm MSD director 
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3 In case it was of use (to me) 
"I believe in leading in computing." 
[The respondent was a member of the Computer and Systems Steering 
Panel. Cf *· He is director of MSD] 
Facilities available 
==================== 
In common with the other directors, a number of different 
facilities had been offered based on l) a vdu terminal linked to 
mainframe and internal databases and 2) a small screen linked to 
Prestel and internal and external databases. (This latter 
arrangement was replaced at some point by one terminal for all 
purposes). The system facilities available included: 
Summaries of internal data (financial and operating data) 
Analyses of internal databases (personnel records) 
Messaging (to other board members and immediate subordinates) 
Diary management 
Other facilities are available within * (eg assassin archiving 
system, plus many others) but it is not clear that any others 
were attempted by this respondent. 
System use prior to discontinuance 
================================== 
"Fits and starts over maybe 2 weeks. Maybe less than 10 hours 
altogether." 
"Now, I make very little use of the system." 
Reasons given for discontinuance 
================================ 
"The limited personnel data was of only marginal use." 
"Little 
by me. 
data or information requires instant action or response 
So, most data comes in written form- quite properly." 
"I can see the potential of having this kind of data [personnel 
database] in the system; but as it is at the moment it's no use." 
"At the end of the day, decisions are made by debate about 
judgements." 
Any aspects of the system particularly awkward ? 
=============================================== 
"Having to use the keyboard was an irritation - not being able to 
type fast." 
"Getting into the system was a problem- the codes and so on." 
(Opening incantation]. 
Any aspects of your job facilitated ? 
=================================== 
"Very limited ... none." 
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"Not at all. But potentially possible." 
Relevance 
========= 
"There are insufficient 'have to have ' features, 
'nice to have' features." 
rather than 
"There is a distinction between judgement and calculation." 
What sort of information would you like - that would be useful 7 
--------------~~----~-------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------
"[When I get my new PC] I will use my new PC for access to 
personnel database, messaging; getting a feel for the age 
structures of the workforce, because of the need to reduce the 
workforce - what will happen to the age structure ?" 
"I hope to play with the database myself.' 
"Maybe use it for budgeting" 
System introduction processes 
============================= 
"Management Services did the whole thing. 
involved at all." 
I was not personally 
Has your view of the system changed since before you used it 7 
============================================================ 
"Limitations exposed more clearly." 
Your views on the role of computers in management 
================================================= 
"Essential for the organization ... Increasingly going up the 
organization. Some of my colleagues have PCs. I will be shortly 
using one." 
[None of his colleagues use a PC except * who is a special 
case] 
"There is a distinction between judgement and calculation." 
"There are insufficient 'have to have' 
'nice to have' features." 
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features, rather than 
S07 
Uf Pe A Ft He Si Df Ti Eb 
RR07 Interview Summary 
==========:====== 
Date; 13/ll/84 
Name : 
Organization: * 
Title: Group Technical Director 
Responsibilities: As a diversified group, * requires group 
technical coordination. The function employs 250 staff and has a 
#:23m annual spend. Group functions undertaken by the Technical 
Directorate include quality control, standards and procedures, 
technical strategy, profitability, external dialogues with EEC 
[but note *'s function], PR etc. R & Dis the main function. In 
addition, two special projects are handled centrally: * business 
development and MOD business development. (These are handled 
centrally until they can be set free to a life of their own; 
presumably they are in this division as much because of *'s 
obvious and very considerable talents, as for any technical or 
administrative reason.) 
Time in organization: 2.5 yrs 
Age range: 30-40 
Work experience: (prior to present organization): 
=============== 
Prior to * 
previously 
development 
engineering. 
had 2 senior roles in a similar technical 
was involved in computer hardware 
and before that in process and 
capacity; 
/software 
electronic 
Gl4 Time in (and nature of) previous functions (reverse order): 
1 -
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 
Education 
========= 
function * 
Technical Director - * 
Technical Director -
Tech. Manager(?) Controls - * 
11 11 (Scotland) 11 
Systems Development mgr (USA) 11 
Mgr - h'ware/s'ware development 
Development engineer (electronics) 
Process engineer 11 
time (yrs) 
2.5 
2 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1.5 
1.5 
Cambridge double 1st in engineering and electrical sciences. 
MIEE and AMBIM. 
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Maths and physics at 'A'level. 
Previous computer exposure 
========================== 
G23 Computer education: (time in any category} 
Concepts Techniques Products 
None School 
College/University None (but wrote programs for scientific 
use) 
Training Agencies 
Manufacturers 
In-house 
Own reading 
Other 
None 
None 
? (maybe some) 
? 
? 
Other computer exposure (prior to present system adoption) 
Direct (Own use hands on) 
Indirect Experience of developing/observing operational 
systems (nb past role in s'ware development) 
Yes Horne computer ? 
Do you use it ? Yes - games with kids. 
category of user 
=============== 
The respondent claimed to be a current direct user. There was an 
* pc on the desk. But see comments below. The respondent stated 
later that his usage was minimal, and in fact he may better be 
described as a "discontinued user" because he had sufficient 
extensive knowledge of the systems to suggest to me that his 
usage must have been much higher at some earlier time. 
[Categorised as slight user] 
Factors in adoption 
=================== [Not directly elicited!] 
Facilities available 
==================== 
In common with other directors at this location the respondent 
had a pc linked to a mainframe. No mention of the pc facilities 
(spreadsheet, wordprocessing and database) was made, however 
(although he knew of them, see comments at end). The mainframe 
DSS systems included extensive organizational and divisional 
databases, financial systems and messaging. The respondent 
described the following elements: 
Cost budgeting 
Competition data analysis (market competitors) 
Company financial model 
Messaging (Exac) 
Mailing (?) 
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Project management (?) [Some PERT~based system.] 
He clearly knew enough about some of these systems to imply that 
he must have used them at some time. 
System use (or use prior to discontinuance) 
========== 
"Minimal" 
"1 - 2 hours per week at most." 
"I know I should use it but ... if the right systems were 
there ... I don't spend much time in the office." 
Nature of use 
-------------
"Messaging is not useful." (To me?] "My secretary uses the 
messaging extensively- I tend to use it through her." 
"The financial system is the most useful. 
used." 
The others aren't 
[Contrast this with*, where the reverse was true ~ but see the 
reasons for* using the messaging!] 
Reasons given for discontinuance/or non-use 
=========================================== 
"I want databases that don't exist." 
"I ask my accountant [for financial data] - he's down the 
corridor." 
"I ... get my planner to do planning for me." 
"If I was one level down I would use it." 
"I would do more if I had the time." 
"Interruptions are a real problem.' [And I can personally vouch 
for the truth of this!] 
Which aspect of the system is of most use to you ? 
================================================= 
"Financial data" [But this was not all that much use.] 
Why do you use the system yourself (rather than have somebody else 
================================== 
use it for you?) 
[Not elicited] 
Any facilities or features you would like to see added? 
====================================================== 
"Yes - there are loads of things if I had the time to specify 
them." " 
"I want databases that don't exist." 
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*** [I would like] " graphics and presentation slides etc" 
This is very important; if I could develope this it would be 
extremely useful ... Bulk communication." 
"Communication 
fundamental!" 
to others - this will be most important; 
"Search in data; search in textual data." 
[None of these items is based on realistic appreciation of 
current difficulties in relation to own personal usage; rather 
they are partly his own vision - a highly developed and 
intellectual vision of what is to come in computing, and 
partly idealised pictures of forthcoming* products.] 
How would you rank the facilities according to preference? 
========================================================= 
"Financial system is the most used." 
Any aspects of the system particularly difficult ? Or 
================================================================= 
inconvenient? 
-------------
-- ---
"Upper case characters" 
mainframe's sensitivity 
"pernickety" care ] 
[this presumably refers 
to upper/lower case, 
to the 
requiring 
"Bad choice of control commands - characters scattered over the 
keyboard." [And hence hard to remember] 
"Error prone" [Not certain what this refers to, but presumably 
the system falls over occasionally and has various software 
wrinkles.] 
Any aspects of your job facilitated ? 
=================================== 
"Marginal as to whether the system helps me personally at all." 
Relevance 
---------
[Very marginal] 
"The system is not the most valuable thing ... it's strong on 
financial things only." 
[In no respect was anything shown to be directly related to the 
respondent's job or personal requirements.] 
Relation to strategic decisions 
=============================== 
Respondent stated that his use of the system did not relate to 
strategic decision making. 
System introduction processes 
-----------------------------
"GIS put the system up." "I wasn't involved at all in the design 
or specification- the system is a standard product." 
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"But I will do in the future (specify his needs] . " 
Quality of written materials - a factor in usage ?" 
"Yes- not good enough." 
"Not enough" 
How long spent learning the system and was it justified? 
"3 to 4 hours- and no; minimal justification." 
Has adopting the technology necessitated a role change? 
==~==================================================== 
"No." 
Has your view of the system changed since before you used it ? 
============================================================ 
[Not asked] 
Your views on the role of computers in management 
================================================= [Here the respondent gave a brilliant and articulate exposition 
on the potential of computers in management. I wish I could do as 
well with advance notice of the question and a set of notes!] 
"Managerial activities are divided into two sets: 
one- operational jobs, people, budgets ... routine; this can be 
helped by computers .... PERT, spreadsheet, database etc 
two - means deciding what to decide about; it is critical but 
least developed, tends to be external; the information doesn't 
exist" 
[And so on; a superb discussion of the important elements of 
managerial computing.] 
"At the top, one tends 
computer could help, but 
the corporate database 
information " 
to go to staff [for information]; the 
there is a short timescale, urgency 
is the last place to look for the 
"If the organization has a matrix structure [meaning the use of 
inter-departmental project teams, which presumably * was implying 
happened in*] ... then the organization must have a computer ... . 
Some company structures preclude any but computer control ... eg 
NASA as a structure." 
[This represents the classic systems orientation to 
organizational matters. Of course none of this relates to his own 
personal use of computing for himself] 
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Appendix 7 
Characteristics of the small firm respondents 
Table Acl Computer training in small firms 
number (n=l6) 
None 3 
Slight (<10 days FTE*) 11 
Moderate (10 - 20 days FTE) 2 
Extensive (> 20 days FTE) 0 
Table A.2 Prior direct (hands-on) involvement 
None 12 
Slight (<10 occasions) 1 
Moderate (10-50 occasions) 1 
Considerable (>SO occasions) 2 
Table A.3 Prior managerial experience of implementation 
Has had prior managerial 
involvement with computer 5 
implementation 
No prior involvement 11 
Note: FTE ~ Full time equivalent. 
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Appendix 8 
Statistical background for small firm analysis 
The statistical test used here has been chosen to suit the modest 
amount of available data and in the absence of knowledge about 
underlying distributions. Non-parametric tests are used because 
the data un the behavioural typology scale is on an ordinal 
rather than interval scale and no assumptions can be made about 
normality (on the contrary, it can be assumed that data on the 
firm size distribution will be skewed in the larger population). 
In order to test for association between two sets of independent 
data, several bivariate non-parametric correlation tests are 
available; the choice of tests with ordinal data is between 
Spearman's rho and Kendall's tau. Spearman's rho is suitable 
where there are few tied ranks in the data and Kendall's tau is 
suitable where there are many tied ranks (Siegel 1956), which is 
the case with the data employed here. 
The data matrix on which the statistic is based is as follows: 
Figure A.l Matrix showing firm size against behavioural category 
(N=14) 
Behavioural 
Pattern 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Firm Size 
Category: 
1 2 
1 
1 
l 
2 
1 1 
3 4 6 
1 2 1 
1 
1 
1 
The calculations for Kendall's tau have been performed using the 
SPSS-X computer package (Nie, Hull 1981) and detailed workings 
are not shown here. The appropriate value of Kendall's tau c 
has been taken, giving a value of -.054847 at a significance 
level of 0.0049. 
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Appendix 9 
Some Practical Implications of the findings 
It is perhaps an unfortunate outcome of this research project 
that a rather pessimistic view of the potential of present-day 
direct computing for top level managers has emerged. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to derive from the findings a number 
of implications which hopefully can be turned to positive effect. 
These implications are presented in terms of implications for 
managers, systems developers and people involved in 
implementation: 
1 Implications for senior managers 
It has been an important finding of this research that in many 
instances senior managers take up direct computing and expend 
varying degrees of time and effort, only to find that the rewards 
in an informational sense are not significant. Although managers 
will still wish to be associated with computing for various 
leaqership-related reasons, it would seem to make sense at 
present to limit time spent learning detailed operating 
procedures unless it is quite clear that a sensible advantage 
will ensue. It must be said that for most senior general 
managers, the opportunities for such advantage do not seem to be 
frequent. (Although there will of course be instances of specific 
specialist systems which replace normal information sources, such 
as personnel records). 
In order to limit wasted effort expenditure it may be advisable 
for the manager to spend much more time with system-providing 
teams during system design and choice activities, when the 
manager's inputs will be most valuable, and correspondingly less 
time alone learning system details after the choice has been 
made. In particular, the use of senior management as a test-bed 
for new systems seems entirely inappropriate when there are far 
better ways of testing these systems. Finally, it is always 
possible that some technological breakthrough will occur in the 
immediate future such that senior managers will find distinct 
advantage from some form of direct computer use. However, there 
have been any number of false dawns already and in the light of 
the special characteristics of senior managerial behaviour and 
decision making, it seems unlikely that any really profound 
changes will occur in the short term which would invalidate these 
comments. 
The position in the smaller firm is of course somewhat different; 
here, the chief executives were involved in a project-management 
capacity in the implementation of systems intended primarily for 
organizational efficiency. A number of firms in the sample showed 
evidence of computer systems which for one reason or another had 
not entirely fulfilled the expectations of their owners; this is 
in contrast to the somewhat optimistic views about small-business 
computing sometimes expounded in the literature. In view of the 
common role of the chief executive in a project-management 
capacity it would seem to make sense if there were training 
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facilities available which were specifically designed to help him 
undertake this specialised responsibility, in contrast to the 
technical and software oriented training which appears to be all 
that there is readily available. Such computer-management 
training may represent a good investment for the small business 
manager if it increases the chances of his achieving more 
successful system implementations and reduces his requirement to 
learn experientially. 
2 Implications for systems developers 
This is perhaps the most difficult section of all in which to 
suggest appropriate directions for development. The research has 
indicated that managers have discontinued their computer use 
when, apart from man/machine interface difficulties, they have 
perceived that system use offers little direct advantage to 
them. However, it has been shown that where systems are 
successful, they have been directly interwoven into the manager's 
current roles; this implies that designing systems which are 
specific to a manager's specific operational responsibilities (if 
he has them) is more likely to be successful than providing 
generalised decision information. (For example, many of the 
system users in this study rejected their organization's 
financial decision support system). It seems likely that close 
study of an individual manager's specific roles and activities 
is more conducive to useful system design than the provision of 
"off-the-shelf" systems. 
Certainly, attention to man/machine interface issues is necessary 
but it must be stressed that this in itself does not appear to be 
a sufficient condition for sustained system use; such use 
requires ongoing effort and managers are unlikely to undertake 
this unless (saving perhaps the implications of leadership-role 
related issues) there is a relevant informational advantage. The 
problem lies in identifying such an informational requirement 
bearing in mind the inherent difficulty of competing with the 
manager's current and probably well-developed network of 
information sources. 
It is possible that developments in Expert systems may in the 
future be useful to senior managers; the development of these 
systems to incorporate general managerial expertise may be 
relevant as a supplement to internal resources. Alternatively, it 
may be useful to develop systems which reflect the manager's own 
organization-specific expertise in order to act as a pool of 
knowledge to be tapped by his colleagues or successors when he 
leaves the company. Whatever the nature of the information, to be 
useful it must reflect the real needs of managers in the special 
context of senior managerial roles and behaviours and must 
constitute an advantage over other sources. In practice this may 
be a very tall order in terms of presently available technology 
and, more especially, in terms of our understanding of management 
processes. 
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3 Implications for system implementers and support personnel 
A model of the senior managerial adoption process has been put 
forward which should provide significant insights for system 
implementers. In particular, attention to the appropriate 
adoption factors should ease problems of introducing a direct 
system in the first instance. However, the research evidence 
shows that once having adopted a computer system there lS a very 
real danger of disenchantment arising from unrealistic 
expectations, leading to discontinuance. The logical solution to 
the disenchantment effect is to involve the manager himself to a 
far greater extent in system design and choice activities, so 
that he will have made a greater contribution to these activities 
and will be more familiar with the nature of the systems which he 
can expect to receive. Such participation in design processes is 
hardly a new recommendation {see the implementation literature 
review in chapter 4); nevertheless, the circumstances found in 
the case studies were far removed indeed from such participation 
and the necessity apparently needs restating. 
Of course, the implementation of computer systems where the 
operator has complete discretion over his system use {although 
his adoption choice may be constrained!) represents a special 
situation for the systems implementor. In the case of the busy 
senior manager, the initial problem may be to persuade him to 
expend sufficient time with the development team during the 
design and choice phases of the project in order to obviate the 
problems of mismatch between the systems capability and the 
manager's real roles and activities. Another problem arises with 
learning processes; the manager will need to acquire sufficient 
detailed operating knowledge to enable him to make use of the 
system effectively and in the shortest possible time. This 
implies the provision of good quality training, helpful and well-
ordered documentation and a reliable and discreet back-up, advice 
and help facility. In the cases reviewed in this research, at 
least two of these items were nearly always absent; system 
documentation in particular was almost universally castigated by 
managers from all cases. It must be pointed out, though, that 
some managers overcame an apparently conspicuous lack of support 
in order to utilise their systems; nevertheless, any sensible 
steps taken to smooth the user's path must pay dividends in terms 
of an improved likelihood of significant system usage being made. 
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Appendix 10 
Opportunities for further research 
During the course of the project a great number of opportunities 
arose for specifying further research. These came from ideas 
generated from the literature review, during the field work and 
during the writing-up phase. They are a reflection of issues 
which were deemed to be tangential to the main focus of the 
project, or arising from ideas or problems which just could not 
be resolved within the project time constraints, or from the 
implications of the research findings. Out of a large array of 
possibilities only a small number will be discussed here; two 
are presented in a little detail with a suggested methodology and 
the rest are merely sketched out in terms of a few sentences 
which contain a germ of an idea for development. 
1. Information in the strategic decision process 
Many organizations have extensive decision-oriented computer 
systems which provide outputs intended for strategic and policy 
decision. However, managers use other sources of information 
(Mintzberg 1975a) so that there is a range of stimuli which may 
act to influence decision choices. Additionally, the nature of 
decision processes is such (see for example Pettigrew 1973 and 
1974) that it is rarely the case that decisions are made simply 
on the basis of well-quantified and analysed options. 
The research question relates to the routing of computer-based 
information from the organizational decision support system 
through to its eventual inclusion and influence in a high-level 
decision situation. What evidence there is (see for example 
Grinyer 1983, or Martin and Winch 1984) suggests that the 
information path is often via specialist staff personnel. 
However, it is generally an act of faith that DSS and related 
systems have a specific effect on decision outcomes and there is 
a clear need to document rigorously the social processes by which 
these effects occur and also the value of the information in 
terms of its real influence on the decision outcome. 
In order to study the effects of computer information in the 
decision process, it would be necessary to study the decision-
making process itself with some care. This will involve following 
through decision processes within a target organization using 
participant observation and interview techniques in conjunction 
with an investigation of the computer-based information. The 
general approach therefore would be that of a case-based, 
qualitative investigation which will analyse the research 
phenomena in some depth. 
2. Towards a managerial support technology 
A key implication of the research findings was that the present 
technology of computer-based tools for senior management was 
inappropriately oriented with respect to senior managerial real 
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roles and activities. The question immediately arises, then, as 
to what kind of computer-based tools would be personally 
appropriate to senior management; this leads on immediately to 
the· question as to how this issue is to be researched and 
resolved - apparently a very difficult problem. Most information 
technology developments in this context seem to be based either 
on matching existing systems to current problems, or to 
developing new technologies in the absence of immediate 
applications. By way of contrast, it might prove fruitful to 
perform a study of an individual manager's real roles and 
activities with a view not to matching (or mismatching) present 
technology to his tasks, but towards specifying those key aspects 
of his work which might most fruitfully be supported by a future 
technology. Such a research effort would entail reviewing 
previous studies of behavioural aspects of managerial work as a 
potential basis for documenting key managerial activities. This 
proposal is both speculative and long-term, and represents a 
significant departure from the current man/machine interface 
research mainstream. 
3. Computing in the small firm 
The small business area seems overdue for an empirical research 
effort which addresses areas of special concern. On the one hand, 
the issues and context of small-business computing are distinctly 
different from those of larger organizations; on the other hand 
there appears to have been very little basic research into the 
realities in the field (although a very recent British study by 
Wroe (1986) may have gone some way towards filling the gap). 
Comparative studies between large and small computing 
environments, and perhaps across different industrial sectors, 
which indicate the differences in terms of relative strengths and 
weaknesses would be very valuable. A key research question 
relates to the special informational needs of small businesses, 
and how these might be satisfied in the context of sparse 
internal resources. 
4. Support for computer users: the role of documentation 
The present study indicated a distinct deficiency in the support 
facilities available to (or perhaps utilised by) the managers as 
they addressed the problems of direct computing. The general 
topic of support in this context needs some investigation in 
order to examine in more detail how these facilities were 
supplied and used, in order to establish how they might best be 
improved. In particular, the written documentation consisting of 
so-called "user manuals" and other paperwork supplied by computer 
hardware and software suppliers was almost universally castigated 
by the managers. Although there already is a body of work in this 
general area, there seems to be a real need for an investigation 
which identifies the current needs of managers for written 
materials supporting their computer use, and which can suggest a 
suitable role for these materials in the general context of user 
support. 
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s. Personal learning costs for direct computer users 
The research showed that managers expended considerable personal 
effort in their attempts to utilise direct computer systems; 
discontinuing users complained of the effort costs in acquiring 
detailed operating skills, and continuing users tended to 
polarise their use on one system facility presumably in order to 
minimise ongoing learning costs. However, the precise nature of 
tnese "learning costs" is not known, in the sense that neither 
the psychological nor the technological parameters can be 
~pecified, except perhaps in the broadest possible terms. There 
has been already been some work done on learning protocols, for 
example in respect of wordprocessing systems see Carroll and Mack 
(1984). But clearly much remains to be done with regard to the 
nature of the learning effort involved in different systems and 
under different circumstances, and particularly with respect to 
the general problem of reducing those learning costs for the 
user, 
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